

601175

PREM

15

**CLOSED
UNTIL**

2001

123

1970 MIDDLE EAST

CYPHER/CAT A

SECRET

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1892

19 JUNE 1970

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1892 OF 19 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PARIS MOSCOW CAIRO AMMAN BEIRUT TEL AVIV AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

TO BE ON DESKS IN FCO BY 9 A.M. TOMORROW, SATURDAY.

MY TEL NO 1852: US INITIATIVE ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

SISCO SUMMONED MILLARD THIS EVENING TO GIVE HIM AN OUTLINE OF THE AMERICAN IDEAS.

2. HE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS CONSIDERED THAT THE TIME WAS PROPITIOUS TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE AND TALKS BETWEEN THE PARTIES UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES. FOR THIS PURPOSE THE AMERICANS PROPOSED THAT A SHORT FORM OF MANDATE SHOULD BE TRANSMITTED TO JARRING. SISCO THEN HANDED OVER THE TEXT CONTAINED IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM, WHICH AS YOU WILL SEE, IS DRAFTED IN THE FORM OF A REPORT FROM JARRING TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL. SISCO WENT ON TO SAY THAT IF BY THE JOINT EFFORTS OF THE FOUR POWERS THE PRINCIPALS, ISRAEL, UAR AND JORDAN, COULD BE PERSUADED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO SUCH A DOCUMENT, IT SHOULD THEN BE TRANSMITTED TO JARRING. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, HE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NOT YET FULLY WORKED OUT THE EXACT FORM OF FOUR POWER PROCEDURE BY WHICH THIS SHOULD BE DONE. THIS POINT, HOWEVER, SHOULD RAISE NO DIFFICULTY IF THE PARTIES AND THE FOUR POWERS AGREED GENERALLY TO THE PROPOSAL.

3. COMMENTING ON THE TEXT, SISCO POINTED OUT THAT IT PROPOSED INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AT THE OUTSET ON THE BASIS OF ACCEPTANCE BY THE PARTIES OF RESOLUTION 242, ASWELL AS ACCEPTANCE BY EGYPT AND JORDAN OF THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL, AND BY ISRAEL OF WITHDRAWAL. IT FURTHER ENJOINED ON THE PARTIES TO OBSERVE A CEASE-FIRE FOR A PERIOD OF AT LEAST THREE MONTHS. THE AMERICANS HAD CONSIDERED AN INDEFINITE CEASE-FIRE BUT HAD COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT ONE OF LIMITED DURATION WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO BE FEASIBLE.

/4.

SECRET

SECRET

2.

4. THE US WOULD BE MAKING IT CLEAR ORALLY TO THE PARTIES THAT THE CEASEFIRE, TO BE EFFECTIVE, MUST INCLUDE AN UNDERSTANDING ON BOTH SIDES TO STOP SHOOTING ON THE GROUND, IN THE AIR AND ACROSS THE CEASEFIRE LINES. IT WOULD ALSO MEAN THAT THE UAR (AND THE USSR) WOULD HAVE TO REFRAIN FROM CHANGING THE MILITARY STATUS QUO BY PLACING SAMs WITHIN THE STAND-OFF ZONE ALONG THE CANAL. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS, SISCO SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD THEIR IDEAS AS TO WHAT THE WIDTH OF THAT ZONE SHOULD BE AND THAT THERE WOULD BE A SIMILAR BAN ON NEW INSTALLATIONS ON THE ISRAELI SIDE IN A ZONE EAST OF THE CANAL.

5. SISCO SAID THAT THE US AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV HAD ALREADY BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PUT THESE PROPOSALS TO MRS MEIR. HE HAD SO FAR HAD NO REPORT OF THEIR CONVERSATION BUT PROMISED TO LET MILLARD KNOW THE OUTCOME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE US REPRESENTATIVES WOULD ALSO APPROACH THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UAR AND JORDAN ABOUT MID-DAY TOMORROW. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD INFORM DOBRYNIN TOMORROW MORNING AND THE FRENCH WOULD BE INFORMED AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME. HMG WERE THEREFORE THE FIRST TO BE INFORMED, APART FROM THE ISRAELIS.

6. SISCO SAID THAT THE AMERICANS REGARDED THIS AS A FOUR POWER OPERATION, AND INTENDED TO MAKE NO ANNOUNCEMENT FOR SEVERAL DAYS IN ORDER TO GIVE THE DIPLOMATIC MOVES A CHANCE OF SUCCESS.

7. TURNING TO THE QUESTION OF ARMS, SISCO SAID THAT DURING THE PERIOD OF THIS POLITICAL INITIATIVE, WHICH HE PUT AT ABOUT TWO MONTHS, IT WAS NOT INTENDED THAT US DELIVERIES TO ISRAEL WOULD EXCEED THE LEVELS TO WHICH THE US WAS ALREADY COMMITTED BY PAST CONTRACTS. ISRAEL HAD SO FAR RECEIVED 44 PHANTOMS. SHE WOULD RECEIVE 3 MORE IN JULY AND 3 MORE IN AUGUST, BRINGING THE TOTAL UP TO THE 50 PROVIDED FOR IN THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT. OF THE SKYHAWKS 88 HAD BEEN DELIVERED AND THE NUMBER WOULD BE BROUGHT UP TO 100, AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONTRACT, OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS. IN ADDITION, THERE WOULD BE CONTINGENT ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING REPLACEMENTS, BUT IT WOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO THE ISRAELIS THAT THESE WOULD BE INFLUENCED BOTH BY THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CEASEFIRE AND BY THE SUCCESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. SISCO POINTED OUT THAT AS THE LEVEL OF PAST CONTRACTS WOULD NOT BE EXCEEDED DURING JULY AND AUGUST, THIS SOLUTION COULD BE REGARDED AS VERY RESTRAINED. IT WAS DESIGNED TO GIVE THE

SECRET

/INITIATIVE

INITIATIVE THE MAXIMUM CHANCES OF SUCCESS AND THE AMERICANS INTENDED TO TELL EGYPT AND JORDAN ABOUT IT, INCLUDING THE CONTINGENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR REPLACEMENTS. IT WAS TENTATIVELY PROPOSED TO MAKE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK.

8. SISCO THEN DEALT WITH THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE U S INITIATIVE TO THE BILATERALS AND THE FOUR POWER TALKS. HE SAID THAT AS THE DRAFT MANDATE TO JARRING WAS IN A VERY TRUNCATED FORM, IT WOULD NOT OBVIATE THE NEED FOR MORE GUIDANCE TO HIM. WORK ON THIS COULD GO ON BOTH IN THE BILATERALS AND THE FOUR POWER TALKS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE DIPLOMATIC MOVES ARISING FROM THE U S INITIATIVE. HE WAS INCLINED, HOWEVER, TO THINK THAT THERE WAS MORE TO BE HOPED FOR FROM THE BILATERALS THAN FROM THE FOUR POWER TALKS.

9. ON TIMING, SISCO SAID THAT THERE WAS NO SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE IN THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE TWO MONTHS PERIOD WHICH HE HAD MENTIONED IN CONNEXION WITH THE U S INITIATIVE AND THE THREE MONTHS LAID DOWN IN THE CEASEFIRE PROPOSAL. THE LATTER PERIOD HAD BEEN CHOSEN PARTLY IN ORDER TO GIVE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTERS AT THE U N GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN THE AUTUMN TO PLAY A PART. THE U S DID NOT PROPOSE MAKING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A CEASEFIRE A PRE-CONDITION. NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE STARTED WITH OR WITHOUT A CEASEFIRE.

10. HE SAID THAT THE U S HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT THAT THEY EXPECTED A POSITIVE RESPONSE AND THAT IN THIS CONTEXT, IT WAS A VERY STRONG PHRASE FOR THEM TO USE, ESPECIALLY AS THIS PROPOSAL MIGHT DIVIDE AND BRING DOWN THE ISRAELI CABINET. THE AMERICANS WERE ALSO GOING TO PUT EGYPTIAN GOOD FAITH TO THE TEST. IN FACT IT SHOULD BE APPARENT HE SUGGESTED, THAT THE U S GOVERNMENT WERE SHOWING A DEGREE OF RESOLVE WHICH WE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO DETECT IN THEM BEFORE.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO PARIS MOSCOW CAIRO AMMAN BEIRUT AND TEL AVIV.
MR FREEMAN.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FILES
N.E.D.
N.A.D.
ARAB. D.
E.E.S.D.
AMERICAN D.
U.N.D.
P.S.
P.S. TO P.U.S.
SIR E. PECK

MR. PHILLIPS

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A

SECRET

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1893

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
19 JUNE 1970

SECRET.

ADDRESSED TO F.C.O. TELEGRAM NUMBER 1893 OF 19 JUNE REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO PARIS MOSCOW CAIRO AMMAN BEIRUT
TEL AVIV AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM: FOLLOWING IS TEXT:

THE UAR (JORDAN) AND ISRAEL ADVISE ME THAT THEY AGREE:

(A) THAT HAVING ACCEPTED AND INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO
CARRY OUT RESOLUTION 242 IN ALL ITS PARTS, THEY WILL DESIGNATE
REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCUSSIONS TO BE HELD UNDER MY AUSPICES,
ACCORDING TO SUCH PROCEDURE AND AT SUCH PLACES AND TIMES AS I MAY
RECOMMEND, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT AS APPROPRIATE EACH SIDE'S
PREFERENCE AS TO METHOD OF PROCEDURE AND PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE
BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

(B) THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE AFOREMENTIONED DISCUSSIONS IS TO
REACH AGREEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE
BETWEEN THEM BASED ON (1) MUTUAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY THE UAR (JORDAN)
AND ISRAEL OF EACH OTHER'S SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND
POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE, AND (2) ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM
TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN THE 1967 CONFLICT, BOTH IN ACCORDANCE
WITH RESOLUTION 242.

(C) THAT, TO FACILITATE MY TASK OF PROMOTING AGREEMENT AS SET
FORTH IN RESOLUTION 242, THE PARTIES WILL STRICTLY OBSERVE,
EFFECTIVE JULY 1 AT LEAST UNTIL OCTOBER 1, THE CEASEFIRE
RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

F C O PASS IMMEDIATE TO PARIS MOSCOW CAIRO AMMAN BEIRUT AND
TEL AVIV.

MR. FREEMAN

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FILES

N.E.D.

N.A.D.

ARAB. D.

E.E.S.D.

AMERICAN D.

U.N.D.

P.S.

P.S. TO P.U.S.

SIR B. PECK

MR. PHILLIPS

CYPHER/CAT'A'

IMMEDIATE CAIRO
TELEGRAM NO. 727

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
20 JUNE 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELNO. 727 OF 20 JUNE REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW AMMAN TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK
AND BEIRUT.

WASHINGTON TELNOS. 1892 AND 1893: U S INITIATIVE IN THE MIDDLE
EAST.

HEAD OF U S INTERESTS SECTION DELIVERED THIS MORNING THE
TEXT AND A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM MR. ROGERS. THE EGYPTIANS HAD
GONE TO CONSIDERABLE LENGTHS TO ENSURE THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER
SHOULD BE AVAILABLE TO RECEIVE IT BUT HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE
TO POSTPONE HIS DEPARTURE FOR THE HEADS OF ARAB STATES GATHERING
IN TRIPOLI AND BERGUS DELIVERED TEXTS TO GOHAR THE SENIOR UNDER-
SECRETARY.

2. THE MESSAGE AS DELIVERED NATURALLY FOLLOWED THE PREVIEW
IN WASHINGTON TELNO. 1892. THE FORMULA ON AIRCRAFT DELIVERIES
WAS ENTIRELY FRANK AND BERGUS HAD AND USED DISCRETION TO GIVE
THE FIGURES IN PARAGRAPH SEVEN OF THAT TELEGRAM. THE ASSURANCE
THAT ALTHOUGH CONTINGENCY ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE FOR REPLACEMENTS
THEY WOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED DURING A PERIOD OF NEGOTIATION AND
WOULD DEPEND ON DEVELOPMENTS CAME THROUGH CLEARLY.

3. ACCORDING TO BERGUS GOHAR WAS CONSIDERABLY IMPRESSED AND
SAID THAT HE MOST EARNESTLY HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE
TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE BASIS OF THIS INITIATIVE. AN AIRCRAFT
WAS STANDING BY TO TAKE MR. ROGERS' LETTER TO THE U A R FOREIGN
MINISTER IN TRIPOLI AND IT WOULD BE WITH HIM THIS AFTERNOON.

4. THE MESSAGE TO THE EGYPTIANS INCLUDED A STATEMENT THAT
H M G THE FRENCH AND THE RUSSIANS HAD ALL BEEN INFORMED. WE
SHALL THEREFORE SOON BE TACKLED BY EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS AND I SHALL
BE GRATEFUL FOR URGENT INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LINE TO TAKE. I
SUGGEST THE CENTRAL POINT TO MAKE IS THAT GIVEN THE PRESSURES ON
THE U S ADMINISTRATION THE ARMS DECISION (PARA 2 ABOVE) REPRESENTS
THE VERY MOST FOR WHICH THE EGYPTIANS COULD RATIONALLY HAVE HOPED.

CONFIDENTIAL

/FCO

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

FCO PASS PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, AMMAN, TEL AVIV,
UKMIS NEW YORK AND BEIRUT.

MR. STEWART

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

F I L E S

NR. EASTERN DEPT.
N. AFR. DEPT.
ARABIAN DEPT.
E.E.S.D.
AMERICAN DEPT.
U.N.DEPT.
P.S.
P.S. TO P.U.S.
SIR E. PECK
MR. PHILLIPS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN

CYPHER/CAT A

3

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV
TELEGRAM NUMBER 582

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
28 JUNE 1970

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELEGRAM NO. 582 OF 20 JUNE 1970,
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

GUARD

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NOS. 1892 AND 1893 : MIDDLE EAST.

I ASKED TO SEE MY U.S. COLLEAGUE THIS MORNING TO HEAR ABOUT HIS APPROACH. AFTER SAYING INITIALLY THAT HE UNDERSTOOD WE WERE TO BE GIVEN A FULL ACCOUNT IN LONDON, HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD SEEN ISRAEL PRIME MINISTER LAST NIGHT AT 6 P.M.. THE INTERVIEW HAD LASTED AN HOUR AND A HALF. SHE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER, STRAIGHT OFF THE AIRCRAFT FROM ROME, RAFAEL AND DINITZ (HER DIPLOMATIC ADVISER).

2. THE MEETING HAD NOT GONE WELL. ALTHOUGH HE HAD ON INSTRUCTIONS ASKED HER NOT TO GIVE AN IMMEDIATE REACTION, MRS. MEIR HAD SAID THAT THE U.S. PROPOSALS WERE COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE. SHE HAD IN EFFECT CONCENTRATED ON THE PROPOSED PHANTOM DEAL TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE PARALLEL POLITICAL INITIATIVE. BARBOUR SAID, INCIDENTALLY, THAT MR. EBAN HAD BEEN AT PAINS TO ESTABLISH THAT THE AIRCRAFT DEAL AND THE POLITICAL INITIATIVE WERE PARALLEL, RATHER THAN LINKED. BARBOUR HAD AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO FORMAL LINK NOW, ALTHOUGH IN PRACTICE A LINK MIGHT DEVELOP IN THE FUTURE.

3. ON THIS, IT SEEMS THAT THE PROPOSED AIRCRAFT DEAL IS A BIT MORE COMPLICATED THAN APPEARS FROM SISCO'S ACCOUNT. AS I UNDERSTAND IT, THE SIX PHANTOMS NOW TO BE DELIVERED IN JULY AND AUGUST WOULD, UNDER THE EXISTING CONTRACT, HAVE BEEN DELIVERED IN 1971. BUT IN FACT THE AMERICANS ARE NOW PROPOSING TO DELIVER THIS NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT IN 1971 AS WELL. (THEY ARE ALSO, IT SEEMS, THROWING IN SOME GROUND WEAPONS AS A MAKE-WEIGHT). ON TOP OF THIS, THEY HAVE SAID THAT THEY WILL MAKE MORE AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE IN OCTOBER-DECEMBER THIS YEAR, PROVIDED NEGOTIATIONS HAVE NOT BY THEN REACHED A STAGE WHICH WOULD MAKE THIS INADVISABLE.

/4. IT WAS

4. IT WAS THIS PROVISION WHICH HAD AROUSED MRS. MEIR'S IRE (AND BARBOUR SAID SHE WAS PRACTICALLY IN TEARS AT THE END OF THEIR TALK). SHE EXPECTED THAT NASSER WOULD ACCEPT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS PROPOSED, WITHOUT ANY INTENTION OF REACHING A CONCLUSION, AND WOULD THEN SPIN THEM OUT, SO AS EFFECTIVELY TO PREVENT ISRAEL FROM OBTAINING THE AIRCRAFT SHE NEEDED.

5. BARBOUR HAD URGED MRS. MEIR NOT TO CONSULT THE CABINET ABOUT THE U.S. DEMARCHE. BUT SHE HAD INSISTED THAT SHE MUST DO SO. (INDEED, IN THE POLITICAL SITUATION HERE, WHEN SHE COULD OTHERWISE BE OUTFLANKED BY GAHAL, IT IS HARD TO SEE HOW SHE COULD HAVE DONE ANYTHING ELSE, BUT IT OBVIOUSLY DOES NOT MAKE THE CHANCES OF ACCEPTANCE EASIER, AND SHE NO DOUBT REALISES THIS). IN EFFECT THEREFORE, THE AMERICANS ARE EXPECTING A FURTHER ISRAELI RESPONSE BEYOND MRS. MEIR'S INITIAL REACTION.

6. IT ALSO EMERGED IN OUR TALKS THAT, ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS ARE PRESSING HARD FOR A THREE-MONTH CEASE-FIRE, ACCOMPANIED BY PROVISIONS THAT RUSSIAN WEAPONS SHOULD NOT BE MOVED FORWARD INTO THE CANAL COMBAT ZONE, THEY ARE NOT INSISTING ON THIS AS A BREAKING-POINT. THAT IS TO SAY, IF THEY COULD GET NEGOTIATIONS STARTED, THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEE THEM GO AHEAD WITHOUT A CEASE-FIRE IF NECESSARY. THIS AGAIN IS HARDLY A SELLING-POINT FOR THE ISRAELIS.

7. BARBOUR WENT ON TO CONFIRM THAT THE AMERICANS ARE HOPING TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION IN CAIRO AND AMMAN THAT THEY ARE GOING TO GIVE THE ISRAELIS MORE AIRCRAFT THAN EXISTING COMMITMENTS REQUIRE. THIS IS ALSO THE BURDEN OF MR. ROGER'S PROPOSED STATEMENT NEXT WEEK, OF WHICH HE HAD SEEN THE TEXT, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SHOW IT TO ME. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY HOPING THAT THIS WOULD BE AMENDED, IN CASE IT MISLED PEOPLE.

8. BY CONCENTRATING ON THE AIRCRAFT, MRS. MEIR HAD NOT, IT SEEMS, FOCUSED ON THE TEXT IN WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 1893, WHICH CONTAINS SEVERAL AMBIGUITIES, PARTICULARLY ON THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION. BARBOUR COMMENTED ON THE DIFFICULTIES OF PRESERVING A BALANCE OR, AS HE PUT IT, "CARRYING WATER ON BOTH SHOULDERS". HE ALSO AGREED THAT THE TEXT REQUIRED THE ISRAELIS TO DITE ON THE WORD "WITHDRAWAL" WHICH WOULD NOT BE CONSENTIAL TO THEM.

/9. HE

TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO. 582 TO F.C.O.

- 3 -

9. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT, ALTHOUGH MRS. MEIR WAS NO DOUBT IN HER INITIAL REACTION EXPRESSING HER OWN VIEWS AND THOSE OF SEVERAL OF HER CABINET COLLEAGUES, HE DID NOT THINK SHE WAS REFLECTING THE OPINION OF THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE. ALTHOUGH IN THE SHORT-TERM PEOPLE ACCEPTED THE NEED FOR A FIRM POSITION, MANY ISRAELIS WERE AT THE SAME TIME LOOKING FOR SOME PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT BEFORE LONG.

10. IN GENERAL, HE WAS AFRAID THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD ACT AGAINST THEIR OWN INTERESTS, INCLUDING THEIR INTERNATIONAL IMAGE, BY REJECTING THE AMERICAN IDEAS, WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE ARABS TO PUT THEMSELVES IN THE WRONG.

11. I SAID THAT SISCO HAD EARLIER GIVEN US TO UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WOULD BE A ROLE FOR US TO PLAY. BUT NOW I WAS NOT QUITE SURE WHAT IT WAS. BARBOUR SAID THAT HE WAS SURE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD WELCOME ANY SUPPORT WE COULD GIVE IN AMMAN AND CAIRO.

12. AS YOU SEE, BARBOUR WAS SPEAKING VERY OPENLY (PARTICULARLY IN REVEALING THE POINTS IN PARAS 6 AND 7 ABOVE) AND I HOPE HIS CONFIDENCE CAN BE CAREFULLY RESPECTED.

13. MAY I LEAVE YOU TO REPEAT IT SOMEWHERE IF YOU THINK NECESSARY ?

14. PLEASE SEE R.I.F.T.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON.

MR. BARNES

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

F I L E S

N.E.D.

N.A.D.

ARABIAN DEPT.

E.E.S.D.

AMERICAN DEPT.

U.N. DEPT.

NEWS DEPT.

P.S.

.S. TO P.U.S.

SIR E. MECK

P.A.
M.
23/6

23/6

PRIME MINISTER

Middle East

The Americans warned us sometime ago that they had in mind a double initiative on the Middle East, one part of it being a political initiative to make progress towards a settlement and the other part being a decision on arms for Israel.

Washington Telegram No. 1892 attached, reports this initiative as it has emerged. The political side of it is basically a mandate to Jarring to be backed by the Four, subject to the agreement of the parties, which provides for indirect negotiations and a cease fire for three months. The arms decision is for the delivery of a limited number of additional aircraft within the commitments of past contracts (but on this see also paragraph 3 of Tel Aviv Telegram No. 582).

The Israeli reaction reported in Tel Aviv Telegram No. 582 has already been highly unfavourable. What seems to have most upset Mrs. Meir are the proposals for the delivery of aircraft with the provision that future deliveries might depend on how negotiations were going.

The U.A.R. reaction, though so far of a preliminary kind, seems to be better (Cairo Telegram No. 727).

It is difficult not to suspect that a main purpose of this U.S. initiative is to enable them to make the further arms supplies to Israel for which there is strong domestic

pressure in the most favourable possible circumstances.

Until there is a more considered Arab reaction it is difficult to form a view, but it is not easy to be optimistic that this initiative will get very far.

Am.

June 22, 1970

P. Moon.

4

Prime Minister

There are the F.C.O. comments

SECRET

on the U.S. M.E. proposals.

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1424

23 JUNE 1973

(NE)

Mr.

24/6

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 1424 OF 23 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS 1892, 1893 AND 1899 : MIDDLE EAST.

WE HAVE STUDIED THESE REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN POLICY DECISIONS WITH INTEREST. OUR PRELIMINARY IMPRESSION IS THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE MADE A NUMBER OF STEPS OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE, NOTABLY IN TRYING TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS TO MAKE COMMITMENTS ON "CARRYING OUT" THE RESOLUTION AND ON WITHDRAWAL. MOREOVER, BY ESTABLISHING A LINK BETWEEN THE SUPPLY OF ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT AND PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE JUNE WAR, THE AMERICANS HAVE TAKEN A SIGNIFICANT STEP IN TERMS OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND HAVE, SURPRISINGLY, BEEN PREPARED TO TELL THE ARABS THIS.

2. AT THE SAME TIME, WONDER WHETHER THE AMERICAN DOCUMENT (YOUR SECOND TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE) WILL RECEIVE THE AGREEMENT WHICH THE AMERICANS ARE LOOKING FOR. THE ISRAELI REACTION HAS BEEN PREDICTABLY HOSTILE AND THERE MUST BE REAL DOUBT AS TO WHETHER THE AMERICANS WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE THE ARABS THE ASSURANCE OF ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE WHICH THE LATTER WILL REGARD AS ESSENTIAL. BUT ON THE ARAB SIDE, THERE ARE EQUALLY REAL DIFFICULTIES. THE COMMITMENTS REQUIRED OF THE ISRAELIS WOULD FALL SHORT OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL AND INDEED WOULD GO NO FURTHER THAN THE AMBIGUOUS WORDING OF THE RESOLUTION. THE ABSENCE OF ANY ISRAELI COMMITMENT ON THE REFUGEE PROBLEM, WHICH HAS OCCUPIED SO PROMINENT A PLACE

SECRET

/ IN

SECRET

-2-

IN NASSER'S RECENT STATEMENTS, MAY ALSO CREATE DIFFICULTIES FOR THE EGYPTIANS. YET BY MAKING THESE LIMITED COMMITMENTS THE ISRAELIS WOULD OBTAIN INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARABS ON A BASIS MUCH LESS SUBSTANTIAL IN TERMS OF CLEAR-CUT ASSURANCES ABOUT THE PROVISIONS OF A SETTLEMENT THAN THE LATTER HAVE RECENTLY REQUIRED. THUS WHILE THE EGYPTIANS OUGHT TO RECOGNISE THAT THE AMERICAN DECISION ON AIRCRAFT IS VERY MUCH BETTER THAN THEY FEARED, AND TO SEE ANY COMMITMENT BY ISRAEL ON WITHDRAWAL AS A STEP FORWARD, THEY MAY BE RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS PROPOSED, PARTICULARLY AS THE REPORT BY JARRING TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD BE BOUND TO BE MADE PUBLIC.

3. IN ADDITION, THE AMERICANS HAVE CHOSEN A METHOD OF OPERATING WHICH IS LIKELY TO REDUCE FURTHER THE PROSPECTS OF THEIR PROPOSAL BEING ACCEPTED. THE REASONS WHY THEY SHOULD HAVE WISHED TO BY-PASS THE RUSSIANS ARE CLEAR ENOUGH. BUT THEIR DECISION TO DO SO AT A TIME WHEN THE LATTER HAVE JUST MADE AN IMPORTANT MOVE IN THE DIALOGUE IS LIKELY TO INCREASE SOVIET SUSPICIONS OF AMERICAN MOTIVES AND SO REDUCE THE CHANCES OF THE RUSSIANS PLAYING ANY USEFUL ROLE IN SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE DOUBT WHETHER THE FRENCH WILL BE HAPPY TO SUPPORT THE RE-LAUNCHING OF JARRING ON SO INSUBSTANTIAL A BASIS. THUS THE CHANCES OF THIS INITIATIVE BECOMING A "FOUR POWER OPERATION", AS SISCO SAID, SEEM TO US TO BE SLIM.

4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND (WHICH IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY) PLEASE THANK SISCO FOR GIVING US A FULL AND EARLY ACCOUNT OF THE AMERICAN DECISIONS. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE ARE NATURALLY RELIEVED THAT THE DECISION ON AIRCRAFT WAS OF A KIND THAT PRESENTED THE MINIMUM DANGER TO OUR COMMON INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD. WE HOPE TO REMAIN IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH WITH THE AMERICANS AS THEIR INITIATIVE DEVELOPS. WE ALSO WELCOME THIS INDICATION OF THE AMERICAN DETERMINATION TO WORK FOR PROGRESS AND WE EARNESTLY HOPE THAT THEY WILL BE SUCCESSFUL. FOR OUR PART, WE SHALL DO WHAT WE CAN TO GIVE THEM A FAIR WIND.

SECRET

/ 5.

*The French have speculated that
the Americans may in fact
have spoken to the Russians.*

SECRET

PCO TELEGRAM NO. 1424 TO WASHINGTON

-3-

5. WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL THEN BE ABLE TO ELICIT FURTHER INFORMATION ON SOME OF THE FOLLOWING POINTS :-

(WE LEAVE IT TO YOUR DISCRETION AS TO HOW MANY OF THESE QUESTIONS YOU PUT TO SISCO AT THIS STAGE, ALTHOUGH ALL OF THEM SEEM TO US TO BE IMPORTANT IN CONSIDERING THE AMERICAN DECISIONS).

(A) HOW EXACTLY DOES HE THINK THE MECHANICS OF THE OPERATION WILL WORK? AT WHAT POINT WILL THE FOUR POWERS BE ASKED TO DO WHAT? WHAT REACTION DO THE AMERICANS EXPECT FROM THE FRENCH WHO HAVE SO FAR STAUNCHLY REFUSED TO AGREE TO RELAUNCH JARRING ON AN INSUBSTANTIAL BASIS AND WHO CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THAT THE FOUR MUST WORK TO PRODUCE SUBSTANTIVE GUIDANCE? WE QUESTION WHETHER SO CLEAR-CUT A SITUATION AS SISCO ENVISAGED IN SPEAKING AS HE DID IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 1092 IS LIKELY TO DEVELOP. MUCH MORE PROBABLE IS A RATHER CONFUSED SITUATION IN WHICH THE FRENCH ATTITUDE COULD BE IMPORTANT.

(B) HOW HAVE THE RUSSIANS REACTED TO THE AMERICAN IDEAS? HAVE THEY SHOWN ANY SENSITIVITY TO THE FACT THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE APPROACHED THE U.A.R. WITHOUT CONSULTING THEM AT A TIME WHEN THEY HAD JUST MADE A POSITIVE MOVE IN THE BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE AMERICANS ON POINTS WHICH THE LATTER HAD ALWAYS URGED AS CRUCIAL? DO THE RUSSIANS SEE THE AMERICAN INITIATIVE AS COMPATIBLE WITH THE DIALOGUE?

(C) WHAT IS THE PRECISE NATURE OF THE LINK BETWEEN THE DECISION ON AIRCRAFT AND THE PROGRESS OF THE POLITICAL INITIATIVE?

WE NOTICE THAT FIRST REPORTS OF THE ISRAELI REACTION SUGGESTED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE MOST UPSET BY THIS LINK. IF THE POLITICAL INITIATIVE DOES NOT PROSPER, BUT THIS IS CLEARLY NOT THE FAULT OF THE ARABS ALONE, WILL THE REPLACEMENT PHANTOMS BE WITHHELD? AND IF IT DOES PROSPER WHAT IS THE TRIGGER WHICH WILL MAKE THE SUPPLY POSSIBLE?

(D) WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS OF OCTOBER AND DECEMBER IN RELATION TO THE DOCUMENT THEY HAVE PUT TO THE ISRAELIS

SECRET

/ AND

SECRET

-4-

AND THE EGYPTIANS ? ARE THESE TO BE HELD IN LIMBO UNTIL SUCH TIME AS JARRING MAY NEED GUIDANCE FROM THE FOUR ? WE SEE DANGER THAT THE LATTER WILL CRITICISE THE LATEST AMERICAN PAPER AS BEING A RETREAT FROM THE TWO PREVIOUS PAPERS IN DEFERENCE TO ISRAELI OPPOSITION. THE REFUGEE PROBLEM, WHICH NASSER HAS EMPHASISED RECENTLY, MIGHT BE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT IN THIS CONNECTION. DO THE AMERICANS STAND BY THEIR EARLIER PAPERS? IF SO, ARE THEY PREPARED TO TELL THE ARABS THIS ?

(E) DO THE AMERICANS ACCEPT THE VALIDITY OF THE POINTS MADE BY H.M. AMBASSADOR AT AMMAN ABOUT THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE JORDANIAN REGIME SUCCEEDING IN IMPOSING A CEASE-FIRE ON THE FEDAYEEN IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES ? IF SO, DO THEY MAKE AN EXCEPTION OF JORDAN ON THIS POINT ? AND ARE THE ISRAELIS PREPARED TO DO SO?

(F) SISCO HAS SAID BEFORE THAT THE AMERICANS FORESAW AN IMPORTANT ROLE FOR THE RUSSIANS THE FRENCH AND OURSELVES IN THE U.S. INITIATIVES. IT IS NOT CLEAR TO US WHAT THESE ROLES ARE AND WE WOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW MORE WHAT SISCO HAD IN MIND.

6. WE ARE PUZZLED BY THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WHAT SISCO TOLD MILLARD ABOUT THE SUPPLY OF AIRCRAFT (PARAGRAPH 7 OF YOUR FIRST TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE) AND WHAT BARBOUR TOLD H.M. AMBASSADOR AT TEL AVIV (TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO. 582 , PARAGRAPH 3). WE HAD ALWAYS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE DELIVERY OF THE AIRCRAFT PROMISED UNDER EXISTING CONTRACTS WOULD BE COMPLETED BY THE END OF THIS YEAR, ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS HAVE NEVER GIVEN US FULL DETAILS ABOUT THIS. IF YOU CAN FIND OUT MORE ON THIS POINT WITHOUT BREACHING BARBOUR'S CONFIDENCE, THIS WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL.

DOUGLAS-HOME

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

N.A.D.

ARAB DEPT.

E.E.S.D.

AMER DEPT.

U.N.D.

DEFENCE DEPT.

RES. DEPT. (AMER SECT)

" " (SOVIET SECT)

COPY TO:

SIR R.HOOPER CABINET OFFICE

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

HER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO CAIRO

TELNO 643

23 JUNE 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO CAIRO TELNO 643 OF 23 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
TO WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW AMMAN TEL AVIV BEIRUT UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 227: MIDDLE EAST.

YOU WILL HAVE SEEN IN PARAGRAPHS 1 TO 3 OF MY TELNO 1424 TO
WASHINGTON OUR PRELIMINARY REACTIONS TO THE US INITIATIVE (WHICH
ARE FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY).

2. IN ANY DISCUSSIONS YOU MAY HAVE WITH THE EGYPTIANS ABOUT THE US
INITIATIVE, YOU SHOULD AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT HMG WERE
CONSULTED ABOUT IT IN ADVANCE OR THAT THEY HAVE CONCERTED WITH THE
AMERICANS THEIR REACTION TO IT. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, IT MIGHT
BE USEFUL FOR YOU TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO THE EGYPTIANS
AT AN APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL AND AT AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY:

(A) IT IS IMPORTANT THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN RECENT YEARS THE
AMERICANS HAVE ESTABLISHED A LINK BETWEEN PROGRESS IN THE POLITICAL
SPHERE AND THE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO ISRAEL:

(B) IT IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE TAKEN THE ARABS
INTO THEIR CONFIDENCE OVER PRESENT AND PROJECTED ARRANGEMENTS
FOR THE SUPPLY OF AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL:

(C) THE EGYPTIANS SHOULD NOT IGNORE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FACT
THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION HAS CLEARLY DECIDED TO APPLY CONSIDERABLE
PRESSURE TO ISRAEL. THIS IS WHAT THE EGYPTIANS (CF NASSER'S MAY DAY
SPEECH) AND THE RUSSIANS HAVE REPEATEDLY ASKED FOR. NOR SHOULD THEY
IGNORE THE FACT THAT THE AMERICANS ARE SEEKING TO OBTAIN COMMITMENTS
FROM THE ISRAELIS WHICH, IF GIVEN, WOULD COMMIT ISRAEL TO ACCEPTANCE
OF THE RESOLUTION IN THE SAME TERMS AS THE ARABS. WE RECOGNISE THAT
THE EGYPTIANS MAY NOT FIND THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS ENTIRELY TO THEIR
/SATISFACTION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

SATISFACTION. BUT WE THINK THAT THE EGYPTIANS COULD GAIN SUBSTANTIAL CREDIT AND ADVANTAGE BY SHOWING THEMSELVES READY TO DISCUSS THE AMERICAN SUGGESTIONS WITH WHATEVER QUALIFICATIONS THEY MAY FEEL IT NECESSARY TO MAKE. WE HOPE THAT THEY WILL NOT REFRAIN FROM DOING SO SIMPLY BECAUSE THE ISRAELIS SEEM LIKELY TO REJECT THEM.

(D) IF THE EGYPTIANS ARGUE THAT THE DOCUMENT PROPOSED BY THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT GIVE THE EGYPTIANS THE COMMITMENT TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL THAT THEY HAVE BEEN ASKING FOR, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE ARE OF COURSE AWARE OF THIS. NEVERTHELESS, WE CANNOT HELP FEELING THAT IF ISRAEL WERE TO COMMIT HERSELF TO THE DOCUMENT, THIS WOULD IN ITSELF REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD FROM THE VIEWS ON WITHDRAWAL EXPRESSED IN MRS. MEIR'S RECENT STATEMENTS AND WE HOPE THAT THE EGYPTIANS WILL NOT IGNORE THIS FACT.

3. YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO TELL THE EGYPTIANS THAT HM AMBASSADOR AT TEL AVIV IS BEING INSTRUCTED TO URGE THE ISRAELIS NOT TO REJECT THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS AND TO EXPLORE ON THE BASIS OF THEM THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING SOME PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT.

DOUGLAS-HOME

/COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET AND
SIR R. HOOPER, CABINET OFFICE/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

N.A.D.

ARABIAN DEPT.

E.E.S.D.

AMERICAN DEPT.

U.N.DEPT.

NNNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

ADVANCE COPIES

F.O.

P.S.

P.U.S.

L. E. Beck

W. Phillips

Hd. N. E. D.

Hd. N. A. D.

H. do. do. Lanning

Rev. Clark

Dep. Dir.

SECRET

CONF0032/23
CYPHER/CAT A

-00- F. O. -00- UKNIS NEW YORK

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO. 1911

23 JUNE, 1973

SECRET.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO. 1911 OF 23 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
TO AMMAN TELRUT CATED TEL AVIV PARIS MOSCOW AND UKNIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO. 1424: MIDDLE EAST.

SISCO TELEPHONED MILLARD THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT IT WAS
TENTATIVELY PROPOSED THAT MR. TOLERS WOULD TAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT
ABOUT THE U.S. INITIATIVE IN THE COURSE OF A PRESS CONFERENCE ON
THURSDAY MORNING, THIS MORN, HOWEVER, HE POSTPONED TILL FRIDAY.
THE STATE DEPARTMENT WAS STILL WORKING ON THE TEXT, BUT WOULD TRY
TO MAKE IT AVAILABLE TO US IN ADVANCE. SISCO SAID THAT IT WOULD BE
LARGELY, IN FACT ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY, DEVOTED TO THE POLITICAL
INITIATIVE, SINCE AS FAR AS ARMS WERE CONCERNED, THE ARABS HAD
ALREADY BEEN TOLD WHAT THE UNITED STATES INTENDED TO DO. THE AIM
IN DRAFTING THE ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE TO TRY TO AVOID GIVING THE
ARABS A TARGET FOR CRITICISM. SISCO ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT REPORTS
FROM ARAB CAPITALS SEEMED TO SHOW THAT THE PROBLEM OF HANDLING
ARAB REACTIONS SHOULD BE MANAGEABLE.

2. HE PROPOSED TO RECOMMEND THAT SOMETHING SHOULD BE SAID IN THE
ANNOUNCEMENT WITH REGARD TO THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF THE
PALESTINIANS. HE RECOGNISED THAT THIS HAD BEEN AN OMISSION IN THE
ORIGINAL INITIATIVE, BUT SAID THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A MISTAKE
TO TRY TO DEAL WITH IT AT A TIME WHEN THE ARAB LEADERS WERE
MEETING IN TRIPOLI TO DECIDE HOW TO HANDLE THE FEDAYEEN.

/3. MILLARD

not yet distributed

3. MILLARD SPOKE ON THE LINES OF PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, AND SAID THAT HE HAD A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WHICH HE SHOULD LIKE TO RAISE. SINCE ASKED HIM TO GO THROUGH THEM WITH ATHERTON, WHOM HE WILL SEE THIS AFTERNOON.

FCO PASS TO AMMAN BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV PARIS AND MOSCOW
MR. FREEMAN

GRPS...300 SENT AT....DEQYRTZ TNW

SECRET

231645Z TNW

INCL 42

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

PRIORITY PARIS

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 594

24 JUNE 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELEGRAM NUMBER 594 OF 24 JUNE 1970 RFI PRIORITY TO UKNIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON ROUTINE TO AMMAN BEIRUT CAIRO MOSCOW TEL AVIV.

MR PALLISER'S TEL. NOS. 582 AND 583: U.S. INITIATIVE ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY SUMMONED THE U.S. MINISTER YESTERDAY AND GAVE HIM A SEVERE DRESSING DOWN. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TOOK GRAVE EXCEPTION TO THE WAY IN WHICH THE U.S. INITIATIVE HAD BEEN LAUNCHED: AND WERE ALSO DISSATISFIED WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT THE AMERICANS WERE PROPOSING. IT WAS DEPLORABLE THAT THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF THE AMERICAN IDEAS IN THE FOUR POWER GROUP BEFORE THEY WERE SUBMITTED TO THE PARTIES. THIS STRUCK A SERIOUS BLOW AT THE PROSPECT OF SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE EMERGING FROM THE FOUR POWER GROUP AT A TIME WHEN THERE HAD AT LAST SEEMED SOME SLIGHT HOPE OF THIS: AND IT AFFORDED AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT OF GETTING OFF THE HOOK OF THE FOUR POWER EXERCISE, WHICH THEY HAD CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED. THE FRENCH WERE ALSO INDIGNANT THAT THEY HAD APPARENTLY BEEN VIRTUALLY THE LAST TO LEARN ABOUT THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS. "EVEN THE ITALIANS AND THE YUGOSLAVS WERE TOLD BEFORE FRANCE". (M. DE NANTEUIL, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT, INTERRUPTED M. ALPHAND AT THIS STAGE TO DEMUR THAT THIS WAS NOT TRUE OF THE YUGOSLAVS') M. ALPHAND CONTINUED THAT, APART FROM THE DISCOURTEOUS AND UNSKILFUL WAY IN WHICH THE U.S. INITIATIVE HAD THUS BEEN HANDLED SO FAR AS AMERICA'S PARTNERS IN THE FOUR POWER GROUP WERE CONCERNED, THE FRENCH REMAINED OF THE VIEW THAT IT WAS POINTLESS TO TRY TO RE-LAUNCH JARRING ON SUCH AN UNSUBSTANTIAL BASIS: HE MUST BE GIVEN MORE SUBSTANTIVE GUIDANCE IF HE WAS TO HAVE ANY HOPE OF SUCCESS. THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL MORE IN THE SAME VEIN. THE ONLY POINT ON WHICH ALPHAND CONCEDED SOME MERIT TO THE AMERICANS WAS IN THEIR READINESS TO LET JARRING DECIDE THE PROCEDURE FOR CONDUCTING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES (SEE PARA 1 OF MR PALLISER'S TEL. NO. 583). HE CONCLUDED BY TELLING BLAKE THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT COULD NOT EXPECT TO RECEIVE ANY FRENCH SUPPORT FOR THEIR PROPOSALS.

2. BY A COINCIDENCE, MY U.S. COLLEAGUE WAS SEEING M. SCHUMANN ON ANOTHER MATTER AT THE SAME TIME AND SCHUMANN RAISED THE MIDDLE EAST WITH HIM ALSO. BUT, ACCORDING TO BLAKE, HE USED MORE MODERATE LANGUAGE THAN ALPHAND AND LARGELY CONCENTRATED HIS CRITICISM OF THE U.S.

CONFIDENTIAL

U.S. INITIATIVE ON THE FACT THAT IT RISKED COMPROMISING THE WORK BEING DONE BY THE FOUR POWERS AND THEREBY MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR ANY CONSTRUCTIVE GUIDANCE FOR JARRING TO EMERGE FROM THE FOUR POWER GROUP.

3. PALLISER GAVE BLAKE SOME ACCOUNT OF MY EARLIER TALK WITH SCHUMANN ON 22 JUNE (PARIS TEL. NO. 582) AND OF HIS OWN SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGE WITH NANTEUIL. BLAKE, WHO HAD CLEARLY BEEN SHAKEN BY THE ROUGH HANDLING HE RECEIVED FROM ALPHAND, SAID THAT IN PRACTICE AND LEAVING ASIDE THE TONE OF ALPHAND'S REMARKS, THE CONTENT SEEMED BROADLY SIMILAR TO WHAT THE FRENCH HAD SAID TO US. HE HAD DONE HIS BEST TO REPLY TO ALPHAND'S CRITICISMS AND IN PARTICULAR TO CONTEST THE VIEW THAT THE AMERICANS WERE IN EFFECT TAKING THE WHOLE MATTER OUT OF THE HANDS OF THE FOUR POWER GROUP. HE HAD ALSO REBUTTED ALPHAND'S CLAIM THAT THE FRENCH HAD BEEN THE LAST TO LEARN ABOUT THE AMERICAN IDEAS. MOREOVER, HE TOOK SOME COMFORT FROM THE RELATIVE MODERATION OF THE TONE TAKEN BY M. SCHUMANN WITH HIS AMBASSADOR AND AGREED THAT IT WAS CHARACTERISTIC OF ALPHAND THAT HE SHOULD HAVE COUCHED HIS ARGUMENTS IN SUCH UNPLEASANT TERMS. ONE OF HIS MAIN CONCERNS WAS LEST THE FRENCH SHOULD NOT ONLY, AS ALPHAND SAID, REFUSE TO SUPPORT THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS, BUT MIGHT WORK MORE ACTIVELY AGAINST THEM BOTH IN ARAB CAPITALS AND WITH THE RUSSIANS, E.G. DURING TODAY'S TALKS AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY WITH VINOGRADOV.

4. THE AMERICANS ARE RIGHT TO DISCOUNT TO SOME EXTENT ALPHAND'S TEMPERAMENTAL DISPOSITION TO BE UNPLEASANT IF HE SEES A GOOD EXCUSE, AND IT IS EQUALLY IN M. SCHUMANN'S DISPOSITION TO AVOID A ROW IF HE CAN. IT IS NOT THEREFORE SURPRISING THAT HE SHOULD HAVE TAKEN A MORE MODERATE LINE WITH MY U.S. COLLEAGUE. ON THE OTHER HAND, WHEN SCHUMANN SAW ME THIS AFTERNOON, HE REFERRED TO HIS TALK YESTERDAY WITH WATSON AND IMPLIED THAT HE HAD BEEN PRETTY SEVERE WITH HIM. IN ADDITION TO HIS CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FOUR POWER TALKS, HE HAD COMPLAINED TO WATSON ABOUT THE NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTS WHO HAD BEEN TAKEN INTO U.S. CONFIDENCE BEFORE THE FRENCH. AND HE WAS PRETTY SCORNFUL OF MY U.S. COLLEAGUE'S OBVIOUSLY RATHER NAIVE EFFORTS TO DEFEND HIMSELF. BUT SCHUMANN AT LEAST SAID THAT HE WAS PERSONALLY NOT DISPOSED TO SUSPECT THE AMERICANS OF A MACHIEVELLIAN ATTEMPT TO SABOTAGE THE FOUR POWER TALKS. (THE IMPLICATION OF THIS MAY BE THAT SOME FRENCH OFFICIALS HOLD THIS VIEW.) HE THOUGHT THE AMERICANS WERE BEING VERY CLUMSY. BUT HIS REAL CONCERN WAS THAT THEY SEEMED TO WANT TO SETTLE THINGS OVER THE HEADS OF THEIR PARTNERS. HIS PURPOSE, AND HE HOPED OURS, WAS TO CONTINUE TO WORK THROUGH THE FOUR POWER GROUP. I SAID THAT I WAS /SURE

SURE YOU WOULD AGREE WITH HIM IN NOT SUSPECTING THE AMERICANS OF MACHIEVELLIANISM: AND GAVE HIM A BRIEF INDICATION OF YOUR REACTION TO THE U.S. PROPOSALS, DRAWING TO SOME EXTENT ON PARA. 5 OF YOUR TEL. NO. 1424 TO WASHINGTON.

5. I AM AFRAID THAT TWO ASPECTS OF THIS AFFAIR WILL TEND TO INCREASE FRENCH IRRITATION WITH THE AMERICANS, QUITE APART FROM THE EXISTING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM. THESE ARE, FIRST, M. SCHUMANN'S DEEP PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT WITH THE FOUR POWER APPROACH AND HIS CONVICTION THAT THE ONLY WAY THAT FRANCE CAN REALLY BE SEEN TO BE PLAYING ANY EFFECTIVE PART IS IF SOMETHING SUCCESSFUL CAN EMERGE FROM THE FOUR: AND, SECONDLY, FRENCH RESENTMENT AT THE FACT THAT, AS THEY BELIEVE, THE AMERICANS DELIBERATELY FAILED TO INFORM THEM UNTIL A VERY LATE STAGE. AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN (PARA. 4 OF PARIS TEL. NO. 583) NAUTEUIL BELIEVES THAT THE AMERICANS MUST HAVE TOLD THE RUSSIANS OF THEIR IDEAS BEFORE LAUNCHING THE EXERCISE. MOREOVER (ALTHOUGH THE FRENCH HAVE NOT SO HINTED TO US, I SHOULD BE SURPRISED IF THEY DID NOT SUSPECT THAT WE ALSO KNEW A GOOD DEAL MORE ABOUT AMERICAN THINKING AT AN EARLIER STAGE THAN THEY. (THE ITALIANS AND THE YUGOSLAVS CAN THEN BE THROWN IN FOR GOOD MEASURE.) IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHILE I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT M. SCHUMANN WOULD CONSCIOUSLY AUTHORISE HIS OFFICIALS TO WORK AGAINST THE AMERICAN INITIATIVE, I THINK THAT (PARTICULARLY IF FRENCH POSTS ABROAD TAKE THEIR CUE FROM THE RECORD THEY RECEIVE OF THE ALPHAND/BLAKE CONVERSATION) THERE MAY BE A RISK OF FRENCH DIPLOMATS BEING PRETTY UNHELPFUL IN ARAB CAPITALS. (AND, IN THIS CONTEXT, IT IS CLEARLY IMPORTANT THAT NONE OF US SHOULD SAY ANYTHING TO ANY FRENCHMEN THAT MIGHT ENCOURAGE THEIR SUSPICION THAT WE HAD FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE AMERICAN PLAN). ON THE OTHER HAND, IT MAY PARADOXICALLY BE NO BAD THING THAT VINOGRADOV SHOULD BE HERE WHILE THE FRENCH ARE IN THIS CAPTIOUS MOOD. SCHUMANN TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD NOT BE SEEING HIM UNTIL TOMORROW; BUT HE UNDERSTOOD FROM HIS OFFICIALS THAT VINOGRADOV WAS NOT TAKING TOO NEGATIVE A LINE TOWARDS THE U.S. INITIATIVE.

F C O PLEASE PASS PRIORITY TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON ROUTINE TO AMMAN BEIRUT CAIRO MOSCOW TEL AVIV

MR. SOAMES

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

F I L E S

N.E.D.

NEWS DEPT.

N.A.D.

PRIVATE SECRETARY

ARABIAN DEPT.

P.S. TO P.U.S.

E.E.S.D.

SIR E. PECK

AMERICAN DEPT.

MR. PHILLIPS

U.N.DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN

1 - ^{fully agreed}
+ ^{the further}
Lyon ^{who does so}
Prime Minister, ^{28/6}
A h

I think we should particularly go out of our way to consult very closely with the French on the M.E., and to be seen by them to be so doing - both for M.E. and European purposes.

Ph.

26/6

... UNITED STATES ...

... THE ...

... THE ...

SEE ...

PLEASE PASS TO ...

...

...

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

... E.M.S.D. ...

CONFIDENTIAL

Middle East

GLY

June 23, 1970

The Prime Minister has seen Paris telegram No. 594 of June 24 about the French reactions to the United States Middle East initiative. The Prime Minister feels that both for Middle East and European purposes we should particularly go out of our way to consult very closely with the French on the Middle East and to be seen by them to be so doing.

PJSM

J.A.H. Graham Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Handwritten initials

CYPHER CAT/A

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE CAIRO TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 763 32 JUNE 1976

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDED TO FCO TELNO. 763 DATED 30/6/76 REPEATED FOR INFO
TO MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, AMMAN, PARIS, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT,
AND URMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 762.

PRESIDENT NASSER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW.

AS PART OF THE ATTEMPT TO BUILD UP THE IMAGE REFERRED TO
IN PARA. 1 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, THE CAIRO PRESS
QUOTES FOREIGN NEWSPAPERS AS STATING THAT THE VISIT WAS
ARRANGED SOME TIME AGO. UNFORTUNATELY, AMMAN REPORTS
(NO DOUBT AS A TYPICAL AGENDA FOR NORMAL INTERNATIONAL TALKS)
THAT THESE WILL COVER NOT ONLY THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT ALSO
SOUTH EAST ASIA, AND AFRICA IN THE LIGHT OF 'BRITAIN'S
INTENTION TO STUDY THE RESUMPTION OF ARMS SALES TO SOUTH AFRICA,
AND ITS EFFECT ON THE FREEDOM STRUGGLE IN THE AFRICAN CONTINENT'.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO WASHINGTON, PARIS AND URMIS NEW YORK.

MR. STEWART +

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

FCO DISTRIBUTION /WH
NORTH AFRICAN DEPT

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

Middle East

EA 7

Cairo telegram no. 762 attached is rather dramatic in tone but Nasser's visit to Moscow could clearly be very important.

If the Russians agree to extend their air defence right up to the Canal there will be great danger of a direct Israeli/Soviet confrontation.

If they do not agree to this, the consequences for Nasser may be very serious.

The outcome of the talks in Moscow seem likely to have a major bearing on Arab reactions to the recent U.S. initiative.

Am.

July 1, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL .

- 2 -

(A) THE VERY DAUNTING PROSPECT OF MAINTAINING HOSTILITIES MORE-OR-LESS INDEFINITELY AT THEIR PRESENT LEVEL DESPITE THE COST AND THE EVER INCREASING PROBLEMS WHICH ARE PROBABLY BUILDING UP;

(B) SOME DESPERATE AND SELF-DESTRUCTIVE ACT SUCH AS A SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO CROSS THE CANAL, AND;

(C) A REAL EFFORT FOR PEACE.

5. THESE SEEM TO BE THE REALITIES WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED IN MOSCOW AND THE DECISIONS TAKEN COULD CLEARLY BE CRUCIAL.

FCO PLEASE PASS ROUTINE WASHINGTON UKHIS NEW YORK AND PARIS.

MR. STEWART

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

WH
FCO/DISTRIBUTION:

H.A.D.

H.O.D. (INTERNAL)

6222

CONFIDENTIAL

EN CLAIR

PRIORITY MOSCOW
TELEGRAM NO. 790

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
2 JULY 1970

UNCLASSIFIED.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 790
OF 2 JULY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
PARIS, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AMMAN AND BEIRUT.

MRS. MEIR'S SPEECH AND THE U.S. INITIATIVE.

PRAVDA OF 1 JULY CONTAINED A SHORT TASS REPORT OF MRS. MEIR'S
SPEECH TO THE KNESSET. THIS PICKED OUT HER STATEMENT TO THE
EFFECT THAT ISRAEL WOULD CONTINUE ITS PRESENT MILITARY OPERATIONS
AGAINST THE UAR, WHICH IMPLIED THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT DID
NOT CONTEMPLATE A PEACEFUL POLITICAL SOLUTION.

2. PRAVDA OF 2 JULY PRINTED A COMMENTARY BY ITS LEADING MIDDLE
EASTERN COMMENTATOR BELYAEV WHICH ECHOES THE ABOVE, WHILE ADMITTING
THAT MRS. MEIR ALSO MADE REFERENCES TO PEACE. THE TREND OF
EVENTS ALONG THE SUEZ CANAL IS, HOWEVER, BETTER EVIDENCE OF ISRAEL'S
TRUE INTENTIONS.

3. BELYAEV CONTRASTS TALK OF PEACE IN WASHINGTON WITH THE FACT
THAT THE SUPPLIES OF PHANTOMS AGREED UPON IN SEPTEMBER 1969,
50 AIRCRAFT IN ALL, WILL BE COMPLETED BY THE END OF JULY, INSTEAD
OF OCTOBER OF THIS YEAR. THE PENTAGON IS SAID TO BE SILENT
ON THE REASONS BEHIND THIS ACCELERATION IN SUPPLIES. ISRAEL
AND ITS AMERICAN BACKERS HAVE THEREBY DEMONSTRATED TO THE WORLD
THAT THEY ARE NOT INTERESTED IN A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, AND ARE
INSTEAD TRYING TO PUT THE BLAME FOR CONTINUED TENSION ON THE
SOVIET UNION. BELYAEV, TO CONFOUND THIS, REITERATES SOVIET FAITH
IN RESOLUTION 242.

FCO PLEASE PASS WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS.
SIR D. WILSON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

F.C.O./WHI. DISTRIBUTION:
N.EASTERN D.

DDDDD

CONFIDENTIAL - COVERING
SECRET-UK EYES ONLY

Sir E. Peck

c.c. Mr. Baker
Mr. Phillips
Mr. Wiggin - American Dept.
Mr. Giffard - E.E.S.D.
Mr. Lambert - U.N. Political Dept.
Mr. Acland - Arabian Dept.
Mr. Cradock - Planning Staff
Mr. Ellingworth - Oil Dept.
Mr. Hope Jones - N.A.D.
Mr. Thomson, Assessments Staff, Cabinet Office
Mr. Orchard - Research Dept. (Soviet Section)
Mr. Paul - Research Dept. (Middle East Section)

Middle East: Soviet policy towards a political settlement

...
R. Inpp
has a
copy
I submit the final version of the paper on this subject which was commissioned some time ago. The paper has been agreed by REED, Research Dept., the Planning Staff, North African Dept. and the Assessment Staff in the Cabinet Office. Copies have been sent to posts and I am consulting H.M. Embassy, Washington, as to whether, and if so in what form, it might be given to the Americans.

2. The principal passages in the paper might be summarised as follows:

- (a) an analysis of why the Russians have believed it in their interest since June 1967 to work for a political settlement based on Security Council Resolution 242, without being prepared to pay an unlimited price for this (paragraphs 5 to 10).
- (b) an analysis of the reasons why the Russians might have become less interested in a political settlement since October/November 1967 (paragraphs 11 to 14). The conclusion of this section is that there has been no major change in the Soviet attitude towards a settlement, although the Russians may now perceive new options as a result of their increased military presence in the UAR.
- (c) Some general conclusions about the nature of Soviet policy and its relation to U.S. policy

/and

CONFIDENTIAL - COVERING
SECRET-UK EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL - COVERING
SECRET-UK EYES ONLY

- 2 -

and to the prospects for a settlement (paragraphs 15 to 19).

3. There are perhaps two general points which are worth making. First, in many respects Soviet policy is the mirror image of American policy. Both the Russians and the Americans have been prepared at various times to try to influence their clients in the Middle East to move closer to a political settlement based on the Security Council Resolution. Neither has been (nor is ever likely to be) prepared to use extreme pressure on their clients. And for much of the time since June 1967 both have shown themselves more concerned to protect their relations with their clients than to use their influence to bring about a settlement. But perhaps most importantly, the degree of influence which either is prepared to use with its clients at any time is a function of the degree of influence it believes that the other will be prepared to use with its clients. Thus the mutual expectations of the super powers are vital factors in determining the course of the search for a settlement.

4. Secondly, the paper brings out the persistent misunderstanding and misperception by both the Russians and the Americans of the motives and intentions of the other. This phenomenon seems to have been particularly acute in the months after October 1969. The latest American political initiative, which is deliberately intended to by-pass the Russians, is unfortunately likely to deepen this misunderstanding. Both the Russians and the Americans clearly recognise that the policy of the other is designed to weaken their position in the Middle East. But there has always been some hope, which we believe certain elements of the U.S. Administration share, that the two super powers could conceivably reach an understanding about the degree of their respective involvement and influence in the area and that this could be the basis for a political settlement between Israel and the Arab states. Any moves by either which are likely to contribute to their mutual misunderstanding are bound to be damaging to the prospects of reaching such an understanding between them.

(J. P. Tripp)
Near Eastern Department
24 June, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL - COVERING
SECRET - UK EYES ONLY

COVERING SECRET - UK EYES ONLY ; 7



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

now attached
Papers in
Prime Minister's box.
3 July, 1970
Dear Peter, Mr.
6/7

Arab/Israel Dispute

As requested, I enclose a note for the Prime Minister on the present state of play in the international effort to promote an Arab/Israel settlement. As discussed between you and Near Eastern Department, I also enclose a copy of the Department's paper on Soviet policy towards a settlement, with a copy of a minute which summarises the main conclusions of the paper. It has not yet been seen by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

Yours ever
[Signature]

P. J. S. Moon, Esq.,
10, Downing Street.

COVERING SECRET - UK EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

The international effort to promote an
Arab/Israel settlement

Both the Russians and the Americans made important new moves in the international effort to promote an Arab/Israel settlement during June. The background to these moves is as follows.

Soviet-American Dialogue

2. Throughout 1969 the best hope of progress towards a settlement lay in the Soviet/American dialogue. By October/November, the Americans and the Russians had come nearer than ever before to agreement on a joint document laying down in greater detail than the Security Council Resolution of 1967 the outline of a settlement. Final agreement on such a document was not however reached, principally because of the refusal of the Americans to give a more explicit commitment on the questions of Israeli withdrawal and boundaries without a clearer Soviet statement on Arab commitments to peace and the question of negotiations; and the corresponding refusal of the Russians to commit themselves more clearly on peace and procedure without an American move on withdrawal and boundaries. In December, the dialogue went into limbo for a period and was only resumed seriously in May/June.

/3.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Four Power Talks

3. The other main forum for efforts to promote a settlement has been the four power talks. These began in April 1969. Their purpose was to provide four power guidance to Dr. Jarring on the outline of a settlement, in amplification of the Security Council Resolution, which would enable him to resume his consultations with the parties with greater prospects of success. Between April and July 1969 the four power talks made little progress, principally because both the Russians and the Americans were concentrating their efforts on their bilateral dialogue. The four power talks resumed in December 1969 and have continued ever since. They have made slow progress, not least because of the influence of events in the area, notably the Israeli deep penetration air attacks on the UAR in January and March and the decision by the Russians to increase their involvement in the defence of the UAR. By March, the four power talks faced deadlock, notably because of the American refusal to agree that the four powers should attempt to begin drafting a report which would form the basis of Dr. Jarring's guidance. The Americans accordingly proposed as a tactical device that the ~~deputies~~ of the four Permanent Representatives should meet to produce an interim report recording the points

/of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

of agreement and disagreement in the four power talks up to that time. The deputies' meetings have continued since early April, interspersed with rarer meetings of the Permanent Representatives themselves. The deputies have made some progress towards defining the areas of agreement between them, but are still some way from producing their report. Even when the report is completed, it will not constitute, at least in American eyes, four power guidance for Dr. Jarring. There will therefore probably have to be a further stage during which the Permanent Representatives consider how such guidance should be drawn up.

The New Soviet Formulations

4. The two latest moves must be seen in the context described above. The Soviet move was made in the Soviet/American dialogue (although it has subsequently been presented by the Russians in the four power talks). Briefly, the Russians gave the Americans reformulations of certain paragraphs of a Soviet paper of June 1969 which covered all aspects of a settlement. The reformulations dealt with the question of commitments to peace and showed a significant shift towards the American position on three points to which the Americans have always attached special importance. Hitherto, the

/Americans

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

Americans have said that without Soviet concessions on commitments to peace, they themselves could not contemplate any change in their own position. After virtually accepting the substance of the American position on these points, the Russians therefore have grounds for expecting the Americans to respond in kind. There are already signs (which may be largely tactical) of Soviet irritation at the American failure to make such a response. The Americans, however, while promising a response in due course, are at present concentrating almost exclusively on their own initiative.

The U.S. Initiative

5. The latest American initiative represents a departure by the Americans from the two power and four power discussions. The Americans have tried by direct approaches to the parties to the dispute to secure their agreement to a document which would become the basis for indirect negotiations between them under the auspices of Dr. Jarring. The document is very much less detailed than previous American proposals, which the Israelis had rejected, which may be seen as a blemish by the Arabs. It gives the Arabs no satisfaction either on the question of total Israeli withdrawal, on which they have hitherto insisted as a precondition of negotiations with Israel, or on the questions of the refugees and "rights of the

/Palestinian

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

Palestinian people". However, the Arabs ought to see
advantage in the fact that under the proposals the
Israelis would be required to commit themselves to
unqualified acceptance of the Security Council Resolution
and in particular to the principle of withdrawal
according to the terms of that Resolution. The Arab
should also see advantage in the fact that, the American
document contains no requirement that the Arabs should
accept the principle of direct negotiation with Israel
at some stage before a settlement is reached. On the
Israeli side, the principal advantage in the U.S.
proposals would lie in Arab acceptance of a process of
negotiation with Israel with the minimum of preconditions
about the terms of a settlement.

6. The American proposals are ingenious in the sense that, if accepted, they would resolve the basic divergence of views between the two sides on negotiating procedures, a divergence which prevented Dr. Jarring from making progress in his mission and which was to an important extent responsible for difficulty in the four power talks and in the Soviet/American dialogue. If the American document were accepted, the prospects for useful discussions between the four powers might also be improved. Already in recent days there has been some

/indication

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

indication of a better atmosphere in New York. Nevertheless, the objections by both the Arabs and the Israelis to the American document make the prospects for the success of the American initiative very uncertain. There is in particular real doubt as to whether the Americans are prepared to put significant pressure on Israel to persuade her to accept the proposals. The Americans appear to have established some sort of connection between their political initiative and the supply of more aircraft. But they have refused to describe this connection to us and, ^{if} what Mr. Eban told the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on 2 July is correct, the link is tenuous in the extreme. Thus there is a danger both that the Israelis will not be brought to accept the initiative and that the further supply of aircraft to Israel will destroy such chance as there is of the Arabs coming to accept it.

7. We have welcomed the American decision to take an initiative and have urged both the Arabs and the Israelis to consider very seriously the advantages in what the Americans have proposed from their points of view. We have also discussed it with the Russians, the French and, of course, with the Americans themselves.

CONFIDENTIAL

EN CLAIR

PRIORITY MOSCOW
TELEGRAM NO. 796

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
3 JULY 1970

UNCLASSIFIED.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM
NO. 796 OF 3 JULY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, NEW
YORK, PARIS, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AMMAN AND BEIRUT.

MIDDLE EAST: U.S. INITIATIVE.

THE SOVIET INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS WEEKLY 'NEW TIMES'
CONTAINS AN ARTICLE BY BUICHKOV ENTITLED 'POLITICAL
MANOEUVRES AGAIN?', WHICH EXAMINES THE AMOUNT OF FAITH
WHICH CAN BE PUT IN THE LATEST U.S. PEACE PLAN.

2. AT A TIME WHEN THE THREAT OF A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT CONTINUES TO BE PRESENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IT IS
NATURAL THAT THE WORLD'S ATTENTION IS FOCUSED UPON ANY STEPS
WHICH RAISE HOPES OF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. MR ROGERS HAS
ANNOUNCED THAT THE NEW PLAN HAS BEEN PASSED TO THE PARTIES AND TO
OTHER INTERESTED STATES. THE WORLD PRESS HAS HOWEVER GREETED
THIS NEWS WITH SOME SCEPTICISM AND CAUTION, SINCE NO-ONE
HAS FORGOTTEN THE ROGERS PEACE PROPOSALS OF DECEMBER 1969 WHICH
SOUGHT TO SATISFY THE EXPANSIONIST DEMANDS OF ISRAEL AT THE
COST OF ARAB COUNTRIES' VITAL INTERESTS. SINCE THAT TIME,
THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH U.S. DIPLOMACY OPERATES HAVE
CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY. THE LESSONS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
IN SOUTH EAST ASIA ARE BOUND TO REFLECT UPON ITS CREDIBILITY
IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. THIS, COMBINED WITH EVIDENT
AND WHOLE-HEARTED U.S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL'S AGGRESSIVE
POLICY MAKES IT UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE THOSE
WHO REGARD EVEN THE NEW AMERICAN PROPOSALS AS YET ANOTHER
DIPLOMATIC MANOEUVRE. TO THIS CAN BE ADDED THE
COINCIDENCE OF THE NEW U.S. PROPOSALS WITH THE RECENT TRIPOLI
MEETING OF ARAB LEADERS. THE DECEMBER PROPOSALS ALSO COINCIDED
WITH THE RABAT MEETING AND ONE IS 'LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION'
THAT WASHINGTON'S PEACE INITIATIVES ARE NOT INTENDED SO MUCH
TO SECURE A TRUE POLITICAL SOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS
MUCH TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE ARAB STATES. THAT THIS MAY
BE PART OF U.S. POLICY IS FURTHER CONFIRMED BY THE FACT THAT
THE QUESTION OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS HAS BEEN LEFT OUT OF THE
LATEST U.S. PLAN. 'IT IS CLEAR THAT SUCH A GIFT TO THE
AGGRESSOR IN THIS DIPLOMATIC PLAN IS CALCULATED TO SET ONE
ARAB COUNTRY AGAINST THE OTHER'.

3. "IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOME OF THE U.S. PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD CONTAIN CERTAIN CONSTRUCTIVE ELEMENTS, THEY SHOULD NOT OF COURSE BE REJECTED (UNDERLINE NEXT TWO WORDS) A PRIORI, WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR TRUE CONTENTS". BUT MR ROGERS ALSO SAID THAT THE U.S. RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL WOULD REMAIN UNCHANGED. IF THIS MEANS AN UNCHANGED POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR RECENT EXPANSIONIST DECLARATIONS BY ISRAELI LEADERS, "WHAT POSITIVE ELEMENT FOR THE CAUSE OF PEACE CAN ONE THUS EXPECT OF THE NEW AMERICAN INITIATIVE?".

4. BUICHKOV REAFFIRMS THE NEED FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION ON THE BASIS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, WHICH CALLS FOR THE UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS AND CATERS FOR THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF ALL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES OF THIS AREA. "IF THE AMERICAN PLAN WERE TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION ALL THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THEN IT MIGHT BE OF USE. IF HOWEVER IT IS INTENDED ONLY TO SATISFY THE AGGRESSOR ISRAEL, THEN UNDOUBTEDLY, IT DESERVES TO BE TREATED IN THE SAME WAY AS FORMER AMERICAN PROPOSALS - THEY WILL BE JUSTIFIABLY REJECTED BY THE ARAB COUNTRIES".

FCO PLEASE PASS WASHINGTON, NEW YORK AND PARIS.

SIR D. WILSON

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

FCO DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

Additional Dist.

Arab/Israel Dispute.

TELETYPE NUMBER 006 OF 26 JUNE 1972

URGENT

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELNO 686 OF 26 JUNE AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
TO AMMAN BEIRUT CAIRO MOSCOW TEL AVIV URMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

11 P TS: AMIDE EAST

MY U S COLLEAGUE SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD ME AT LUNCH THAT HE HAD
DELIVERED YESTERDAY TO THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER, IMMEDIATELY
BEFORE THE LATTER WAS GOING TO SEE MR. VINCIGRADOV, AN EXTREMELY FIRM
MESSAGE FROM THE U S SECRETARY OF STATE. (INDEED, WATSON SAID THAT
THE TALK HAD BEEN SO FIRMLY CALIBERED THAT HE HAD SOUGHT
AND OBTAINED FROM WATSON THE USE OF THE WORD "COMPLICATIONS")
THE SENSE OF THIS MESSAGE WAS TO:

- (A) TO CONFIRM THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NO INTENTION OR DESIRE TO
TAKE THE ISSUE OUT OF THE HANDS OF THE FOUR POWER GROUP AND
WERE INDEED ANXIOUS THAT THE GROUP SHOULD CONTINUE ITS WORK.
- (B) TO MAKE IT EXTREMELY CLEAR THAT THE AMERICANS LOOKED TO THEIR
FRIENDS TO DO WHAT THEY COULD TO GIVE THE U S INITIATIVE A HAND
WITH THE PARTIES AND EQUALLY NOT TO TAKE ANY ACTION
THAT MIGHT MAKE ITS SUCCESS MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE.

MY U S COLLEAGUE SEEMED MODERATELY ENCOURAGED BY SCHUMANN'S
RESPONSE. HE RECEIVED A FURTHER LECTURE FROM SCHUMANN ABOUT THE
DISSENTING WAY IN WHICH THE INITIATIVE HAD BEEN HANDLED AND
THE NEED TO KEEP THE FOUR POWER GROUP IN CONTROL. BUT SCHUMANN
SAID THAT HE NATURALLY HOPED THAT THE INITIATIVE COULD SUCCEED.
WATSON SAID THAT, AS A NEWCOMER TO THE DIPLOMATIC GAME, HE FOUND
IT DEPRESSING TO SEE HOW IMPORTANT IT APPARENTLY WAS FOR THE FRENCH
FOREIGN MINISTER TO GET PERSONAL KUDOS OUT OF THIS SITUATION.
THIS APPEARED TO BE A MAJOR CONSIDERATION IN SCHUMANN'S MIND. THE
MESSAGE FROM ROGERS HAD VERY DISCREETLY IMPLIED THAT THE AMERICANS
WERE NOT TRYING TO STEAL ANYONE'S THUNDER, BUT SIMPLY WANTED TO
BRING PEACE TO THE AREA. AND HE (WATSON) HAD RUBBED THIS IN EAR
TO SCHUMANN AND HAD DONE WHAT HE COULD TO FLATTER THE LATTER'S EGO
BY REFERRING TO THE CONSTRUCTIVE PART THE FRENCH WERE PLAYING.
THE ILLUSTRATION OF WHAT HE MEANT TO DO WAS TO SAY THAT THE
U S WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD BUT DID NOT WANT TO BE THE MAIN
DRIVING FORCE.

3. THE U S INITIATIVE, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT, TOOK A SLIGHTLY LESS OPTIMISTIC VIEW. HE AGREED WITH WATSON (AS DID PALLISER AND I) THAT SOUBRIAN AND HIS SENIOR OFFICIALS COULD HARDLY WANT THE INITIATIVE TO FAIL. INDEED, WHEN HE HAD DELIVERED TO ALPHAND YESTERDAY THE TEXT OF MR. ROGERS' PRESS STATEMENT, ALPHAND HAD SLIGHTLY MODIFIED THE VERY HARD LINE HE TOOK ON 24 JUNE (MY TEL NO 594) AND HAD TOLD BLAKE THAT THE FRENCH WERE "NEITHER FOR NOR AGAINST" THE INITIATIVE, BUT HE FEARED THAT CIRCULATION TO FRENCH POSTS ABOARD OF THE RECORD OF HIS TALK WITH ALPHAND WAS ALREADY HAVING SOME REPERCUSSIONS. THE U S AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN HAD REPORTED SAID RIFA' AS SAYING THAT THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR WAS DESCRIBING THE ATTITUDE IN PARIS AS "VERY NEGATIVE" (POSSIBLY IN THE CONVERSATION WITH KING HUSSEIN REFERRED TO IN PARA 3 OF AMMAN TEL NO 597). HOWEVER, BLAKE WILL BE SEEING THE POLITICAL DIRECTOR AT THE QUA. THIS EVENING AND HE AND HIS AMBASSADOR AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL, IN THE LIGHT OF THE LESS NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TAKEN WITH PALLISER THIS MORNING BY DE LECUSE (MY TEL NO 604) AND, EVEN MORE, OF THE REASONABLY ENCOURAGING SOVIET ATTITUDE DISPLAYED HERE BY VINOGRADOV, TO TRY TO GET THE QUA TO INSTRUCT THEIR POSTS IN ARAB CAPITALS, IF NOT TO GIVE THE U S INITIATIVE A FAIR WIND, AT LEAST NOT TO CRITICISE IT OPENLY TO THE ARABS.

4. SEE M I F T.

F C O PLEASE PASS TO AMMAN DEIRUT CAIRO MOSCOW TEL AVIV UKINS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

MR. SOAMES'

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.
N.A.D.
ARABIAN DEPT
W.E.D.
E.E.S.D.
AMERICAN DEPT
C.N.D.
RESEARCH DEPT (W.E.SEC)
RESEARCH DEPT (SOVIET SEC)
RESEARCH DEPT (AMER.SEC)

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY PARIS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 664

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
26 JUNE, 1975.

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED F.C.O. TELNO. 664 DATED 26 JUNE, 1975,
REPORTED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, MOSCOW, TEL
AVIV, UKHIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

YOUR TEL. NO. 335: MIDDLE EAST.

MINISTER SPOKE ACCORDINGLY THIS MORNING TO DIRECTEUR AFRIQUE/
LEVANT AT THE QUAI.

2. DE LEUSSE EXPRESSED BROAD AGREEMENT WITH YOUR PARA. 4(A)
AND TOOK UP ENERGETICALLY THE IMPLICATION THAT THE FRENCH WERE
POUR COLD WATER ON THE AMERICAN INITIATIVE WITH THE PARTIES.
HE SAID THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION WHATEVER OF THE FRENCH BEING
CRITICAL OF THE INITIATIVE IN SPEAKING TO THE PARTIES. SO FAR AS
THE ISRAELIS WERE CONCERNED, THEY WOULD NOT IN ANY CASE PAY MUCH
ATTENTION TO THE FRENCH. BUT IT WOULD CLEARLY BE WRONG FOR THE
FRENCH TO SPEAK CRITICALLY OF THE AMERICANS TO THE ARABS AND HE
COULD ASSURE ME THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THIS HAPPENING.
HE ALSO EXPRESSED FULL AGREEMENT WITH YOUR PARA. 4(B) EXCEPT THAT
HIS IMPRESSION (WHICH HAD BEEN HEIGHTENED BY WHAT VINOGRADOV
HAD SAID IN PARIS) WAS THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO RESPONSE BY YOST TO
THE NEW SOVIET FORMULATIONS (LAST SENTENCE OF YOUR PARA. 4(B)).
PALLISER TOOK HIM UP ON THIS AND READ HIM PARA. 6 OF UKHIS NEW
YORK TEL. NO. 1431. DE LEUSSE SAID THAT THIS GAVE A MORE DETAILED
ACCOUNT OF WHAT YOST HAD SAID THAN HAD BEEN REPORTED BY KODOLCHENKO-
MORZET WHO HAD, SO FAR AS HE RECOLLECTED, SIMPLY DESCRIBED YOST
AS TAKING NOTE OF THE NEW SOVIET FORMULATIONS. IN THE LIGHT OF
THE UKHIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM, HE AGREED THAT THE U.S. REACTION
WAS MODERATELY ENCOURAGING AND SAID THAT IT WAS NO DOUBT FOR THEIR
OWN PURPOSES THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE BEING SO CRITICAL OF WHAT
THEY DESCRIBED AS THE AMERICAN FAILURE TO REACT. (SEE H.L.F.T.).

/3.

CONFIDENTIAL

... BUT THAT IF THE PARTIES WERE WILLED TO ACCEPT THE
U.S. PROPOSALS THE FRENCH WOULD OF COURSE BE PLEASED. BUT THEY
WERE VERY COGNIZANT OF THE FACT THAT SUCH ACCEPTANCE, PART OF
THEIR INITIATIVE, WOULD BE THE RESULT OF A MISTAKE. THE
INITIATIVE STEPPED FROM THEIR INABILITY TO UNDERSTAND THE MOTIVE
THAT UNDERLAY IT. THERE WERE THOSE WHO SUSPECTED THAT IT WAS
SIMPLY A SMOKESCREEN DESIGNED TO ENABLE THE AMERICANS TO GO ON
TO SUPPLY FURTHER AIRCRAFT ETC. TO ISRAEL. THIS WAS NOT THE VIEW
OF HIS MINISTER. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CONTENT OF THE
INITIATIVE (WHICH WAS NOT 100%) WAS IN CERTAIN RESPECTS
SUCH AS TO MAKE IT VERY DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE OF THE PARTIES
AGREEING. NOT ONLY WAS THE PROVISION ON WITHDRAWAL TOO VAGUE AND
PRECISE, BUT IT WAS ALSO NONSENSE TO EXPECT THAT THE PROPOSED
ENVISAGED COULD, IN FACT, BEGIN WITH A CEASE-FIRE. THE HISTORY OF
MOST CONFLICTS OF THIS CHARACTER SHOWED HOW UNREALISTIC IT WAS TO
HOP FOR A CEASE-FIRE, AT LEAST IN THE INITIAL STAGES. IN ANY
CASE, THE FRENCH REMAINED OF THE VIEW (AND WAS IT CONSIDERED
A GOOD) BETWEEN THE FRENCH, ENGLAND AND THE ARAB STATES THAT
THE ARAB STATES WOULD REFUSE TO RETURN TO THE AREA UNLESS HE HAD SOME
MORE SUBSTANTIAL GUARANTEES. HEICE DE LEUSSE'S FULL AGREEMENT
WITH YOUR PARA. 4(B). HE ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD NOW BE
ESSENTIAL TO HAVE A DISCUSSION WITHIN THE FOUR POWER GROUP OF THE
PROBLEM OF FRONTIERS. GIVEN THE RELATIVE PROGRESS ON WITHDRAWAL
AND PEACE, IT SHOULD BE USEFUL TO SEE WHAT COULD NOW BE ACHIEVED
ON FRONTIERS. AND IN ANY CASE THE RUSSIANS WOULD PROBABLY INSIST ON
THIS (SEE M.I.F.T.) KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET WOULD BE INSTRUCTED ACCORD-
INGLY. DE LEUSSE THEN REVERTED TO THE RUSSIAN CRITICISM THAT THEIR
OWN MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE ON PEACE WAS BEING DISREGARDED BY
THE AMERICANS. THE RUSSIANS PROFESSED TO BE PARTICULARLY IRRITATED
BY THE TIMING OF THE AMERICAN INITIATIVE. THE AMERICANS HAD
CHOSEN TO LAUNCH IT AT VIRTUALLY THE SAME MOMENT AS THE RUSSIANS
(AS THEY SAW IT) HAD MADE A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD, A STEP OF
WHICH THE AMERICANS APPEARED TO BE TAKING NO ACCOUNT WHATEVER.

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS TELNO. 604 TO F.C.O.

-3-

41 DE LECASSE SAID THAT THE FRENCH WERE NOW AWAITING THE CONSIDERED REACTIONS FROM THE PARTIES. THE PRELIMINARY REACTIONS THEY HAVE SO FAR RECEIVED FROM CAIRO AND AMMAN ARE BROADLY THE SAME AS THOSE DESCRIBED IN CAIRO TEL. NO. 737 (PARAS. 1 AND 2) AND AMMAN TEL. NO. 337.

SEE M.I.F.T.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, MOSCOW, TEL AMIV, UKRIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

MR. SOAMES.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

N.A.D.

ARABIAN DEPT

W.E.D.

E.E.S.D.

AMERICAN DEPT

U.N.D.

RESEARCH DEPT (W.E. SECTION)

RESEARCH DEPT (SOVIET SECTION)

RESEARCH DEPT (AMERICAN SECTION)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

20250

25 JUL 1970

[illegible]

Journal of Management Education 30(6)p.789-804

CONFIDENTIAL

APPROXIMATE DISTRIBUTION:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

01 JUL 1979

TELETYPE PARIS

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELETYPE NUMBER 594

24 JUNE 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED TO F C O TELETYPE NUMBER 594 OF 24 JUNE 1979 RFI PRIORITY
TO UKNIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON ROUTINE TO AMMAN BEIRUT CAIRO
MOSCOW TEL AVIV.

MR PALLISER'S TEL. NOS. 582 AND 583: U.S. INITIATIVE ON THE
MIDDLE EAST.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT THE U.N. MONDAY SUMMONED THE U.S.
AMERICAN MINISTER AND GAVE HIM A CLEAR MESSAGE CONCERNING THE
FRENCH GOVERNMENT TOOK GRAVE EXCEPTION TO THE WAY IN WHICH THE U.S.
INITIATIVE HAD BEEN LAUNCHED: AND WERE ALSO DISSATISFIED WITH THE
SUBSTANCE OF WHAT THE AMERICANS WERE PROPOSING. IT WAS DEPLORABLE
THAT THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF THE AMERICAN IDEAS IN
THE FOUR POWER GROUP BEFORE THEY WERE SUBMITTED TO THE PARTIES. THIS
STROKE A SERIOUS BLOW AT THE PROSPECT OF SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE
EMERGING FROM THE FOUR POWER GROUP AT A TIME WHEN THERE HAD AT LAST
SEEMED SOME SLIGHT HOPE OF THIS: AND IT AFFORDED AN EXCELLENT
OPPORTUNITY TO THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT OF GETTING OFF THE HOOK OF THE
FOUR POWER EXERCISE, WHICH THEY HAD CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED. THE FRENCH
WERE ALSO INDIGNANT THAT THEY HAD APPARENTLY BEEN VIRTUALLY THE LAST
TO LEARN ABOUT THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS. (M. DE NANTEUIL, WHO WAS
ALSO PRESENT, INTERRUPTED M. ALPHAND AT THIS STAGE TO DEMUR THAT THIS
WAS NOT TRUE OF THE YUGOSLAVS.) M. ALPHAND CONTINUED THAT, APART
FROM THE DISCOURTEOUS AND UNSKILFUL WAY IN WHICH THE U.S. INITIATIVE
HAD THUS BEEN HANDLED SO FAR AS AMERICA'S PARTNERS IN THE FOUR POWER
GROUP WERE CONCERNED, THE FRENCH REMAINED OF THE VIEW THAT IT WAS
POINTLESS TO TRY TO RE-LAUNCH JARRING ON SUCH AN UNSUBSTANTIAL BASIS.
HE MUST BE GIVEN MORE SUBSTANTIVE COVERAGE IF HE WAS TO HAVE ANY
HOPE OF SUCCESS. THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL MORE IN THE SAME VEIN. THE
ONLY POINT ON WHICH ALPHAND CONCEDED SOME MERIT TO THE AMERICANS
WAS IN THEIR READINESS TO LET JARRING DECIDE THE PROCEDURE FOR
CONDUCTING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES (SEE PARA 1 OF
MR PALLISER'S TEL. NO. 583). HE CONCLUDED BY TELLING BLAKE THAT
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT COULD NOT EXPECT TO RECEIVE ANY FRENCH SUPPORT
FOR THEIR PROPOSALS.

2. BY A COINCIDENCE, MY U.S. COLLEAGUE WAS SEEING M. SCHUMANN
ON ANOTHER MATTER AT THE SAME TIME AND SCHUMANN RAISED THE MIDDLE
EAST WITH HIM ALSO. BUT, ACCORDING TO BLAKE, HE USED MORE MODERATE
LANGUAGE THAN ALPHAND AND LARGELY CONCENTRATED HIS CRITICISM OF THE U.S.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. INITIATIVE ON THE FACT THAT IT RISKED COMPROMISING THE WORK BEING DONE BY THE FOUR POWERS AND THEREBY MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR MY CONSTRUCTIVE GUIDANCE FOR JARRING TO EMERGE FROM THE FOUR POWER GROUP.

3. PALLISER GAVE BLAKE SOME ACCOUNT OF MY EARLIER TALK WITH SCHUMANN ON 22 JUNE (PARIS TEL. NO. 502) AND OF HIS OWN SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGE WITH NANTHEUIL. BLAKE, WHO HAD CLEARLY BEEN SHAKEN BY THE REPLY NANTHEUIL HE RECEIVED FROM ALPHAND, SAID THAT IN PRACTICE AND LEAVING ASIDE THE TONE OF ALPHAND'S REMARKS, THE CONTENT SEEMED BROADLY SIMILAR TO WHAT THE FRENCH HAD SAID TO US. HE HAD DONE HIS BEST TO REPLY TO ALPHAND'S CRITICISMS AND IN PARTICULAR TO CONTEST THE VIEW THAT THE AMERICANS WERE IN EFFECT TAKING THE WHOLE MATTER OUT OF THE HANDS OF THE FOUR POWER GROUP. HE HAD ALSO REBUTTED ALPHAND'S CLAIM THAT THE FRENCH HAD BEEN THE LAST TO LEARN ABOUT THE AMERICAN IDEAS. MOREOVER, HE TOOK SOME COMFORT FROM THE RELATIVE MODERATION OF THE TONE TAKEN BY M. SCHUMANN WITH HIS AMBASSADOR AND AGREED THAT IT WAS CHARACTERISTIC OF ALPHAND THAT HE SHOULD HAVE COINED HIS ARGUMENTS IN SUCH UNPLEASANT TERMS. ONE OF HIS MAIN CONCERNS WAS LEST THE FRENCH SHOULD NOT ONLY, AS ALPHAND SAID, REFUSE TO SUPPORT THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS, BUT MIGHT WORK MORE ACTIVELY AGAINST THEM BOTH IN ARAB CAPITALS AND WITH THE RUSSIANS, ETC. DURING TODAY'S TALKS AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY WITH VINOGRADOV.

4. THE AMERICANS ARE RIGHT TO DISCOUNT TO SOME EXTENT ALPHAND'S TEMPERAMENTAL DISPOSITION TO BE UNPLEASANT IF HE SEES A GOOD ENOUGH AND IT IS EQUALLY IN M. SCHUMANN'S DISPOSITION TO AVOID A ROW IF HE CAN. IT IS NOT THEREFORE SURPRISING THAT HE SHOULD HAVE TAKEN A MORE MODERATE LINE WITH MY U.S. COLLEAGUE. ON THE OTHER HAND, WHEN SCHUMANN SAW ME THIS AFTERNOON, HE REFERRED TO HIS TALK YESTERDAY WITH WATSON AND IMPLIED THAT HE HAD BEEN PRETTY SEVERE WITH HIM. IN ADDITION TO HIS CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FOUR POWER TALKS, HE HAD COMPLAINED TO WATSON ABOUT THE NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTS WHO HAD BEEN TAKEN INTO U.S. CONFIDENCE BEFORE THE FRENCH, AND HE WAS PRETTY SCORNFUL OF MY U.S. COLLEAGUE'S OBVIOUSLY RATHER NAIVE EFFORTS TO DEFEND HIMSELF. BUT SCHUMANN AT LEAST SAID THAT HE WAS PERSONALLY NOT DISPOSED TO SUSPECT THE AMERICANS OF A MACHIEVELLIAN ATTEMPT TO SABOTAGE THE FOUR POWER TALKS. (THE IMPLICATION OF THIS MAY BE THAT SOME FRENCH OFFICIALS HOLD THIS VIEW.) HE THOUGHT THE AMERICANS WERE BEING VERY CLUNSY. BUT HIS REAL CONCERN WAS THAT THEY SEEMED TO WANT TO SETTLE THINGS OVER THE HEADS OF THEIR PARTNERS. HIS PURPOSE, AND HE HOPED OURS, WAS TO CONTINUE TO WORK THROUGH THE FOUR POWER GROUP. I SAID THAT I WAS /SOME

WERE YOU WOULD AGREE WITH HIM IN NOT SUSPECTING THE AMERICANS OF
 MANIPULATION AND GAVE HIM A BRIEF INDICATION OF YOUR REACTION
 TO THE U.S. PROPOSAL, DRAWING TO SOME EXTENT ON PARA. 3 OF YOUR
 TEL. NO. 1 1994 TO WASHINGTON.

BEING AFRAID THAT TWO ASPECTS OF THIS MATTER WILL TEND TO
 ENERGE A LONG IRRITATION WITH THE AMERICANS, QUITE APART FROM THE
 EXISTING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM AND THE FRENCH, FIRST, THE
 FACT THAT INVOLVEMENT WITH THE FRENCH POLICE APPROACH AND THE
 CONVICTION THAT THE ONLY WAY THAT WE CAN REALLY BE HELD TO BE
 PLAYING ANY EFFECTIVE PART IS IF WE CAN DO SOMETHING OF ALL OUR OWN
 FROM THE MOON AND, SECONDLY, FRENCH DISSENT AT THE FACT THAT,
 AS THEY BELIEVE, THE AMERICANS DELIBERATELY FAILED TO INFORM THEM
 UNTIL A VERY LATE STAGE. AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN (PARA. 4 OF PARIS
 TEL. NO. 593) NANTEUIL BELIEVES THAT THE AMERICANS MUST HAVE TOLD
 THE RUSSIANS OF THEIR IDEAS BEFORE LAUNCHING THE EXERCISE. MOREOVER
 (ALTHOUGH THE FRENCH HAVE NOT SO NINTED TO US, I SHOULD BE SURPRISED
 IF THEY DID NOT SUSPECT THAT WE ALSO KNEW A GOOD DEAL MORE ABOUT
 AMERICAN THINKING AT AN EARLIER STAGE THAN THEY. (THE ITALIANS AND
 THE YUGOSLAVS CAN THEN BE THROWN IN FOR GOOD MEASURE.) IN THESE
 CIRCUMSTANCES, WHILE I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT M. SCHUMANN WOULD
 CONSCIOUSLY AUTHORISE HIS OFFICIALS TO WORK AGAINST THE AMERICAN
 INITIATIVE, I THINK THAT (PARTICULARLY IF FRENCH POSTS ABROAD
 TAKE THEIR CUE FROM THE RECORD THEY RECEIVE OF THE ALPHAND/BLAKE
 CONVERSATION) THERE MAY BE A RISK OF FRENCH DIPLOMATS BEING PRETTY
 UNHELPFUL IN ARAB CAPITALS. (AND, IN THIS CONTEXT, IT IS CLEARLY
 IMPORTANT THAT NONE OF US SHOULD SAY ANYTHING TO ANY FRENCHMEN THAT
 MIGHT ENCOURAGE THEIR SUSPICION THAT WE HAD FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE
 AMERICAN PLAN). ON THE OTHER HAND, IT MAY PARADOXICALLY BE NO BAD
 THING THAT VINOGRADOV SHOULD BE HERE WHILE THE FRENCH ARE IN THIS
 CAPTIOUS MOOD. SCHUMANN TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD NOT BE SEEING HIM
 UNTIL TOMORROW; BUT HE UNDERSTOOD FROM HIS OFFICIALS THAT
 VINOGRADOV WAS NOT TAKING TOO NEGATIVE A LINE TOWARDS THE U.S.
 INITIATIVE.

F C O PLEASE PASS PRIORITY TO UKHIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON ROUTINE
 TO AMMAN BEIRUT CAIRO MOSCOW TEL AVIV

MR. SOAMES

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

FILES

N.E.D.

NEWS DEPT.

N.A.D.

PRIVATE SECRETARY

ARABIAN DEPT.

P.S. TO P.U.S.

E.E.S.D.

SIR E. PECK

AMERICAN DEPT.

MR. PHILLIPS

U.N. DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

WILL

CONFIDENTIAL

P. J. S. Moon East



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

3 July, 1970

*It is a pity we were
not sent these telegrams
at the time. P.A.*

*M.
6/7*

Dear Peter,

Middle East

Thank you for your letter of 29 June about the Prime Minister's concern that we should consult very closely with the French about the Middle East. I have brought the Prime Minister's views on this to the attention of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

... Since we received Paris telegram No. 594 of 24 June, to which you referred in your letter, instructions have been sent to H.M. Ambassador in Paris to discuss the latest U.S. initiative with the French (FCO telegram No. 333 to Paris) and we have subsequently had reports of these discussions (Paris telegram Nos. 604 to 606). I enclose copies of these telegrams. Sir Alec Douglas-Home has also himself discussed the U.S. initiative with the French Ambassador and will of course be meeting M. Schumann in France on 15 July, when he will have a further opportunity to discuss the question.

The Prime Minister may like to know that we have in recent years held a regular series of official talks with the French on the Middle East (and on other geographical areas), the most recent of which took place in London on 18 June. On that occasion, officials agreed that it might be useful to hold a further round of talks once reactions to the U.S. initiative from the states in the area had become clear.

*Yours ever
P. J. S. Moon*

P. J. S. Moon, Esq.,
10 Downing Street.

CONFIDENTIAL

1. INITIATIVE ON THE FACT THAT IT RISKED COMPROMISING THE
TALKS BY THE FOUR POWERS AND THEREBY MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT
FOR ANY CONSTRUCTIVE GUIDANCE FOR JARRING TO EMERGE FROM THE FOUR
POWER GROUP.

2. PALLISTER GAVE BLAKE SOME ACCOUNT OF MY EARLIER TALK WITH
HIM ON 22 JUNE (PARIS TEL. NO. 502) AND OF HIS OWN SUBSEQUENT
EXCHANGE WITH HARTGILL. BLAKE, WHO HAD CLEARLY BEEN SHAKEN BY THE
ROUGH HANDLING HE RECEIVED FROM ALPHAND, SAID THAT IN PRACTICE AND
LEAVING ASIDE THE TONE OF ALPHAND'S REMARKS, THE CONTENT SEEMED
BROADLY SIMILAR TO WHAT THE FRENCH HAD SAID TO US. HE HAD SOME
DIBT TO REPLY TO ALPHAND'S CRITICISM AND IN PARTICULAR TO CONTRAST
THE VIEW THAT THE AMERICANS WERE IN EFFECT TAKING THE WHOLE MATTER
OUT OF THE HANDS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, AND THAT THE
ALPHAND'S CLAIM THAT THE FRENCH HAD BEEN THE LAST TO LEARN ABOUT
THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE
RELATIVE MODERATION OF THE TALKS WITH ALPHAND AND HAD BEEN
IMPRESSIONED AND AGREED THAT IT WAS CHARACTERISTIC OF ALPHAND THAT HE
SHOULD HAVE COINED HIS ARGUMENTS IN SUCH UNPLEASANT TERMS. ONE OF
HIS MAIN CONCERNS WAS LEST THE FRENCH SHOULD NOT ONLY, AS ALPHAND
SAID, REFUSE TO SUPPORT THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS, BUT MIGHT WORK
ACTIVELY AGAINST THEM BOTH IN ARAB CAPITALS AND WITH THE RUSSIANS,
E.G. DURING TODAY'S TALKS AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY WITH VINOGRADOV.
3. THE AMERICANS ARE RIGHT TO DISCOUNT TO SOME EXTENT ALPHAND'S
TEMPERAMENTAL DISPOSITION TO BE UNPLEASANT IF HE SEES A GOOD REASON.
AND IT IS EQUALLY IN H. SCHUMANN'S DISPOSITION TO AVOID A ROW IF HE
CAN. IT IS NOT THEREFORE SURPRISING THAT HE SHOULD HAVE TAKEN A
MORE MODERATE LINE WITH MY U.S. COLLEAGUE. ON THE OTHER HAND, WHEN
SCHUMANN SAW ME THIS AFTERNOON, HE REFERRED TO HIS TALK YESTERDAY
WITH WATSON AND IMPLIED THAT HE HAD BEEN PRETTY SEVERE WITH HIM. IN
ADDITION TO HIS CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FOUR
POWER TALKS, HE HAD COMPLAINED TO WATSON ABOUT THE NUMBER OF
GOVERNMENTS WHO HAD BEEN TAKEN INTO U.S. CONFIDENCE BEFORE THE
FRENCH, AND HE WAS PRETTY SCORNFUL OF MY U.S. COLLEAGUE'S
OBVIOUSLY RATHER NAIVE EFFORTS TO DEFEND HIMSELF. BUT SCHUMANN AT
LEAST SAID THAT HE WAS PERSONALLY NOT DISPOSED TO SUSPECT THE
AMERICANS OF A MACHIEVELLIAN ATTEMPT TO SABOTAGE THE FOUR POWER
TALKS. (THE IMPLICATION OF THIS MAY BE THAT SOME FRENCH OFFICIALS
HOLD THIS VIEW.) HE THOUGHT THE AMERICANS WERE BEING VERY CLUNSY, BUT
HIS REAL CONCERN WAS THAT THEY SEEMED TO WANT TO SETTLE THINGS ON
THE HEADS OF THEIR PARTNERS. HIS PURPOSE, AND HE HOPED OURS, WAS
TO CONTINUE TO WORK THROUGH THE FOUR POWER GROUP. I SAID THAT I WAS /SURE

CONFIDENTIAL

CRYPTER/CAT 'A'
PRIORITY MOSCOW
TELEGRAM NO. 798

RESTRICTED

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
4 JULY 1970

RESTRICTED.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.
798 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO CAIRO, AMMAN, TEL AVIV,
UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON PARIS AND BUCHAREST.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 606 PARA. 1 (NOT REPEATED TO ALL):

VISIT OF PRESIDENT NASSER.

THE U.A.R. AMBASSADOR TOLD ME LAST NIGHT (AT A RECEPTION
FOR THE SOVIET COSMONAUTS , ATTENDED BY PRESIDENT NASSER
AND HIS PARTY) THAT THE TALKS HAD GONE WELL, THAT SO
FAR THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN PUTTING HIS OWN VIEWS TO THE RUSSIANS
AND THAT IT STILL REMAINED FOR THEM TO REPLY. THE TALKS WOULD
HAVE TO BE FINISHED BY MONDAY AFTERNOON AT THE LATEST, IN
ORDER TO PERMIT THE SOVIET LEADERS TO TRAVEL TO BUCHAREST.

2. PRESIDENT NASSER WAS CHATTING WITH DIPLOMATS AND SEEMED
CHEERFUL.

3. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE IS DEPRESSED ABOUT SOVIET REACTION
TO U.S. INITIATIVE, BUT CAN OR WILL GIVE ME NO VERY CONCRETE
REASONS, BEYOND WHAT HAS OR HAS NOT APPEARED IN SOVIET PRESS.

FCO PLEASE PASS UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, PARIS AND BUCHAREST.

SIR DUNCAN WILSON.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION:

E.E.S.D.

~~SECRET~~

RESTRICTED

Soviet Policy 1967-70

A. Arms Supplies

Soviet policy since the 1967 war can conveniently be considered under two heads. First, the Russians quickly resolved that they should help to rebuild the shattered Arab defences. This they did rapidly and comprehensively. By 1969, the U.A.R. losses in armour, for example, had been wholly made good. However the Russians have been selective in the material which they have given to the U.A.R., apparently attempting so far as possible to limit Arab strategic offensive capability (e.g. by restricting the supply of medium bombers). In this, the Russians would contrast their policy with that of the Americans, who have been prepared to supply Israel with fighter-bombers such as the Phantom. Even by supplying SA-3 missiles and Soviet-manned fighter cover in the U.A.R. the Russians have confined themselves to reinforcing U.A.R. air-defences. They have thus avoided giving President Nasser any equipment which would strengthen the temptation for (or as he has publicly admitted the pressure on) him to try to retaliate against Israeli air raids in kind, although the increased confidence given to the Egyptians by the improved air defences has had the effect of increasing U.A.R. pressure on Israel's Canal lines. All the evidence suggests that the decision to supply the SA-3s was only taken after the Israeli deep-penetration raids had resulted in the virtual elimination of any effective air-defence capability in the U.A.R. It seems probable that the Russians intended their decisions as a defensive reaction to these developments, intended to neutralise at least in part the effect of Israeli military pressures on the U.A.R., although there may subsequently be a temptation to extend their involvement and make it more secure. In short, the Russians have fulfilled and are fulfilling what they no doubt regard as a commitment to defend the Arabs against Israel, while so far as possible limiting the risk of putting the Arabs in a position to contemplate another war against Israel in the foreseeable future, which the Russians must realise that the Arabs would lose.

B. The Search for a Settlement

2. The Aftermath of War.

Secondly, the Russians have taken a major part in activities connected with the promotion of a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. The initial Soviet reaction to the outbreak of war was to support the Arab call in the Security Council for Israeli withdrawal. However, by 6 June, when it was clear beyond doubt that the Israeli attack had been wholly successful, the Soviet Government, apparently without prior consultation with the Egyptians, began to support the appeal for a cease-fire without any proviso about withdrawal.

3. The Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly

After the Security Council's cease-fire resolutions had been passed, the Russians announced their request for an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly. This was no doubt intended as a device to try to recover through mobilising international support for the Arab Cause some of the prestige the Russians had lost by their failure to do anything to avert the military defeat. In the early stages of the Assembly, the Russians maintained total support for the Arab demand for complete Israeli withdrawal as a precondition for agreement on any other subject. (At this stage, the Americans were supporting the Israeli demand for negotiations before making any commitment on the terms of a settlement). When however the Arab-supported draft resolution (like the Latin American draft) was heavily defeated at the vote, the Russians changed tack and decided to continue to work for a substantive resolution, apparently in the face of Arab opposition. In the process, they seem to have been prepared to put some pressure on the Arabs, notably the U.A.R. (which Nasser visited specially and where Malik spent much of July). By the middle of July, the Russians put some compromise texts to the Americans during meetings between Goldberg and Gromyko. In these texts the Russians for the first time accepted that the principles of withdrawal and peace should be set on an equal footing. In the event, the drafts were rejected out of hand by the Arabs; the Russians did not proceed with them; and the Assembly was quickly adjourned.

4. The Security Council Meeting.

Between the Assembly and the Security Council meeting in November the Arab Summit took place at Khartoum. The Khartoum Declaration affirmed "the basic Arab commitment and conviction which entails non-recognition of Israel, nor conciliation nor negotiation with her", but clearly reflected Nasser's own preference for looking for a political way of redressing the Arabs' military defeat. Before the Security Council met, both the Americans and the Russians, no doubt reflecting the attitudes of the Israelis and the Arabs in the wake of the Khartoum Summit, had begun to withdraw somewhat from the formulae which both Goldberg and Gromyko had effectively been prepared to accept in July. When Lord Caradon began to canvass the British draft resolution at the Security Council (which embodied the same basic principles as these formulae, but added the proposal for the appointment of a Special Representative by the Secretary-General), both the Americans and the Russians reacted negatively. And although in the end both supported the Resolution, they each in effect made their support dependent on a gloss on the text - the Russians that it implied total withdrawal, the Americans, less explicitly, that it did not supplant the need for direct negotiations between the parties at some stage. The persistence of these two reservations about the Resolution, which reflected the reservations made by the U.A.R. and Israel in accepting the Resolution, has, of course, remained the greatest obstacle to the achievement of major power agreement on how it should be implemented.

5. The Soviet Proposals of September 1968.

For almost a year after the passage of the resolution, the

SECRET - U.K. EYES ONLY

Jarring mission held the stage. The same period saw the progressive breakdown of anything like a stable cease-fire regime. The continuation of hostilities (including notably growing fedayeen activity from Jordanian territory), which led notably to the major Israeli raid against Karameh in Jordan and the growing affirmation of Israeli control over Jerusalem (the Independence Day parade was held in East Jerusalem in May 1968) seriously muddled the waters for Jarring's efforts and, in particular, reduced such prospects as there may have been of Arabs accepting any kind of negotiation with Israel. By the summer of 1968, Jarring's attempts to get the parties to meet him under his auspices and to establish a meaningful dialogue between them had failed. At this stage (on 4 September) the Russians put to the Americans a set of proposals for a settlement. The Soviet document began with the statement that "the Soviet Government ... considers its contribution to the achievement of a Middle East settlement to be one of its principal foreign policy tasks". Its preamble said that "the persistence of tension in the Middle East and the continued illegal occupation by Israel of indigenous Arab territories cannot fail to cause concern to the Soviet government, since such a situation threatens the general peace". The document then set out, not always clearly (which may have reflected some bargaining with the Arabs), the content of a "possible plan" for a settlement drawn up on the basis of contacts with the governments of the "Arab states, above all that of the U.A.R.". This plan, which covered problems at issue between Israel and all her Arab neighbours, was chiefly remarkable for the fact that it had been worked out in considerable detail and that it contained a clear statement that the various elements of the settlement would be interrelated and interdependent, i.e. there would be an agreed timetable by which both sides would carry out their respective parts of the bargain, starting with Israeli withdrawal and the deposit of declarations by the Arabs on the cessation of the state of war etc. It is also interesting that the plan left the refugee problem, the problem of passage through the Suez Canal and Jerusalem for settlement separately and after the other problems. In short, the plan was little more than it purported to be, namely Arab views on how the Security Council Resolution should be implemented.

6. Mr. Rusk's "Seven Points" and U.S. Policy

In the period after the presentation of the Soviet plan, the search for a settlement, including notably American policy, became more active. As a result of a more forthcoming speech by Mr. Eban in the U.N. General Assembly (Mr. Eban's "nine points") Dr. Jarring was able to act as a messenger for exchanges between Mr. Eban and Mr. Riad. Although at first the Americans played no active part in this process, they later made some efforts to persuade the Israelis to make some clear commitments on territorial questions, though without success. At the same time on 4 November Mr. Rusk put to Mr. Riad seven points which might provide the

SECRET - U.K. EYES ONLY

basis for an agreement between Israel and the U.A.R. (they covered no other Arab country: however Israel was at that time trying to establish a secret negotiation with Jordan). These points represented a substantial advance on previous American ideas, although they were by no means a comprehensive "plan". They included Israeli withdrawal, though without specifying its extent, an irremovable international force at Sharm-el-Sheikh; a secret poll of the refugees; and a document recording the agreement to be signed by both Israel and the U.A.R. The U.A.R. reply in December insisted that Israel/U.A.R. problems could not be separated from other issues, did not accept the idea of a jointly signed document and stated that no U.N. force in Sinai could be permanent. The Americans were initially disappointed by this response and made no further move towards the U.A.R. before the new Administration took office. Another significant act of the Johnson régime before it left office was the announcement shortly before the Presidential election of the intention to conclude the first Phantom and Skyhawk deal with Israel, which introduced as from September 1969 weapons qualitatively different from any previously deployed in the Middle East on either side.

7. The Soviet Proposals of December 1968.

The continuing exchanges between the Russians and the Americans resulted in a further Soviet initiative in December. After a visit to Cairo by Gromyko, the Russians put to the outgoing Administration a new set of proposals which differed from those of September in several important respects and appear only to have been put forward after high-level pressure by the Russians on the Egyptians. On the major problem of peace, the proposals did not go beyond the language of Resolution 242. The principal novelties were that the proposals clearly stated the concept of a "package" settlement (including the refugee problem and freedom of navigation and presumably, though not explicitly, Jerusalem) and that they spoke of an "agreement" which would embody the settlement, as opposed to the parallel declarations which were the most the Arabs had been prepared to offer before. This agreement, the proposals suggested, might be a signed "multilateral document" (which we believe could be made as binding in international law as peace treaties of the kind which the Israelis have always advocated). The new proposals thus represented a significant move by the Russians on at least two points of considerable importance to the Americans and Israelis.

8. American Policy under President Nixon.

The American reply to these proposals was given by the outgoing Administration. It did not contain any detailed statement of the American position, but emphasized a number of salient points, notably the importance of negotiations between the parties (which had of course not been one of Mr. Rusk's seven points). Shortly thereafter, however, the imminent failure of Dr. Jarring's

SECRET - U.K. EYES ONLY

latest round of consultations made it necessary to devise some other way by which the search for a settlement could be pursued. The Nixon Administration, of which the Arabs entertained high hopes because of Governor Scranton's statement during a visit to the area that U.S. policy should be more "even-handed", was clearly resolved to try to make some progress in the direction of a settlement. The new Administration's first major decision was to agree to the French suggestion for four power talks as a means of providing a new basis for Dr. Jarring's mission and at the same time to embark on further bilateral discussions with the Russians. It soon became clear that in American minds the bilateral talks were the first priority and the Americans effectively prevented H.M.G. from making the move which we thought could lead to early progress in the four power talks (which began in April), namely acceptance of the idea that the settlement should be embodied in a multilateral document as the Russians had proposed. Instead, the Americans preferred to put proposals of their own to the Russians bilaterally.

9. The American Proposals of May 1969.

These proposals, which still only covered Israel/U.A.R. aspects of a settlement, were the first comprehensive plan which the U.S. Government had produced since June 1967. Their predominant feature was the heavy emphasis they put on negotiations, although it was recognised (as the Israelis had recognised in mid-1968 in dealing with the U.A.R. through Dr. Jarring) that these might at first be indirect. The proposals contained no positive commitment on boundaries, saying merely that the old international boundary "is not necessarily excluded". On Sharm-el-Sheikh, the proposals were less explicit than Mr. Rusk's seven points. They did, however, spell out in detail the meaning of "peace" (including the need to control the fedayeen) and the possible terms of a refugee settlement, including the imposition of an overall limit to the number of refugees to be repatriated (a point which had not been made by Mr. Rusk in November). In short, these proposals stood in relation to the Israeli position very much as the Soviet proposals stood in relation to the Arab position. But in certain senses the Arabs were likely to see them as less satisfactory than Mr. Rusk's seven points, discussion of which had of course run into the sand.

10. The Soviet Proposals of June 1969.

The Soviet reaction to the American proposals was surprisingly swift. After a further visit by Gromyko to Cairo, the Russians put to the Americans in June a third set of proposals (which again covered all the issues in dispute, although they were clearly mainly directed at Israel/U.A.R. issues). These contained further changes in the Soviet position. First, the Russians accepted the format of the American May proposals - that of a "pre-agreement" between the parties which would provide the basis for negotiations under Jarring. Secondly, the Soviet proposals

SECRET - U.K. EYES ONLY

contained a clearer statement than ever that all parts of the agreement would become binding before its implementation began and that the agreement would be signed by the parties to it. Thirdly, the proposals contained more detailed language on peace, mostly lifted verbatim from the American proposals, though with substantial omissions (e.g. on control of the fedayeen and the Arab boycott). They also contained substantial new proposals on a U.N. presence, on standard Soviet lines. In short, the Russians showed some willingness to move gradually closer to the American position in response to the American willingness to be more explicit about their own attitude.

11. The American Proposals of July 1969.

The Americans also reacted quickly to this Soviet move by producing new proposals in July. These contained one small, almost drafting, change in their position on the procedure by which a settlement would be achieved and incorporated some Soviet language. But they still made no clear statement on the principle of withdrawal and no explicit commitment on the Israel/U.A.R. boundary. They also showed a change on refugees - with the idea of annual quotas substituted for an overall ceiling (but this was in some ways less acceptable to the Arabs). The proposals as a whole represented less a move towards the Soviet position than a lateral extension of the previous American position. On vital points (peace, withdrawal and boundaries), the Americans stuck to their guns, arguing that they would not be justified in trying to "deliver" Israel without evidence of more movement on the Soviet side.

12. The Continuation of the Dialogue.

By this stage, however, the situation on the ground once more intervened to influence the search for a settlement. The intensification of the war on the Canal, the burning of the Al Aqsa mosque, leading as it did to the Islamic Summit in September and the Arab Summit in December, and the beginning, in January 1970, of Israeli deep penetration attacks on the U.A.R. all complicated the task of peacemaking. Nevertheless, the Americans and the Russians continued the dialogue, which reached a critical stage in October. The readiness of both the Russians and the Egyptians to give contingent agreement to a formula which referred to "the procedures utilised by the parties at Rhodes in 1949" (which the Americans proposed as a means of resolving the continuing divergence on procedure) seemed to offer hope. But the Israeli campaign to interpret this in public as meaning direct negotiations removed the ambiguity which was the virtue of "the Rhodes formula" from the Soviet and Arab point of view, and led to its eventual public rejection by the Arabs. Thus the new American proposals of 28 October (on Israel/U.A.R. issues) and 18 December (on Israel/Jordan issues, which were put forward in the four power talks) were fatally flawed before they were put forward. Despite the fact that they

SECRET - U.K. EYES ONLY

contained a clearer American commitment on boundaries than ever before, which made them substantially more attractive to the Arabs than previous American proposals, this flaw, the fact that they appeared to leave more issues open for negotiation between the parties than the July proposals, the somewhat confused way in which they were put forward and above all their rejection by the Israelis in December created a situation in which the Russians seemed not to have been able to decide easily or quickly how to react.

13. The End of the Dialogue: the Four Power Talks.

The Soviet reply to the U.S. proposals of 28 October was given in late December and was directed to a number of points (notably the absence of a clear statement on withdrawal, the increased emphasis on negotiation between the parties and the maintenance of the Rhodes formula) which made it impossible for them to consider the document, as the Americans had somewhat optimistically suggested, as a "joint Soviet-U.S. working paper". Meanwhile, the Americans and the Russians had both agreed to the resumption of the four power talks in December. The delivery of the Soviet reply and the short response which the Americans made to it effectively closed the dialogue and left the field to the four power talks. Soviet policy in the four power meetings must be seen against the background of the situation on the ground. During the early part of 1970, the Israelis intensified their bombing of the U.A.R. (leading to the attack on Abu Zaabal in February), while at the same time agitating actively for more Phantom and Skyhawk aircraft from the Americans. The presumption that these would be granted and the weakness of the U.A.R. as a result of Israeli bombing made any real move by the Arabs towards a compromise agreement effectively impossible and so tied the hands of the Soviet Government. At the same time, the difficulty the U.S. Government had in withstanding intense Zionist pressure to abandon the latest U.S. proposals and grant more aircraft to Israel redoubled American determination not to make any further move from their own positions, which they felt to be as exposed as was tolerable. Moreover, the Americans professed to believe that it was up to the Russians to produce the next move, possibly in the form of a more explicit position on commitments to peace. (The Russians, of course, have consistently held the converse belief - that the Americans should make a more explicit commitment on withdrawal). Thus any constructive moves in the four power talks became increasingly unlikely and the talks progressively resolved themselves into unprofitable exchanges between the Americans and the Russians, the former blaming the Arabs for their refusal to move on commitments to peace, the latter the Israelis for their opposition to withdrawal - a deadlock, in fact, which reflected the reservations which both sides had always placed on the resolution itself. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the Russians asked the Americans in March, shortly after the arrival of SA-3s in the U.A.R. was confirmed, to resume the dialogue, a move which may indicate a desire to reopen more serious discussions than had been possible

SECRET - U.K. EYES ONLY

in the four power context in a situation in which the U.A.R. was no longer under heavy pressure from Israel. Since only preliminary meetings have so far been held, however, it is impossible to know whether the Russians intend to make any significant new move. While it would be consistent with their general approach in the previous period to have extracted some new concession from the U.A.R. in exchange for the supply of SA-3s and the increased security which these have given the U.A.R., there has been no sign so far of their having done so.

SECRET - U.K. EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

MIDDLE EAST

see note attached to
FCO letter to Mr. Inoué
d. 3/7/70.

P.A.

Am.

13/7

K2h

The attached F.C.O. paper describes briefly the state of play in the Soviet/American dialogue on the Middle East and in the Four-power talks.

The main events of current interest are:-

- (i) the recent U.S. initiative (on which you have seen the telegrams); and
- (ii) the new Soviet proposals on the question of Arab commitments to peace.

The latter are referred to in paragraph 4 of the F.C.O. note. In rather more detail, what they amount to is Russian acceptance that language on commitments to peace should cover control of the Fedayeen; an end of the economic boycott of Israel; and the establishment of a formal state of peace.

These are substantial concessions by the Russians who now look to the Americans to produce something on Israeli withdrawal which is the balancing factor to Arab commitments to peace.

The F.C.O. have also sent me a long but interesting paper giving their assessment of the real nature of Soviet policy towards the Arab/Israel dispute. You may like to look at the conclusions in this paper from paragraph 15 to paragraph 19 which I have sidelined (Flag A).

Am.

CONFIDENTIAL

July 6, 1970

SECRET-UK EYES ONLY

Soviet Policy towards an
Arab-Israel Settlement

Scope of the Paper

The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature and development of Soviet policy towards a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute since the June War.

Introduction

2. The Soviet Union became more active in the Middle East in 1955, when the U.A.R. was seen as a stepping stone beyond the Western containment pacts in a new campaign for influence in Asia and Africa and when Western, and especially U.S., tactics over the financing of the Aswan High Dam project offered a golden opportunity to the Soviet Union, as well as representing a considerable provocation of the U.A.R. This approach was conceived as the most effective and safest way of pursuing Communist objectives in the nuclear age. Political and economic support in connection with the Suez crisis enabled the Russians to consolidate and extend their influence. In the early phases, the Russians, specially during the period in which Khrushchev dominated Soviet policy, were not always forced to face up directly to the political and economic implications of their actions; these have impressed themselves increasingly on Khrushchev's successors. They inherited aspirations and commitments which have become increasingly difficult to fulfil, especially after the acuteness of the risks were demonstrated by the June War. The problems of the collective Politburo have no doubt been increased by internal disagreements with the general policy of prudence and caution (for which there is occasional evidence in statements by suspected 'hard-liners' about support for 'Arab victory' or for the Fedayeen). Nasser has also referred privately to the influence of the Minister of Defence, who we believe to be interested at least in neutralising Israeli military pressures.

3. In view of these complexities, it is probably unrealistic for us to think in terms of a single consistent line of Soviet policy. It seems more probable that individual decisions have been weighed, as events and opportunities have dictated a need, in the light of conflicting considerations about aspirations and the restraints on them, commitments, and security risks. These might be defined broadly as follows:

- a) Aspirations have indicated the broad lines of action without posing any urgency or requiring either progress or retreat at a particular time.

SECRET-UK EYES ONLY

They include:

- (i) a consistent desire to increase influence and apply pressure in the Arab world, and to use this as a base for extending influence more widely in Africa and Asia.
- (ii) a corresponding hope of damaging Western interests, reducing Western influence, limiting Western freedom of action, and undermining the southern flank of NATO.
- (b) the restraints have included the following:
 - (i) the complexities of Arab politics which the Russians must have come to perceive more sharply. As we, and to a lesser extent the Americans, have found in the past, direct involvement in the Middle East, as contrasted with the rôle of outside critic, carries its own risk. The Arabs are by no means willing to play the Soviet game; nor do the Russians wish to support all Arab intentions (e.g. Nasser's aggressiveness or his pan-Arab aspirations). At the same time, the political instability of many Arab countries and their economic, technical and social backwardness are an uncertain foundation for the development of strong and lasting influence.
 - (ii) There are limits to the pressures the Russians can apply without undermining their clients. The Russians do not seem to have pressed for the opening of the Suez Canal for example, although this would appear to be very much in their interest. They would no doubt like to establish a clandestine institutional base (for example in the police, armed forces and political organisations) the creation of regimes which were both more stable and more sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Their advocacy of a purge of Westernised officers in the Egyptian forces after the 1967 defeat was a sign of this. But to be detected in trying to do this would alienate their present support. Exaggerated pressure on Arab régimes would not only clearly undermine the present basis of Soviet influence but also set up at every level Arab opposition to that influence. Furthermore, after their experience with Mao and Castro, they would probably not at present wish to encourage the establishment of an Arab variant of Communism.
 - (iii) the Russians cannot undertake to replace all the Western economic links (notably derived from oil) in the Arab world, from which the Arab countries derive great profits. This has limited, for example, their efforts to undermine Western oil interests.

SECRET-UK EYES ONLY

- (iv) in order to avoid being outflanked on the left they have to compete with Chinese opportunism and militancy. They cannot ignore, for example, the possibility of a Fedayeen takeover in Jordan.
- (c) the main Commitments, which represent a stake not lightly to be jeopardised, are:
 - (i) about two fifths of all economic aid to non-communist countries (amounting to over 2½ milliard dollars) has been extended to Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Algeria (in descending order).
 - (ii) about one quarter of military aid to non-communist countries (nearly 1½ milliard dollars) has been given to Egypt and a further quarter to Iraq, Syria and Algeria. The U.A.R., Iraq and Syria are almost wholly dependent on Soviet weapons and equipment. Until recently there were about 5,000 military advisers in the U.A.R; now there may be as many as 10,000.
 - (iii) the influential and valuable political position as defender of the Arab cause on Palestine which their economic and military involvement and the evolution of the Arab-Israel dispute have created and which has increasingly involved the commitment of Soviet prestige.
- (d) Security and risks.
 - (i) The Middle East (because of US involvement) probably ranks third, after Eastern Europe and China, in the expenditure of political and military effort to preserve Soviet interests. This is largely a question of wishing to avoid political setbacks in an area where Soviet prestige is very obviously engaged. But the Russians probably also see a direct security interest: the area of national security interest, conceived largely in terms of preventing a Western presence, is tending to expand. One reason for this is the fact that about half of Soviet merchant shipping is based on the Black Sea, with a consequently great need for its protection.
 - (ii) the risks are seen largely to arise from an explosive increase in tension in the Arab dispute with Israel, or some imprudent act by either side which could embroil the super-powers.

4. The trends which have been detectable in Soviet behaviour as a result of the operation of these factors are as follows:

- (i) a harder calculation of risks, commitments, and advantages. This has led on the whole to prudence and caution, but also to the acceptance of the risks involved in greatly increased military involvement when this is

SECRET-UK EYES ONLY

considered necessary or desirable in order to protect the Soviet position in the area.

- (ii) increasing interest, as Soviet strength has grown, in the demonstration of power to offset the dominance of the US (exemplified in the build-up of the Mediterranean fleet to a regular level of around 12 surface combatant ships and up to ten submarines, plus auxiliaries).

Soviet Motives in the Search for a Settlement

5. An analysis of recent Soviet policy must be made against this background. The development of Soviet policy since the 1967 war and its relationship to events in the area and to the evolution of American policy are summarised in the study which forms the Appendix to this paper. It emerges clearly from this study that the Russians have since the June War, though more actively at some periods than at others, been prepared to take initiatives connected with a settlement of the kind laid down in the Security Council Resolution of November 1967. Their activities to this end have on a number of occasions involved pressure on the U.A.R. and, in the early phases at least, were not matched by any comparable initiatives by the Americans, who were largely content to "give Israel carte blanche to seek a settlement" (in the words of one well placed U.S. official). (On 21 October 1968, the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, told Sir P. Dean of his "personal guess that at the end of the day the parties to the dispute would find their own way to resolve the questions at issue"). As early as July 1967 the Russians evidently calculated that only an agreement broadly on the lines later embodied in the Security Council Resolution could realistically be expected as the basis for a political settlement in the Middle East. As time went on, the Russians seem to have accepted that such a settlement would have to be on a "package" basis and that they, acting on behalf of the Arabs, would have to make some compromises to this end. During 1968/9 the steady evolution of Soviet proposals reflected shifts in their position, similar to and at times more substantial than those made by the Americans and the Israelis on their side.

6. One arguable explanation of the Soviet moves is that the Russians have wished only to appear to be negotiating seriously for a settlement and to seek by this means to meet their basic needs for the avoidance of confrontation with the U.S.A. and the reduction of the cost of and strain on their relations with their Arab clients. But this explanation is by no means altogether satisfactory. It is hard to reconcile with the facts (cp. the Appendix) that the Russians have been prepared to move ahead of the Arab position on critical points (e.g. the acceptance of the "package" and the signature of an agreement with Israel). This explanation also pre-supposes an extremely short term and optimistic Soviet analysis of the situation in the Arab world (cp. para. 9 below). A much more satisfactory hypothesis, on the evidence available, is that the Russians have been genuinely interested in

SECRET-UK EYES ONLY

working for a settlement based on the Resolution, albeit not at any price. In this sense, Soviet policy has been consistent with Soviet descriptions of their policy, e.g. in the preamble to their proposals of September 1968 (cited in paragraph 5 of the Appendix) and in Mr. Kosygin's messages of February 1970, which said:-

"We proceed from the belief that lasting peace can and must be established in the Middle East. The Soviet Union strives invariably to achieve this aim and influences its friends accordingly".

(It is of some interest that these messages have not been published).

7. At the same time, it is clear that the Russians have not been prepared to undertake to produce Arab agreement to the terms of a compromise settlement unless there was some sign that the Americans were prepared to reciprocate. It is probably no coincidence that the most serious Soviet efforts appear to have been made in the period September 1968 to October 1969, and especially after President Nixon's inauguration, when there was good reason to hope for greater flexibility in American policy; and that their apparently diminished interest thereafter coincided with clear evidence of the difficulty which the Americans would have in producing Israeli agreement even to the "Rogers proposals" of October and December of 1969 and with the persistent refusal of the Israelis to make any clear commitment on withdrawal (or, indeed, at times to use the word at all). In the same way, the Soviet request to resume the U.S./Soviet dialogue in March 1970 came very soon after the American decision not to sell more Phantoms to Israel had given some evidence of the U.S. Government's willingness and ability to withstand Israeli and American Zionist pressures and also after the arrival of Soviet SA-3s in the U.A.R. had created a situation in which the U.A.R. Government was no longer under heavy military pressure from Israel. It will not be possible to judge whether the desire to resume the dialogue reflects a genuine Soviet determination to make further progress until the first exchanges in the new series have taken place. It might be argued that by taking this initiative the Russians were hoping to achieve little more than to engage the Americans in negotiation so as to dissuade them from a strong response to the new Soviet military commitments in the UAR. It is however significant that in mid-June the Russians shifted their position on three points which the Americans had previously emphasised as of great importance.

8. Why might the Russians have assessed that a settlement on the lines laid down in the Security Council Resolution would serve their interests better than the other options open to them? There may be several reasons for this (in addition to direct interests, e.g. the re-opening of the Suez Canal). First, the Russians do not appear to equate the achievement of a political settlement with the attainment of peace. More realistically, they see that a settlement would not mean the end of tensions between the Arabs and the Israelis, and so of tensions between the Arabs and the Americans, and would not therefore lead to the disappearance of the prime basis for the growth and extension of their influence in the Middle East. Conversely, they may calculate that the extent and nature of their influence in the U.A.R. and other Arab countries is now

SECRET-UK EYES ONLY

such that they no longer need to rely on instability such as that created by the Arab-Israel dispute to sustain their position. Admittedly, the Arabs might become reconciled to some degree with the West after a settlement was achieved. But so long as Israel existed the reconciliation would be limited and Soviet influence safe. Admittedly, too, the willingness of the U.A.R. to accept a direct Soviet commitment to its defence might decline. But this would have clear compensating advantages. Overall, there are good reasons for believing that the Soviet position in the Arab world need not be substantially, if at all, diminished by a settlement and in some respects, e.g. if the Russians succeeded in appearing as having brought about Israeli withdrawal, it could be improved. Soviet diplomats have on occasion used these arguments in terms and there seems no reason to disbelieve them, since their assessment is the same as our own.

9. Secondly, the Russians seem since July 1967 to have calculated that the absence of a settlement based on the Security Council Resolution (and they no doubt rightly interpret the Israeli position as ruling out any arrangement which would offer withdrawal at a lesser price to the Arabs) could very well create in the Middle East tensions of a sort which would hardly suit the interests which they have been building up in the Arab world (see paragraph 2 (c) above). It is by no means obvious that the nature and degree of influence the Russians would be able to exercise in an Arab world still more unstable than at present (the likely consequences of a persistence of the Arab-Israel dispute) would suit them better than their position with present Arab régimes. The innate caution of the present Soviet leadership makes it all the more probable that this would be their assessment. The position of the fedayeen is particularly important in this connection. The fedayeen notably A.F. tar, have not hesitated to look to both Moscow and Peking as sources of support. Arafat visited both in early 1970. The Russians have remained cautious in their attitude towards the fedayeen. But they must see the growing strength of the Palestinians at least to some extent as a threat to their present bases of influence in the Middle East. Significantly, when they did seem to be developing their contacts with the fedayeen in early 1970, they appear to have been at pains to point out that Soviet policy was to work for a political settlement based on the Security Council Resolution, which of course the Palestinians reject.

10. Thirdly, the Russians have had to reckon with the possibility that the Arab-Israel dispute could once more escalate into a major confrontation. The Russians must be as well aware as the West of the reality of this danger, which implies a dilemma for them. On the one hand, short of outright Soviet involvement comparable to that of the Americans in Vietnam, the Russians must calculate that the Arabs would in any future war suffer another defeat at the hands of Israel. This result would be both costly to the Russians and politically damaging to their hopes of extending their influence further. For although the Arabs would admittedly have nowhere else to turn for arms, the task of rebuilding Arab confidence in the Russians would be daunting; the pressures on the Russians

SECRET-UK EYES ONLY

to undertake more extensive and risky direct military commitments in the area than they have hitherto willingly contemplated would be strong; and the prospect that the Arabs would in any case be forced to make an unfavourable settlement with a victorious Israel would be sufficiently real to take account of. Alternatively, the Russians would face the danger of a direct confrontation with the Americans, a danger which becomes potentially greater as the Soviet military stake in the area increases and one which the Russians have shown every sign of wishing to avoid. Since the avoidance of confrontation with the Americans must be assumed to be one of their basic objectives and since an obvious risk of such confrontation has, in varying degree, existed since June 1967, it may reasonably be inferred that the Russians have wished, without sacrificing any other important interest, to contain this risk. As is argued above, they have probably assessed can ultimately only be done by a settlement.

11. Do the Russians still assess the situation in the same way as they appear to have done when the international search for a settlement was at its most intense - i.e. in September 1968 - October 1969? As paragraph 13 of the Appendix makes plain, the presentation of the American proposals of October 1969 in the guise of a "draft US-USSR working paper" was the last major move in the series of Soviet-American exchanges before June 1970. Thereafter, the search for a settlement on both sides became becalmed and other issues, notably the intensification of hostilities in the area and the problem of arms supplies to both sides, became dominant. Has there, during this period, been a fundamental change in Soviet policy? A priori, a number of reasons can be suggested why there might have been such a change. First, the Russians might have begun to calculate that their increased military involvement in the area has had the effect (even though this was almost certainly not the reason for it, see paragraph 1 of the Appendix) of transforming the situation. It has, so the calculation might go, neutralised Israeli military pressures against the U.A.R. to the point where a reasonably stable situation will develop which, while short of a settlement, will come to be accepted by the Egyptians (c.f., for example, the periods 1951-6 and 1957-1967) and so to be tolerable to the Russians. And, partly as a consequence of this, it could be said to have reduced to an acceptably low level the danger of direct confrontation with the Americans who, the Russians might argue, will henceforth be obliged in their own interest of avoiding confrontation with the Russians to restrain Israel from a forward military policy. If the Russians do make such calculations, they might conclude that a situation could now evolve which would satisfy their basic needs without requiring them to make the effort necessary to bring the Arabs to make a settlement. Such an outcome, if it materialised, would represent a significant achievement of Soviet policy.

12. Another reason why Soviet policy might have undergone a basic change is that the Russians may have concluded that the Americans, and still less the Israelis themselves, are not seriously interested in a settlement on terms which could be accepted by the Arabs. After almost a year of negotiating with the Nixon Administration, they may have assessed that the Americans are never likely to be

SECRET-UK EYES ONLY

prepared to use the degree of influence necessary to bring Israel to accept a reasonable compromise settlement. The fact that the Americans could not prevent Israel from publicly rejecting the "Rogers proposals" in late 1969, which contrasted strongly with the care taken by the Russians themselves to secure prior Arab agreement to their own sets of proposals in 1968/9, may have seemed particularly significant to the Russians, quite apart from complicating the task of the Russians in agreeing with the Arabs any constructive response to these American proposals (see paragraph 13 of the Appendix). Conversely, the Russians may be tempted to argue that the only logic that the Israelis will ever heed is the logic of force and that the deterrent effect of the Soviet military presence in the U.A.R. is more likely to bring about a moderation in Israeli policy than, for example, U.S. political pressure. The fact that there appears to have been a substantial and unusual growth of doubt about the rectitude of Israeli policy within Israel since the arrival of the SA-3s might lend force to this argument. And if this argument carried weight, the Russians could be expected to exploit to the full the present uncertainties about their future intentions in the U.A.R. as a means of increasing the pressure on Israel (even though this tactic is, of course, double-edged since so long as these uncertainties persist, the Israelis will have a valuable lever to use in trying to extract greater American support).

13. At the same time, the Russians have to reckon with the effect on the U.A.R. leaders of their new-found security. This may well have had the salutary (for the Russians) result of diminishing, at least for the time being, Egyptian demands for more military support. But it has also had the results, which were almost certainly partly if not wholly unforeseen by the Russians, of inducing a largely irrational confidence in the Egyptians in the strength of their position, which is likely to lead, at least for a time, to a greater inflexibility about the terms of a settlement; and of provoking an intensification of the Egyptian war of attrition, thus strengthening the hands of the more extreme tendencies in Israel (with consequent feedback onto Egyptian thinking about Israeli inflexibility). This elaborate structure of cause and effect may well have the result, of reducing Soviet freedom of manoeuvre in working constructively for a settlement even supposing they wished to do so.

14. All these reasons can be adduced to explain why Soviet policy might recently have given lower priority to participation in the search for a settlement and laid greater emphasis on a hard and uncompromising approach towards Israel and the United States. The available evidence does not permit a conclusive judgment as to whether there has been any fundamental change in the Soviet interest in achieving a settlement. On balance, however, the reasons for supposing that such a change has already taken place do not carry conviction. They pre-suppose a Soviet assessment of the risks to their position that is essentially very short-term, since in the medium or longer term the present trend towards the degeneration of the situation both between the Arab countries and Israel and, more importantly, within the Arab world itself is a way that is likely to threaten the Soviet position and to expose the failure of

Soviet diplomacy in support of the Arabs, seems strongly established. And in any case, developments in the region since December 1969 and the lack of tactical address in the presentation of U.S. policy (see paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Appendix) seem more than adequate as explanations of the less flexible appearance of Soviet policy during this period. There seems little reason to doubt, however, that recent developments will have caused Soviet policy makers to re-examine the arguments in favour of a less cautious approach. Thus, if the search for a settlement fails to make any headway, the Russians may well be tempted to experiment further in the use of the direct application of Soviet power as a means of stabilising the situation and reducing Israeli pressures on the Arabs. (Such a policy could have some very important consequences, of which one is worth noting. The growth in influence of the fedayeen in these circumstances would almost certainly cause the Russians to intensify their contacts with and support for the fedayeen. This would be likely to put them under increasing pressure, sooner or later, to subscribe to something like the current Palestinian insistence on the creation of a multinational state in Palestine. Were the Russians to do this, it would imply withdrawal of Soviet support for the existence of Israel which has so far not been affected by Arab demands. They would in any case be likely to move cautiously and not to get ahead of the U.A.R. and other Arab regimes. But in this connection, the curious and so far unexplained incident in April when the Soviet press attachés in Iraq and Jordan stated that the Russians were in favour of the "establishment of a democratic Palestinian state", the "elimination of Zionism" and "a full struggle against the Golda Meir government" is possibly significant).

Some Conclusions

15. As has been suggested above, it would be wrong to suppose that there has been a consistent single line of Soviet policy since 1967. The Russians no doubt, like ourselves, see many uncertainties in the Middle East situation and their policy may well be influenced by these. Nevertheless, the preceding analysis suggests a number of other conclusions about future Soviet policy. First, the Russians, like the Americans, see a settlement coming about, if at all, only by means of concessions being made by both sides. Whenever the Russians show interest in working towards a settlement, their willingness to use their influence with the Arabs will depend on evidence of American willingness and ability to do the same with Israel. (Since the converse proposition is also true, it is fair to say that in this sense Soviet policy is the mirror image of American policy). The more evidence the Russians see that the Americans are only interested in a settlement on what the Russians consider to be fundamentally Israeli terms, or that Israel is in any case unwilling to settle on terms which the Russians believe the Arabs could be brought to accept, the less seriously are the Russians likely to be prepared to pursue efforts to promote a settlement. In this situation, the search for a settlement will tend simply to reflect the basic divergence between the two sides reflected in the reservations each has always made on the terms of the Resolution itself (cp. paras. 4 and 13 of the Appendix).

SECRET-UK EYES ONLY

16. Secondly, the Russians will not be prepared in the future any more than in the past to pay an unlimited price for a settlement in terms of their relations with the Arabs. Their commitments to the Arabs and the constraints imposed on the Russians by these commitments (see paragraph 2 (b)) are no less real than the constraints imposed on the US Government by their relations with Israel. Some of these constraints are largely intrinsic to Soviet/Arab relations - for example Soviet commitments in extreme Arab countries such as Syria and also the steady growth in influence of the fedayeen which has narrowed the margin of manoeuvre, at least in public, of the Arab régimes. But others are of a different order. Thus, Israeli military policy and its influence on the willingness of the Arab leaders to approach a settlement will continue, as it did notably in the early part of 1970, to influence Soviet ability to work constructively for a settlement. Signs of Israeli "expansionism" will likewise both make it harder for the Russians to contribute to a settlement and reduce the dividends of their doing so by making any prospective terms seem less palatable to the Arabs. The Arab belief in Israeli aggressiveness and expansionism, which the Russians very probably share to a considerable extent, is the mirror image of the Israeli belief in Arab unwillingness to make peace, which the Americans share to an equivalent extent. Both beliefs have equally inhibiting effects on the ability or willingness of the super-powers to influence their clients.

17. Thirdly, the Soviet attitude will be conditioned to some extent by the progress of their dialogue with the United States (and their assessment of U.S. policy) in other fields, e.g. SALT, East-West relations, Indochina, etc.

18. Fourthly, even if they continue seriously to work for a settlement, the Russians will continue to provide the Arabs with military assistance in increasing quantities if necessary. They will probably not be keen to extend their direct involvement in the area where this seems to them to involve substantial risks. But if they again consider it necessary militarily to do so, they will probably act accordingly.

19. Finally, were there to be any sign (and it may well seem as unlikely to the Russians as it does to the West) that the situation in the area could be stabilised sufficiently for any substantial period without a settlement, this would be likely to weaken Soviet interest in a settlement because it would enable the Russians to retain the maximum opportunity to expand their influence without having to pay the price of trying to bring the Arabs to accept unpalatable terms. Such would be a state of "controlled tension", although the history of the Arab-Israeli confrontation has shown few signs that such control could be assured. But in any event, the Russians will continue to work by all available means to consolidate and extend their influence in the area and, if events since 1967 are any guide, they will show resource and determination in doing so.

Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
22 June, 1970.

E.R.

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 1 of 7 copies

7A - F

SIR BURKE TREND

cc Sir D Greenhill
Sir E Peck
Sir H Maguire
Sir D White

CABINET OFFICE
5286
1 JUL 1970
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

Arab-Israel

On the basis of evidence which needs fuller assessment it is my tentative view that the Israelis may be very close to concluding that the military tide has turned against them. I do not mean that they have inadequate equipment to defend themselves or that they would believe the Arabs, even with some Russian backing, could or would attack Israel at present. It is in a special sense and on a narrow front that they may judge the tide has turned. The Israelis may now conclude that a continuation of their present tactics is unlikely to prevent the Russians in due course from defending the Canal Zone as they now defend the rear areas in the UAR.

2. The Israelis have frequently and publicly said that it would be intolerable to them if the Russians defended the Canal Zone while the Egyptians continued to carry out military operations across the Canal. Mrs Meir, amongst others, has publicly stated that in these circumstances the Israelis would not scruple to tangle with the Russians as well as the Egyptians.

3. The situation foreseen by Mrs Meir has not yet come about but it has progressed so far that the Israelis may well think that it is all but inevitable. In such circumstances and remembering their success in 1967, the Israelis could decide once again to take time by the forelock and strike first. However, this time it is not so easy to see the obvious military move against the UAR (as distinct from the other Arabs) nor is it easy to see how the Israelis could make any major move against the UAR without serious risk of overt hostilities with Soviet forces.

TOP SECRET

E.R.

4. These considerations will no doubt weigh considerably with the Israelis, as will their assessment of the potentialities of the political situation. The Russians may have chosen their moment well. By their formulation on the "peace" issue in the four-power talks they have shown some sign of conciliation. They have not denounced the latest American initiative. They are no doubt discussing it with Nasser in Moscow at present. If they could get him to express even a qualified interest, still more approval, of the American proposal, the Israelis would be put in a very awkward situation. On their own showing the Americans hoped to elicit approval from Nasser first and then if this was forthcoming, to put pressure on the Israelis. An Israeli military adventure following an unusually forthcoming attitude by the USSR and the UAR would put the US in a distinctly awkward position. This may be one of the considerations that the Israelis are having to take into account at the moment.

5. It is not my business to advise on policy but I believe that those who have this responsibility will wish to know of the following assessments -

(a) the tentative view expressed in paragraphs 1 - 3 above;

(b) my personal belief that the Russians have a carefully calculated political/military squeeze play going and that they may be seriously trying to get Nasser to make a conciliatory response to the American proposals;

(c) my conviction that the Americans' understand all this and probably a good deal more, and thus are probably taking various bilateral steps which they may hope will reduce the risks;

(d) our consistent view that the event which could most damage British interests in the Middle East whether in Libya or the Gulf or elsewhere, is a really high level of Arab/Israeli tension, to say nothing of a new war.



J A THOMSON

6 July 1970



Secretary of the Cabinet

TOP SECRET

Mr. Moon

Interesting : and here
may be something in it.
You may like to show it
to the P.D. ?
K. J.

J.I.C. report now received.

P.A.

M.

877

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE U K MISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1511

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
9 JULY 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 1511 OF 9 JULY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO
WASHINGTON, PARIS AND SAVING TO MOSCOW, AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO,
TEL AVIV, UKDEL NATO AND JERUSALEM.

FOR ATTENTION FRIDAY MORNING.

MIDDLE EAST.

1 UNDERSTAND THAT YOU WILL BE SEEING MR. ROGERS THIS WEEKEND AND
SINCE THE QUESTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST IS BOUND TO ARISE IT MAY BE
HELPFUL TO HAVE A SUMMARY OF THE POSITION REACHED HERE.

2. AS YOU KNOW, THE FOUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES HAVE BEEN
UNABLE TO MAKE ANY NOTICEABLE PROGRESS TOWARDS DRAFTING AGREED
GUIDELINES FOR DR. JARRING TO RESUME HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE
PARTIES ON RESOLUTION 242. THE DEPUTIES WERE THEREFORE INSTRUCTED
TO DRAW UP A LIST OF SUCH PROPOSITIONS AS WERE AGREED BY THE FOUR
PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO THE THREE QUOTE KEY QUESTIONS UNQUOTE
OF COMMITMENTS TO PEACE, WITHDRAWAL AND BOUNDARIES.

3. ON COMMITMENTS TO PEACE, THE AMERICANS ARE NOT READY TO NEGOTIATE.
NEVERTHELESS, WHEN SERIOUS DISCUSSION ON THIS SUBJECT BEGINS, IT
WILL BE FOUND THAT THE LATEST SOVIET PROPOSALS HAVE MADE AGREEMENT
MUCH EASIER, AND THE AMERICANS DO NOT DENY THIS. ON WITHDRAWAL,
WE CAN GET NOWHERE BECAUSE THE AMERICANS WILL NOT AGREE TO SOVIET
DEMANDS FOR THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS. THE DEPUTIES
HAVE THEREFORE HAD TO CONCENTRATE ON BOUNDARIES, AND IT HAS RECENTLY
COME TO BE REALISED THAT AN AGREEMENT ON BOUNDARIES OFFERS A WAY
ROUND THE PROBLEM OF WITHDRAWAL. SINCE ALL FOUR DELEGATIONS RECOGNIZE
THAT WITHDRAWAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 242 SHOULD BE TO SECURE
RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES, IF THOSE BOUNDARIES CAN BE DEFINED THE EXTENT
OF WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE PERFECTLY CLEAR.

/4.....

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

.2.

4. IT IS THEREFORE ENCOURAGING THAT IN DISCUSSION OF BOUNDARIES THE U.S. MISSION HERE HAVE BEEN WILLING TO MAKE VERY HELPFUL COMMENTS WHICH MAY BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS.

(I) EGYPT-ISRAEL

- (A) THE BOUNDARY SHOULD BE THE FORMER INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE MANDATED TERRITORY OF PALESTINE.
- (B) THE ISRAELIS SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM SHARM-EL-SHEIKH. THERE IS NO TERRITORIAL PROBLEM HERE AND THE ONLY CONCERN IS ONE OF ENSURING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE STRAITS OF AQABA.
- (C) THE GAZA STRIP ONLY REQUIRES SPECIAL CONSIDERATION BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH LONG ADMINISTERED AS ARAB TERRITORY, ITS SOVEREIGNTY HAS NEVER BEEN FORMALLY FIXED AND THE PARTIES SHOULD AGREE ON THIS.

(II) ISRAEL-JORDAN

- (A) THE BOUNDARIES SHOULD BE BASED ON THOSE OF THE 1949 AND 1957 ARMISTICE LINES EXCEPT INSOFAR AS MINOR RECTIFICATIONS ARE CONCERNED.
- (B) THESE MINOR RECTIFICATIONS, THE NATURE OF WHICH IS NOW UNDER DETAILED DISCUSSION, ARE SMALL AND OF LOCAL IMPORTANCE ONLY.

(III) ISRAEL-SYRIA

- (A) IF SYRIA ACCEPTS RESOLUTION 242 THE GENERAL APPROACH AND PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE EVIDENT IN RESPECT OF THE ISRAEL-EGYPT AND ISRAEL-JORDAN BOUNDARIES WILL APPLY TO HER ALSO. (I MUST ADMIT THAT THIS SEEMS TO ME SCARCELY CREDIBLE IF IT REFERS TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS).

5. THE ABOVE OUTLINE APPEARS TO LEAVE ONLY THE PROBLEM OF JERUSALEM IN THE DARK. THE AMERICANS OF COURSE HAVE ENTERED INTO NO COMMITMENTS AND THEIR OFFICIAL POSITION IS THAT THEY STILL ABIDE BY THEIR PROPOSALS OF 18 DECEMBER 1969. THEY ALSO DRAW A VERY SHARP DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT IS SAID BY AMBASSADOR YOST AT MEETINGS OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES AND THE KIND OF VIEWS THEY ARE PREPARED TO EXPRESS IN MEETINGS OF THE DEPUTIES. FURTHERMORE, WE ARE ALL AGREED THAT VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THE DEPUTIES ARE NEITHER TO BE CONSIDERED AS NATIONAL PROPOSALS NOR ARE IN ANY WAY BINDING

/UNTIL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UKMIS NEW YORK TEL NO.1511 TO F.C.O.

.3.

UNTIL A COMPLETE PACKAGE HAS BEEN AGREED. NEVERTHELESS, I FIND IT HARD TO SEE HOW THE AMERICANS CAN SCRAMBLE BACK FROM SOME OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID IN THE DEBATES IN RECENT WEEKS. THEY MAY ONE DAY HAVE TO DO SO UNDER ISRAELI PRESSURE BUT I THINK THAT WHETHER THEY MEANT TO, OR NOT, THEY HAVE CONSIDERABLY TIED THEIR OWN HANDS.

6. THE SOVIET DELEGATION ALSO REGULARLY INSIST THAT THEY ARE UNCOMMITTED AND IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT MR. MALIK HAS IN THE PAST SOMETIMES REFUSED TO RECOGNISE VIEWS EXPRESSED OR PROPOSALS MADE BY HIS DEPUTY.

7. TO SUM UP, IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT WE HAVE MADE ASSURED AND AGREED PROGRESS. DIFFICULT PROBLEMS LIKE JERUSALEM AND THE REFUGEES HAVE HARDLY BEEN DISCUSSED. ON THE OTHER HAND, BOTH SIDES IN THE TALKS HAVE DRIFTED A LITTLE TOWARDS EACH OTHER AND IT IS EASIER THAN SIX MONTHS AGO TO SEE THE KIND OF AGREEMENT WHICH MIGHT BE REACHED. I ALSO FEEL THAT THERE HAS BEEN SO MUCH DETAILED EXPLANATION OF VIEWS AND SO MUCH WORDING HAS BEEN CAREFULLY EXAMINED AND REJECTED OR PUT INTO COLD STORAGE THAT ONCE THERE WAS AGREEMENT TO OVERCOME THE PRINCIPAL OUTSTANDING DIFFICULTIES THE REMAINDER OF THE PROPOSALS COULD BE FILLED IN VERY QUICKLY INDEED. HOWEVER, WE ARE STILL A LONG WAY FROM THAT.

8. PLEASE SEE M.I.F.T.

FCO PASS PARIS AND SAVING TO MOSCOW, AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, UKDEL NATO AND JERUSALEM.

MR WARNER

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N. E. D.

N. A. D.

U. N. D.

ARABIAN DEPT

AMERICAN DEPT

E. E. S. D.

W. E. D.

RESEARCH DEPT (AMER. SEC)
RESEARCH DEPT (SOVIET SEC)
RESEARCH DEPT (W. E. SEC)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

CONFIDENTIAL

Middle East
Original on F.M., July 1970

SECRET AND PERSONAL

EXTRACT FROM NOTE 9
BY ROBERT ARMSTRONG, 27/7/70

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

Mr. John Freeman, the British Ambassador in Washington, came to see the Prime Minister on Thursday, July 23 at 6 p.m.

In a brief tour d'horizon of the American scene, Mr. Freeman said that President Nixon's main concern was now with the situation in the Middle East. He had now come to accept that what was going on in this area involved a confrontation between the major Powers, with all the risks that that implied, and he had come to an awareness of the large strategic issues involved.

Extract from Record of PM's Talk with Mr William Rogers,
U.S. Secretary of State, at 1215pm. on Sunday 12. 7. 70. at Chequers.

Middle East

Top Copy on:- Middle East
USA July 1970.

Referring to his discussions with Mr. Rogers the
previous day on the Middle East, the Foreign and Commonwealth
Secretary said that he had expressed concern at the

/possibility

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

possibility of a limited operation backed by the USSR to open the Suez Canal. In this case he assumed that the U.S. would have to react. On the other hand it had to be recognised that any such operation would be taking place entirely on UAR soil. There seemed to be great danger in such a situation.

Mr. Rogers said he did not think the risk was too serious at present. The Israelis could deal with any UAR attempt of this kind. If Russian forces were directly involved the USSR must know that there would have to be a U.S. response. The Russians were maintaining very strongly that they were not taking part in military operations and Mr. Rogers did not think that they would give this kind of support.

Referring to arms supplies, Mr. Rogers said that the U.S. was giving the Israelis what they needed. Aircraft were being supplied more or less on schedule. The U.S. had to continue to support Israel and see that she was not destroyed and the USSR knew that. Mr. Rogers mentioned that the Israelis were confident that if necessary they could deal with the Soviet pilots now in the UAR if they took part in operations. Mr. Rogers expressed concern that the Israelis might feel that a pre-emptive attack would be to their advantage.

Mr. Hillenbrand said that the general assessment in the State Department was that the Russians were taking advantage of the situation in the Middle East, but playing

CONFIDENTIAL /it cautiously

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

it cautiously so as not to sacrifice the gains which they were enjoying anyway.

Mr. Rogers concurred in this. He remarked that the Russians were making great play with their recent proposals for language on "peace" in the Middle East negotiations. He thought that the Russians were concerned about the growing strength of the Fedayeen. ^{latter} The /were certainly in a position to overthrow King Hussein and could eventually threaten President Nasser. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary commented that this represented a pressure on the Russians to encourage negotiation.

Mr. Hillenbrand said that the U.S. knew that the Soviet decision to put in SA missiles was only taken after very careful consideration. Mr. Rogers said it could be argued that the Russians had supplied SAMs to improve the prospects for negotiation.

The Prime Minister wondered if the Israelis were in a position to negotiate. He feared that they could not agree to negotiations without tearing themselves apart internally.

Mr. Rogers said he thought the Israelis would negotiate if they could see the possibility of a settlement. There was a lot of feeling now in Israel that they had been too inflexible.

The Defence Secretary wondered if the Russians must not be aware of the risk that their presence in the UAR

/would become

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

would become increasingly irksome to the Arabs. Mr. Rogers doubted whether the Russians reacted in this way. They were not subject to the same compunctions and moral pressures as we were. Once they were in a country their tendency was to stay whatever anyone said. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he felt that one difficulty was that the Israelis genuinely could not see any guarantee working. Mr. Rogers suggested that if there was a Four Power guarantee with a veto for each of the Four Powers, you could not have "more than that."

The Prime Minister said that the Israelis were concerned to have secure boundaries and could not see the prospect of any boundaries more secure than those they held at present. It was for this reason that they wanted to stay on the Canal. There was also the problem of Jerusalem on which they could not be flexible.

Mr. Rogers thought that the idea that Israel's present borders were secure was increasingly being questioned in Israel. The Israelis were suffering significant losses on the borders and this was having an effect. Returning to the question of guarantees, Mr. Rogers said that one matter which most concerned the Israelis was the guarantee of free navigation through the Straits of Tiran. The proposal had been made that there should be an international presence backed by all four Powers. If such a presence could only be removed with the agreement of the Four and each of them had

/a veto

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 7 -

a veto on its removal, this would seem to represent as good a guarantee as could be provided.

Mr. Pedersen referred to Israeli insistence on face-to-face negotiations. He said that the Israelis considered that the Arabs would only feel themselves bound if agreement came as a result of such direct negotiations. He thought that if the Arabs would engage in direct negotiations the Israelis would make considerable concessions on boundaries.

Mr. Rogers agreed but said that it was not the U.S. view that it was necessary to start with face-to-face negotiations. They thought that the negotiations should start under Ambassador Jarring's auspices and it should be left to him how to bring the parties together. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary commented that unfortunately Ambassador Jarring did not seem to be very energetic and clearly needed support.

The Prime Minister said that since none of the Arabs could agree to start direct negotiations, some alternative would have to be worked out, such as the Rhodes' system. Mr. Rogers said that he had earlier proposed something of this kind and it had been accepted by the Arabs but unfortunately the Israelis had described it as "direct" negotiations and the Arabs had then withdrawn. He saw no alternative now to leaving it to Jarring to get the two sides together as best he could.

U.S. Trade

CONFIDENTIAL

1
CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO 2303

S E C R E T

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
6 AUGUST 1970

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 2303
OF 6 AUGUST 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION (FLASH) TO NICOSIA AND
HOBFNE (IMMEDIATE) TO CAIRO TEL AVIV AMMAN MOSCOW PARIS AND
UKHIS NEW YORK.

A. FROM MILLARD. MIDDLE EAST.

SISCO GAVE ME THIS AFTERNOON IN STRICT CONFIDENCE LATEST US
IDEAS ABOUT CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS.

2. STATE DEPARTMENT HAD DECIDED THAT THE ONLY SAFE WAY TO MAKE
SURVEILLANCE ARRANGEMENTS WAS THAT EACH SIDE SHOULD VERIFY
MILITARY STANDSTILL BY THEIR OWN MEANS WITHOUT RECIPROCAL OVERFLIGHTS
ENTRY OF ISRAELI PLANES INTO U.A.R. AIR SPACE AND VICE VERSA
WOULD INVOLVE TOO GREAT A RISK OF INCIDENTS. ON THE EASTERN BANK
OF THE SUEZ CANAL AMERICANS PROPOSED THAT ISRAELIS SHOULD FLY R
RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS WITH OBLIQUE PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE
OF WESTERN BANK. AS ISRAELIS LACKED EQUIPMENT FOR SUFFICIENTLY
DETAILED OBLIQUE PHOTOGRAPHY, THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE TO
PROVIDE ADDITIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION. FOR THIS PURPOSE THEY
PROPOSED TO USE U2 AIRCRAFT BUT ONLY OVER ISRAELI HELD TERRITORY
UP TO THE CANAL. THEY HOPED THEY COULD MANAGE WITH TWO U2 AIRCRAFT
THOUGH A THIRD MIGHT BE NECESSARY LATER. THEY HAD ALREADY ASKED
FOR FLIGHT CLEARANCE THROUGH RAF CHANNELS TO SEND THESE AIRCRAFT TO
THE UK. PROVIDED HMG HAD NO OBJECTION, AMERICANS WOULD LIKE
TO BASE THEM IN THE UK FOR THE DURATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE. THEY WOULD
ALSO BE GRATEFUL FOR OUR AGREEMENT TO THE USE OF REFUELLING AND REC-
OVERY FACILITIES AT RAF BASES IN CYPRUS. SISCO EMPHASISED THAT
THESE FACILITIES WERE ESSENTIAL FOR SURVEILLANCE OF THE CEASE-

/FIRE

S E C R E T

-2-

FIRE AND WOULD BE USED SOLELY FOR THAT PURPOSE. AMERICANS WANTED TO GET CEASE-FIRE INTO OPERATION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE (SEE PARA 4 BELOW) AND HOPED THAT FIRST U2 AIRCRAFT COULD LEAVE FOR UK TOMORROW EVENING WITH THE SECOND AIRCRAFT FOLLOWING TWENTY-FOUR HOURS LATER.

3. SISCO SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD ALREADY GIVEN THEIR APPROVAL TO THESE ARRANGEMENTS. EGYPTIANS HAD ALSO BEEN INFORMED BUT HAD NOT YET GIVEN THEIR ANSWER. STATE DEPARTMENT HAD NOT YET BEEN IN TOUCH WITH RUSSIANS BUT PROPOSED TO DO SO IF EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT WAS RECEIVED. THEY HAD SPELLED OUT PRECISE DETAILS IN THEIR APPROACH TO CAIRO AND ASSUMED THAT EGYPTIANS WOULD MAKE SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS ON THEIR SIDE OF THE CANAL WITH HELP FROM THE RUSSIANS IN THE SHAPE OF SOVIET EQUIVALENT OF U2S.

4. STATE DEPARTMENT HAD PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION OF CEASE-FIRE AT MIDNIGHT, LOCAL TIME, TONIGHT. THIS WOULD NOW NOT BE FEASIBLE BUT SISCO THOUGHT THERE WAS AN EVEN CHANCE THAT IT WOULD TAKE EFFECT WITHIN NEXT TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OR, AT LATEST, ON SATURDAY.

5. SISCO STRESSED THE VERY DELICATE NATURE OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS AS WELL AS THE NECESSITY TO REACH RAPID AGREEMENT ON ALL ASPECTS. HE VERY MUCH HOPED, THEREFORE, THAT HMG COULD GIVE THEIR APPROVAL TO THE ABOVE REQUESTS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE ON THE STRICT UNDERSTANDING THAT U2 AIRCRAFT WOULD BE CONFINED TO EASTERN BANK OF CANAL. /

F C O PASS FLASH TO NICOSIA AND HQBFNE AND IMMEDIATE TO CAIRO TEL JAVIV AMMAN MOSCOW AND PARIS

MR. FREEMAN

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

/SENT TO D.C.C./

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.	W.E.D.
S.E.D.	DEFENCE DEPT.
N.A.D.	P.U.S.D.
U.N.D.	RES. D. (AMER. SECT.)
ARABIAN DEPT.	RES. D. (SOV. SECT.)
AMERICAN DEPT.	RES. D. (W.E. SECT.)
E.E. & S.D.	

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

S E C R E T

SECRET CAT 2A

IMMEDIATE CAIRO TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 853

6 AUGUST 1970

Duty Clerk

No. 10 DS

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED IMMEDIATE TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 853 OF 6 AUGUST 1970, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, URMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, TEL AVIV,
PARIS AND MOSCOW, SAVING TO BEIRUT.

NY TEL. NO. 852.

ARAB/ISRAEL.

I WAS SENT FOR AT SHORT NOTICE BY DR. MAHMUD
FAWZI THIS AFTERNOON (WHEN UAR GOVT. OFFICES WOULD NORMALLY
BE SHUT FOR THE WEEK-END). HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE
CHEF DE CABINET (UNDERLINED) OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS WHO IS ABSENT ABROAD. HE IS ALSO SEEING THE FRENCH
SOVIET AND AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES.

2. DR. FAWZI ASKED ME TO INFORM YOU, IN REGARD TO THE
MEETING OF THE FOUR IN NEW YORK AND THE EXERCISE ON WHICH
DR. JARRING IS ABOUT TO EMBARK, THAT THE "U.A.R. GOVT.
CONSIDERS ITSELF BOUND ONLY BY THE TEXT IN MR. ROGERS'
LETTER AND BY ITS OWN REPLY".

3. MY ATTEMPTS TO PROBE THIS SOMEWHAT SYBILLINE FORMULA
ELUCIDATED THE "EXPLANATIONS" THAT IT " SHOULD BE CONSTRUED
NOT ONLY FOR WHAT IT SAID BUT FOR WHAT IT DID NOT SAY" AND
THAT IT APPLIED TO ANY "INTERPRETATIONS OR GLOSSES PLACED ON
THE TWO DOCUMENTS BOTH BY PARTIES DIRECTLY INTERESTED AND
A FORTIORI (UNDERLINED) THOSE ONLY INDIRECTLY INVOLVED";
AND FINALLY THAT THE U.A.R. GOVT WAS ENTERING THIS NEW PHASE
OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM " IN A SPIRIT OF OPENNESS AND
FRANKNESS" AND THAT THE TIME FOR "CLEVERNESS" WAS PAST.

/s. I INTERPRET

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

I INTERPRET THIS AS REFERRING

(I) PRIMARILY TO ANY GLOSSES WHICH THE ISRAEL GOVT. MAY PLACE EITHER ON THE ROGERS FORMULA OR ON THE U.A.R. GOVT.'S ACCEPTANCE WHICH ONCE AGAIN DR. FAWZI SAID WAS UNCONDITIONAL, (THE ACCOMPANYING MEMORANDUM BEING, ACCORDING TO MR. MOHAMED RIAD, A RESTATEMENT OF THE U.A.R. POSITION FOR THE BENEFIT OF DR. JARRING) BECAUSE IN ANSWER TO A QUERY OF MINE, DR. FAWZI SAID THAT THERE WAS ONE MAN WHO WAS ALWAYS BEING "CLEVER" AND COULD NOT HELP BEING "CLEVER" - REFERRING ALMOST CERTAINLY TO EBAN.

(II) TO ANY TENDENCY OF THE U.S. GOVT. TO ACCEPT TACITLY ANY ISRAELI GLOSSES OR STRICTURES AND TO EXPECT THEM TO BE TACITLY ACCEPTED BY THE ARAB SIDE OR OTHERS.

(III) TO ANY REMARKS MADE BY THE ARABS WHO DO NOT SUBSCRIBE TO THE AMERICAN INITIATIVE WHICH THEY MAY IMPUTE TO THE U.A.R. GOVT. E.G. THE IRAQIS.

(IV) TO ANY COMMUNIQUE WHICH MAY COME OUT OF THE TRIPOLI MEETING WHICH THE U.A.R. DELEGATION MAY FEEL BOUND TO SUBSCRIBE TO FOR REASONS OF "ARAB SOLIDARITY" BUT WHICH, DR. FAWZI MAY BE ENDEAVOURING TO STRESS, WILL NOT REPRESENT THE U.A.R. GOVT.'S POSITION WHICH IS, AS HE SAID, GOVERNED SOLELY BY THE TERMS OF THE TWO DOCUMENTS MENTIONED.

5. P.S. MR. VARNERS' INTERPRETATION OF THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE AT THE FOUR POWER TALKS (PARA 3 OF UKNIS TEL 1673) MAY BE RELEVANT TO (I) AND (II) IN THE FOREGOING PARAGRAPH.

FCO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, UKNIS NEW YORK, PARIS AND SAYING TO BEIRUT

SIR R. BEAUMONT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

A.M.D. W.D.D.
H.A.D. G.I.D.
ARAB.D. I.R.D.
U.N.D. NEWS D.
DEF.D. RES.D.(U.F.SEC.)
AMER.D. RES.D.(SOV.SEC.)
E.EUR.& SOV.D. RES.D.(AMER.SEC.)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION:

ARMY/NAVY DESPATCH

[COPIES SENT TO
NO 10 DS]

CONFIDENTIAL

DDDD

ICAD ADJUSTMENT

Despatched 2

3

[Privacy marking]

Addressed to WASHINGTON

And to CATRO (FLASH)

repeated for information to (IMMEDIATE) NICOSIA, HOFER, THE

AVIV, ISRAEL and (ROUTINE) PARIS, FRANKS NEW YORK

Saving to... ASHLEY, BOSTON

A. MIPT (not to all)
~~1990-1991~~ / 2302: Middle East.

134
Please confirm to Sisco that ~~we are anxious to~~

~~cooperate with the Americans.~~—However, before

agreeing to the arrangements proposed by him (para 11)

2 of your telegram under reference), we wish to obtain

directly from the Egyptians their agreement to HMG

participating to this extent in these arrangements.

We accordingly hope that Sisco will agree to our

making an approach to the Egyptians on this subject.

You should also tell Sisco that we will wish, if

Egyptian approval is obtained, to inform the Russians

of our exchanges with the Egyptians before the arrang

ments take effect. We assume that the Americans would

have no objection to our doing this after they

themselves had been in touch with the Russians (para. 3

of your telegram under reference).

/2. AS

~~SECRET~~

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Departmental

Distribution:—

NED SED NAD
UND WED PUSD
Arabian Dept.
American Dept.
Defence Dept.
EUSD

Copies to—

Res. Dept. (S.S.
{ W.E.S.
{ W.E.S.

Add'l Dist.
Arab/Israel
Dispute

2. As soon as confirmation is received from Washington that the Americans agree to our making this approach, H.M. Ambassador at Cairo should speak urgently to the U.A.R Foreign Minister or his deputy. He should say that the Americans have asked HMG whether they would agree to American photo-reconnaissance aircraft being sent to the U.A. and subsequently being based there for the purpose of participating in the verification of the ceasefire by means of flights which would be strictly confined to the East Bank of the Canal. HMG are in principle prepared to give their agreement to these arrangements, provided the Egyptians accept them. Sir R. Beaumont should say that HMG are therefore formally asking the UAR authorities whether they agree to the arrangements proposed by the Americans, including the use of American aircraft based in the U.K. Sir R. Beaumont should make plain to the Egyptians that if, as we hope would not be the case, the use of aircraft based in the U.K. were to become public, we would expect that the fact that we had obtained prior Egyptian agreement to our participation in these arrangements would also be made public. We would wish Egyptian agreement on both these points to be recorded in an exchange of notes between us. (H.M. Embassy at Cairo should prepare a suitable note, for use if necessary).

3. H.M. Embassy at Washington may inform the State Department of the terms of these instructions to H.M. Ambassador at Cairo.

SECRET

(12803) Dd.643296 150m 8/69 .W.B.Ltd. Cp.863
(13541) Dd.643727 200m 12/69 G.W.B.Ltd. Cp.863

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry
No.

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Open

APIS
7/8

Draft.

Telegram to:—

Washington

No.

(Date)

And to :—

Repeat to :—

En Clair.
Code
Cypher

Distribution :—

Copies to :—
Sir J. Johnston
Mr. Hayman
Mr. Allinson
Mr. Simons
MOD (Personal for
Sir J. Dunnett)
Sir Burke Trend,
Cabinet Office.
Mr. Moon,
10 Downing St.

Copy No. 2 of 5 copies

• Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s)

FLASH

EMERGENCY
IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
with _____ priority
without
DEFERRED

(Date)

Despatched

[Security classification] *TOP SECRET*
—if any

[Codeword—if any] *SECRET*

Address to *SECRETARY OF STATE*

telegram No. (date)

repeated for information to

Your telegram No. 2503 and *Cairo Telegram*
No. 851.

As you are aware there is a certain history
(and we presume the Americans also, would)
to use of U.2 aircraft and we ~~prefer not~~
to risk drawing attention to our previous
contacts with the Americans *on this*.

2. Whilst we are anxious to cooperate with
them over arrangements for observing the Middle
East ceasefire, we ~~are moved to ask~~ *wonder* whether it
is really necessary for the aircraft to be based
in the U.K. and refuelled and recovered at ~~our~~
bases in Cyprus. The difficulties we foresee
would be lessened if the Americans only wished
to stage the aircraft through the U.K. It might,
for example, be possible for the aircraft ~~itself~~
to be based in Israel or at U.S. stations in
/Turkey.

Agency.

7. If, however, in the U.S. view, there would be real advantages in doing as Sisco proposed, we would be prepared to agree and would consult with the Americans over the cover story in case news of previous visits by U.2s to the ... should leak.

Subject to the
previous
~~provisions~~
RIFT,

[Approved by the system]

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

TOP SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

My three immediately following messages are:-

- (i) Washington telegram No. 2505 containing an American request for facilities for U2 aircraft to be employed on surveillance of the Middle East cease fire.
- (ii) Two draft telegrams to Washington in reply.

Your agreement is sought to these two draft telegrams which have been approved by Mr. Rippon.

The clearance proposed in the second draft telegram *may* cause some delay, but it would seem essential to ensure that our participation is fully known to and accepted by the Egyptians and Russians.

You know something of the background to the matters referred to in the first ^{and last} paragraphs of the first draft telegram. Consideration is being given to what line can be taken in reply to ^{possible} press probings in the event of the Americans having facilities here. The advice is likely to be that we should refuse to answer any questions about previous "history".

Am.

August 7, 1970

TOP SECRET



Ruth,

Please ensure

that the Prime Minister
deals with

~~these~~ this before his

engagement at 8 pm.

this evening.

In view of the
classification, please
take the greatest care
of these papers

Peter Moran

7/8



Note

At F.C.O.'s request
Christopher Roberts
obtained the P.M.'s
consent to two
aircraft being
positioned in the U.K.
household without
prejudice to their
current stationing.
The question of their
presence or absence would
have to be decided
probably on Saturday.
In the meantime Ruth
will find out what

Since the PM will
be available tomorrow.

Ch.

7.8.70

SECRET - GUARD

CAIRO TELEGRAM NO.857 TO FCO.

-3-

5. SEE MY TWO IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS.

FCO PLEASE PASS FLASH TO WASHINGTON, UKMI S NEW YORK,
IMMEDIATE TO PARIS AND SAVING TO BEIRUT

SIR R.BEAUMONT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.EAST. DEPT.

N.AFR. DEPT.

S.EUR DEPT.

U.N.D.

ARAB DEPT.

AMER DEPT.

E.E.S.D.

W.EUR DEPT.

DEFENCE DEPT.

F.U.S.D.

RES. DEPT. (AMER SECT)

" " (SOVIET SECT)

" " (W.E.SECT)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

SECRET - GUARD

CYPHER/CAT A
FLASH WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2317

S E C R E T
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
7TH AUGUST 1978

SECRET.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 2317
OF 7 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO CAIRO NICOSIA HOFFME TEL AVIV
MOSCOW PARIS UKNIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO AMMAN BEIRUT.

YOUR TELEGRAMS NUMBERS 1752 (NOT TO ALL) AND 1753: MIDDLE EAST.

FROM MILLARD.

1 CARRIED OUT THESE INSTRUCTIONS WITH ALEXIS JOHNSON THIS EVENING.
2. HE EXPRESSED GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT. HE SAID THAT THERE WAS NO WAY
OF COVERING FULLY THE CEASEFIRE ZONE EXCEPT BY THE USE OF THESE
AIRCRAFT. IT WAS ABSOLUTELY CRUCIAL TO THEIR UNDERSTANDINGS WITH
THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY SHOULD BE ABLE TO DO SO AND TO DO SO FREQUENT-
LY, SINCE THE SA 3S COULD BE MOVED UP UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS IN A
MATTER OF SIX HOURS OR SO. THERE WOULD BE NO QUESTION OF THE AIRCRAFT
VIOLATING THE CEASE-FIRE OR BEING SHOT AT BY THE EGYPTIANS. WHEN
BERGUS HAD INFORMED THE EGYPTIANS OF THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS FOR
HIGH-LEVEL RECONNAISSANCE BY U S AIRCRAFT (THE AMERICANS DO NOT
DESIGNATE THEM AS U 2S BECAUSE OF THE EMOTIVE CONNOTATIONS OF THIS
NAME), THE REACTION, ALTHOUGH NOT ENTHUSIASTIC, HAD BEEN LOW-KEY
AND THE EGYPTIANS HAD SAID THAT THEY WOULD QUOTE IGNORE IT UNQUOTE.
THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE NOW INFORMING THE RUSSIANS AND EXPECT THEIR
REACTION TO BE ROUGHLY THE SAME. THERE IS THEREFORE NO QUESTION
OF THIS BEING A COVERT OPERATION, THOUGH IT WILL OF COURSE BE AS
DISCREET AS POSSIBLE.

/3. ALEXIS JOHNSON

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

- 2 -

3. ALEXIS JOHNSON SAID THAT HE COULD NOT AGREE TO OUR APPROACHING THE EGYPTIANS AND ASKING THEM TO AGREE SPECIFICALLY TO THE ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED. THEY WOULD NOT DO MORE THAN ACQUIESCE AND IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO PRESS THEM. THE WHOLE POINT WAS THAT THEY WERE NOT REQUIRED TO AGREE TO IT, SINCE THE AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT FLY OVER EGYPTIAN TERRITORY.

4. JOHNSON RULED OUT THE SUGGESTION THAT THE AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE BASED IN ISRAEL. HE POINTED OUT THAT THEY WOULD HAVE U S MARKINGS AND U S AIR FORCE CREWS AND FOR OBVIOUS REASONS THIS MAKES THE IDEA UNATTRACTIVE TO THE AMERICANS, TO SAY THE LEAST. THEY HAD NOT UNTIL NOW CONSIDERED USING BASES IN TURKEY, BUT WOULD NOW DO SO. WHAT THEY REQUIRED, HOWEVER, MOST URGENTLY WAS PERMISSION TO FLY THE AIRCRAFT THIS EVENING TO ENGLAND. THIS WOULD BE ENTIRELY WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THEIR SUBSEQUENT DESTINATION, AND COULD THEREFORE BE REGARDED AS A STAGING FLIGHT. THE ESSENTIAL THING WAS TO SAVE TIME, SINCE THE AIRCRAFT ARE SLOW. WITH THE ATLANTIC CROSSING, AND CREW REST, UP TO A DAY MIGHT BE GAINED.

5. JOHNSON ASKED ME TO PUT THIS TO YOU WITH ALL POSSIBLE EMPHASIS. HE WENT ON TO URGE THAT WE SHOULD RECONSIDER OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS PROVIDING THE AMERICANS WITH A BASE FOR SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS. WHAT WOULD REALLY SUIT THEM BEST WOULD BE TO BASE THE AIRCRAFT IN CYPRUS AND MERELY STAGE THEM THROUGH THE U K. AS SEEN FROM HERE, THE USE OF CYPRUS WOULD ORBIATE THE DIFFICULTIES REFERRED TO IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 1752, THOUGH IT WAS CLEAR FROM WHAT ALEXIS JOHNSON SAID THAT THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES WOULD NOT BE CONCERNED ABOUT THIS ASPECT.

6. I MUCH HOPE THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE TO AGREE TO THE AMERICANS REQUESTS. AS JOHNSON POINTED OUT, THESE FACILITIES ARE REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF PEACE-MAKING, NOT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS. THERE IS SOME RISK THAT IF WE CANNOT AGREE THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE

/CEASE-FIRE

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 2317 TO F.C.O.

- 3 -

CEASE-FIRE WILL COLLAPSE, WITH CONSEQUENCES WHICH I NEED NOT EMPHASISE. BUT IN ANY EVENT, IF WE REFUSE TO AFFORD BASE FACILITIES, I AM AFRAID OUR ATTITUDE WILL BE REGARDED AS UNHELPFUL AND MAY EVEN BE UNFAVOURABLY COMPARED WITH THAT OF THE RUSSIANS AND OF THE PARTIES.

7. SINCE DRAFTING THE ABOVE, I HAVE RECEIVED BY TELEPHONE FROM THE DEPARTMENT AUTHORITY TO INFORM THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF YOUR AGREEMENT TO THE PREPOSITIONING OF THE AIRCRAFT IN THE U.K. WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS. I HAVE SO INFORMED STATE DEPARTMENT WHO WERE DULY GRATEFUL.

FCO PASS FLASH CAIRO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA HQBFNE TEL AVIV MOSCOW
PARIS AND SAVING TO AMMAN BEIRUT.

MR. FREEMAN

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

/SENT TO D.C.C./

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.
S.E.D.
N.A.D.
U.N.D.
W.E.D.
P.U.S.D.
ARABIAN DEPT.
AMERICAN DEPT.
L.E.S.D.
DEFENCE DEPT.
RES. D. (SOV. SECT.)
RES. D. (AMER. SECT.)
RES. D. (W.E. SECT.)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

COPIES TO:

MOD (PERSONAL FOR SIR J. DUNNETT)
SIR BURKE TREND, CABINET OFFICE
MR. MOON, DOWNING STREET.

S E C R E T

NNNNN

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

S E C R E T

F L A S H FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO 1753

7 AUGUST 1970 (N.E.D.)

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELNO 1753 OF 7 AUGUST AND TO CAIRO REPEATED FOR INFORMATION NICOSIA, HQBFNE, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW, PARIS, UKNIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO AMMAN, BEIRUT.

M.I.P.T. (NOT TO ALL): MIDDLE EAST.

IN THE EVENT OF THE AMERICANS WISHING TO STAND BY THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL IN WASHINGTON TELNO 2503 PLEASE TELL SISCO THAT BEFORE AGREEING TO THE ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED BY HIM (PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE), WE WISH TO OBTAIN DIRECTLY FROM THE EGYPTIANS THEIR AGREEMENT TO HMG PARTICIPATING TO THIS EXTENT IN THESE ARRANGEMENTS. WE ACCORDINGLY HOPE THAT SISCO WILL AGREE TO OUR MAKING AN APPROACH TO THE EGYPTIANS ON THIS SUBJECT. YOU SHOULD ALSO TELL SISCO THAT WE WILL WISH, IF EGYPTIAN APPROVAL IS OBTAINED, TO INFORM THE RUSSIANS OF OUR EXCHANGES WITH THE EGYPTIANS. WE ASSUME THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO OUR DOING THIS AFTER THEY THEMSELVES HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE RUSSIANS (PARA.3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE).

2. AS SOON AS CONFIRMATION IS RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON THAT THE AMERICANS AGREE TO OUR MAKING THIS APPROACH, H.M.AMBASSADOR AT CAIRO SHOULD SPEAK URGENTLY TO THE U.A.R. FOREIGN MINISTER OR HIS DEPUTY. HE SHOULD SAY THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE ASKED HMG WHETHER THEY WOULD AGREE TO AMERICAN PHOTO-RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT BEING SENT TO THE U.K. AND SUBSEQUENTLY BEING BASED THERE FOR THE PURPOSE OF PARTICIPATING IN THE VERIFICATION OF THE CEASEFIRE BY MEANS OF

/FLIGHTS

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

FLIGHTS WHICH WOULD BE STRICTLY CONFINED TO THE EAST BANK OF THE CANAL. HMG ARE IN PRINCIPLE PREPARED TO GIVE THEIR AGREEMENT TO THESE ARRANGEMENTS, PROVIDED THE EGYPTIANS ACCEPT THEM. SIR R. BEAUMONT SHOULD SAY THAT HMG ARE THEREFORE FORMALLY ASKING THE UAR AUTHORITIES WHETHER THEY AGREE TO THE ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED BY THE AMERICANS, INCLUDING THE USE OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT BASED IN THE U.K. SIR R. BEAUMONT SHOULD MAKE PLAIN TO THE EGYPTIANS THAT WHEN THE USE OF AIRCRAFT BASED IN THE U.K. BECAME PUBLIC, WE WOULD EXPLAIN THAT THIS WAS OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE AIRCRAFT ARRANGEMENTS AND THAT WE HAD OBTAINED PRIOR EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT TO OUR PARTICIPATION IN THESE ARRANGEMENTS. WE WOULD WISH EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT ON BOTH THESE POINTS TO BE RECORDED IN AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN US. (H.M. EMBASSY AT CAIRO SHOULD PREPARE A SUITABLE NOTE, FOR USE IF NECESSARY).

3. H.M. EMBASSY AT WASHINGTON MAY INFORM THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF THE TERMS OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS TO H.M. AMBASSADOR AT CAIRO.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.
S.E.D.
N.A.D.
U.N.D.
W.E.D.
P.U.S.D.
ARABIAN DEPT.
AMERICAN DEPT.
DEFENCE DEPT.
E.E.S.D.
RES. D. (SOV. SECT.)
RES. D. (W.E. SECT.)
RES. D. (AMER. SECT.)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION:
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

COPIES TO:
MOD (PERSONAL FOR SIR J. DUNNETT)
SIR BURKE TREND, CABINET OFFICE
MR. MOON, 10 DOWNING STREET.

S E C R E T

NNNNN

T O P S E C R E T

COPY NO. ...

1 CYPHER/CAT A

F A S H FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO 1752

7 AUGUST 1970 (MR. HAYMAN)

TOP SECRET

DEYOU

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 2303.

AS YOU ARE AWARE THERE IS A CERTAIN HISTORY TO USE OF U.2. AIRCRAFT AND WE SHOULD PREFER, AND WE ASSUME THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD ALSO PREFER, NOT TO RISK DRAWING ATTENTION TO OUR PREVIOUS CONTACTS WITH THE AMERICANS ON THIS.

2. WHILST WE ARE ANXIOUS TO COOPERATE WITH THEM OVER ARRANGEMENTS FOR OBSERVING THE MIDDLE EAST CEASEFIRE, WE WONDER WHETHER IT IS REALLY NECESSARY FOR THE AIRCRAFT TO BE BASED IN THE U.K. AND REFUELLED AND RECOVERED AT RAF BASES IN CYPRUS. THE DIFFICULTIES WE FORESEE WOULD BE LESSENERD IF THE AMERICANS ONLY WISHED TO STAGE THE AIRCRAFT THROUGH THE U.K. IT MIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, BE POSSIBLE FOR THE AIRCRAFT TO BE BASED IN ISRAEL OR AT U.S. STATIONS IN TURKEY.

3. IF, HOWEVER, IN THE U.S. VIEW, THERE WOULD BE REAL ADVANTAGES IN DOING AS SISCO PROPOSED, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO AGREE, SUBJECT TO THE PROVISOS IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM, AND WOULD CONSULT WITH THE AMERICANS OVER THE COVER STORY IN CASE NEWS OF PREVIOUS VISITS BY U.2S TO THE U.K. SHOULD LEAK.

DOUGLAS-HOME

COPIES TO:

MR. HAYMAN
HD. P.U.S.D.
DEPUTY HD. P.U.S.D.

COPIES TO:

PERSONAL FOR SIR J. DUNNETT, MOD.
SIR BURKE TREND, CABINET OFFICE.
MR. MOON, NO. 10 DOWNING STREET.

T O P S E C R E T

NNNNN

CYPHER CAT 'A'

SECRET - GUARD

14A
SECRETARY OF STATE'S FILE

FLASH CAIRO TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 857

7 AUGUST 1970

SECRET

ADDRESSED FLASH TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 857 OF 7 AUGUST 1970, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
FLASH TO WASHINGTON, UKMI'S NEW YORK, TEL AVIV,
AMMAN, IMMEDIATE TO PARIS AND MOSCOW AND SAVING TO BEIRUT.

GUARD

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 853.

I HAVE NOW SEEN THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE. ALTHOUGH
HIS VISIT TO CYPRUS WAS NOT CONNECTED WITH THE CEASEFIRE
HE TELLS ME THAT HE HAS BEEN HANDLING THIS MATTER HERE
WITH THE U.A.R. HE HAS GIVEN ME THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION
ON A STRICTLY PERSONAL BASIS AND HAS ASKED THAT THE FACT
THAT HE HAS DONE SO SHOULD NOT IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCE BE
REVEALED TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT OR U.S. MISSIONS.

2. MR BERGUS SAID THAT HE FOUND THE U.A.R. SIDE TO BE
KEEN, AS I HAVE REPORTED, ON THE CEASEFIRE COMING INTO
EFFECT SOON AND HE TOLD ME THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ARE
EQUALLY KEEN THAT THIS SHOULD HAPPEN LEST THE ISRAELIS TRY
TO MOUNT A LAST-MOMENT MASSIVE PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK. IT IS
POSSIBLE THEREFORE THAT IT MAY COME INTO FORCE AT MIDNIGHT
TONIGHT. MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM CONTAINS AN
AMERICAN PROPOSAL FOR A CEASE-FIRE, WHICH
MR BERGUS TELLS ME HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE ISRAELIS AND
HE YESTERDAY PUT TO THE EGYPTIANS WHO ARE EXPECTED TO
ANSWER TODAY.

SECRET - GUARD

/3. IN

3. IN THE COURSE OF PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS THE EGYPTIAN SIDE SAID THAT THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE ARAB WORLD MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO ACCEPT A VERIFICATION OF THE CEASEFIRE BY ALLOWING MUTUAL OVERFLIGHTS SINCE ANY ISRAELI OVERFLIGHTS OF EGYPT WOULD BE USED POLITICALLY AGAINST PRESIDENT NASSER BY, E.G. IRAQ. MR. BERGUS IS HOWEVER GOING TO TELL THE U.A.R. SIDE THAT THE UNITED STATES INTEND TO HELP ISRAEL ON CEASEFIRE OBSERVATION (PRESUMABLY THIS IS ONE OF PRESIDENT NIXONS UNDERTAKINGS TO THE ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER) BY MAKING HIGH ALTITUDE FLIGHTS ON THE ISRAELI SIDE OF THE CANAL AND THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ASSUMES THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL HELP THE U.A.R. SIMILARLY. MR BERGUS SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT FOR HIS OWN INFORMATION THAT "OTHER MEANS" WILL ALSO BE USED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ASSUMES THAT THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES EQUALLY WILL USE "OTHER MEANS" TO KEEP WATCH ON BEHALF OF THE EGYPTIANS.

4. IT WILL BE OBSERVED FROM THE TEXT IN MY I.F.T. THAT WHEREAS ANY CHANGE IN THE MILITARY STATUS IN THE FIFTY KILOMETRE ZONE IS NOT ALLOWED , THERE IS TO BE NO STANDSTILL ON DELIVERIES OF FURTHER WAR MATERIAL TO THE RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES DURING THE CEASEFIRE, PROVIDED IT DOES NOT ENTER THE ZONES. IN THIS CONNEXION THE EGYPTIANS HAVE BEEN SAYING FOR SOME DAYS THAT THEY HAVE NOW MOVED THEIR ROCKETS UP TO THE CANAL - WE HAVE HEARD THIS FROM AT LEAST TWO HIGHLY-PLACE EGYPTIANS. WE HAVE ASSUMED THAT THIS WAS A COVER STORY UNDER WHICH THEY HOPED TO MOVE UP SOME MISSILES DURING THE CEASEFIRE AS NASSER HINTED IN HIS SPEECH OF 23 JULY BUT THE U.S. AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN TOLD BY GENERAL DAYAN THAT BETWEEN THREE AND SIX MISSILE SITES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED WITHIN THE FIFTY KILOMETRE ZONE HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED SINCE 19 JUNE, I.E. THE DATE OF THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS.

FLASH CAIRO TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 858 7 AUGUST 1970

SECRET

SECRETARY OF STATE'S FILE

ADDRESSED FLASH TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 858 OF 7 AUGUST 1970, REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION FLASH TO WASHINGTON, U.K.M.S NEW YORK,
TEL AVIV, AMMAN, IMMEDIATE TO PARIS AND MOSCOW AND
SAVING TO BEIRUT.
GUARD

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PROPOSAL PUT BY UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE
HERE TO THE U.A.R. AUTHORITIES LAST NIGHT.

BEGINS.

PROPOSAL.

- A. ISRAEL AND THE U.A.R. WILL OBSERVE CEASEFIRE EFFECTIVE
AT 2200 GMT THURSDAY, AUGUST 6.
- B. BOTH SIDES WILL STOP ALL INCURSIONS AND ALL FIRING
ON THE GROUND AND IN THE AIR, ACROSS THE CEASEFIRE LINE.
- C. BOTH SIDES WILL REFRAIN FROM CHANGING THE MILITARY
STATUS QUO WITHIN ZONES EXTENDING FIFTY KILOMETRES TO THE
EAST AND THE WEST OF THE CEASEFIRE LINE. NEITHER SIDE
WILL INTRODUCE OR CONSTRUCT ANY NEW MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
IN THESE ZONES. ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE ZONES WILL BE LIMITED
TO THE MAINTENANCE OF EXISTING INSTALLATIONS AT THEIR
PRESENT SITES AND POSITIONS AND TO THE ROTATION AND
SUPPLY OF FORCES PRESENTLY WITHIN THE ZONES.
- D. FOR PURPOSES OF VERIFYING OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE
EACH SIDE WILL RELY ON ITS OWN NATIONAL MEANS, INCLUDING
RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, WHICH WILL BE FREE TO OPERATE
WITHOUT INTERFERENCE UP TO TEN KILOMETRES FROM CEASEFIRE
LINE ON ITS OWN SIDE OF THAT LINE.

SECRET - GUARD

/E. EACH

E. EACH SIDE MAY AVAIL ITSELF AS APPROPRIATE OF ALL U.N. MACHINERY IN REPORTING ALLEGED VIOLATIONS TO EACH OTHER OF THE CEASEFIRE AND OF THE MILITARY STANSTILL.

F. BOTH SIDES WILL ABIDE BY THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1949 RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND WILL ACCEPT THE ASSISTANCE OF THE ICRC (INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS) IN CARRYING OUT THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THAT CONVENTION. END PROPOSAL.

ENDS.

2. SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

FCO PLEASE PASS FLASH TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, IMMEDIATE TO PARIS AND SAVING TO BEIRUT

SIR R.BEAUMONT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.EAST. DEPT.

N.AFR. DEPT.

S.EUR DEPT.

U.N.D.

APAB DEPT.

AMER DEPT.

E.E.S.D.

W.EUR DEPT.

DEFENCE DEPT.

P.U.S.D.

RES. DEPT. (AMER SECT)

" " (SOVIET SECT)

" " (W.E.SECT)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

CYPHER CAT A
FLASH CAIRO

CONFIDENTIAL GUARD
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 859 7 AUGUST 1970
CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED FLASH TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 859 OF 7 AUGUST 1970, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
FLASH TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, AMMAN,
IMMEDIATE TO PARIS AND MOSCOW AND SAVING TO BEIRUT.

GUARD

MY TELEGRAM NO 853 AND MY TWO I.P.T.S.

I ASKED MR BERGUS WHETHER HE HAD BEEN SENT FOR AND WARNED
IN SIMILAR TERMS AS I HAD YESTERDAY BY DR FAWZI. HE SAID
THAT HE HAD BEEN AND THAT HIS INTERPRETATION OF IT WAS THE
FOLLOWING: HE HAD BEEN INFORMED BY U.S. DELEGATION TO
U.N. IN NEW YORK THAT DR JARRING REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE
ASSURANCES OF THE FOUR POWERS THAT ALL PARTIES
CONCERNED HAD AGREED TO THE U.S. INITIATIVE AND WISHED
TO RECEIVE THESE ASSURANCES PERSONALLY FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED IN NEW YORK. HE HAD IMMEDIATELY
BEEN GIVEN A FULLY SATISFACTORY ASSURANCE BY THE
U.A.R. REPRESENTATIVE. THE JORDANIAN REPRESENTATIVE HOWEVER
WAS UNABLE TO DO SO BECAUSE HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE STILL
EN ROUTE, WHILE THE ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE APPARENTLY HAD
SAID THAT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO GO ANY FURTHER THAN MRS MEIR'S
PUBLIC STATEMENT. MR BERGUS SAID THAT THIS WAS THE REASON FOR
U THANT HOLDING UP THE RENEWAL OF DR JARRING'S MISSION.
HE BELIEVED THE ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE'S STATEMENT TO HAVE
BEEN HYPER-CAUTIOUS, IF NOT INTENTIONALLY OBSTRUCTIVE SINCE
AMBASSADOR RABIN HAD TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT
BEEN AUTHORISED TO TELL THE AMERICANS THAT THE ISRAELI
GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED THE UNITED STATES INITIATIVE
UNRESERVEDLY. HE ASSUMED THAT THIS INCIDENT HAD AROUSED
EGYPTIAN SUSPICIONS OF ISRAELI DUPLICITY.

CONFIDENTIAL GUARD

/2.

2. ON THE QUESTION OF THE CEASEFIRE WITH JORDAN, MR BERGUS SAID THAT THE U.S. LINE WAS THAT SINCE THE JORDANIANS HAD NEVER DENOUNCED THE CEASEFIRE THERE WAS NO NEED TO REACH AN AGREEMENT SUCH AS THAT NOW PROPOSED BETWEEN THE UAR AND ISRAEL. HE SAID HOWEVER THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD TELL THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT THAT THEY WOULD HOLD THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT TECHNICALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE BY THE FEDAYIN AND THAT THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD ENDEAVOUR TO CONTROL THEM, BUT THAT BOTH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE ISRAELIS ACCEPTED THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION THAT THERE WAS A LIMIT TO THE CONTROL WHICH THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT WAS PHYSICALLY CAPABLE OF IMPOSING.

3. THIS PRESUMABLY MEANS THAT THE ISRAELIS, PROVIDED THAT FEDAYIN INCURSIONS ARE NOT TOO SEVERE, WILL ABSTAIN FROM THEIR POLICY OF PERIODIC REPRIALS.

FCO PLEASE PASS FLASH TO WASHINGTON , UKMIS NEW YORK,
IMMEDIATE TO PARIS AND SAVING TO BEIRUT

SIR R. BEAUMONT

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N. EASTERN D.
N. AFR. D.
S. EUR. D.
U.N.D.
ARABIAN D.
AMERICAN D.
E.E.S.D.
W. EUR. D.
DEFENCE D.
P.U.S.D.
RESEARCH D (AMERICAN SECTION)
" (SOVIET SECTION)
" (W.E. SECTION)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

CYPHER CAT A

FLASH CAIRO TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 860 7 AUGUST 1970

S E C R E T

SECRETARY OF STATE'S FILE

ADDS TO FCO TELNO.860 DATED 7/8/70 REPEATED FOR INFO
(FLASH) TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV AND AMMAN
(IMMEDIATE) TO MOSCOW AND PARIS.
REPEATED SAVING TO BEIRUT.

G U A R D

MY TELEGRAMS NOS.857 AND 858 : ARAB-ISRAEL CEASE-FIRE.

UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TELLS ME THAT U.A.R. GOVERNMENT
HAVE ACCEPTED U.S. CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN MY
TELEGRAM NO.858. MR. BERGUS HAS HOPES OF THE CEASE-FIRE
COMING INTO EFFECT AT MIDNIGHT TONIGHT (7-8 AUGUST) PROVIDED
ISRAEL GOVERNMENT NOW GIVE THEM CONFIRMATORY ASSENT.

2. REPORT CONTAINED IN THIS MORNING'S AL AHAM THAT
U.S. PROPOSALS FOR CEASEFIRE WERE TURNED DOWN BY U.A.R. ARE
THUS UNTRUE. THEY PROBABLY REFER TO EARLIER SUGGESTION FOR
MUTUAL OVERFLIGHTS (SEE MY TELEGRAMS UNDER REFERENCE).

FCO PLEASE PASS WASHINGTON (FLASH) , UKMIS NEW YORK (FLASH)
AND PARIS (IMMEDIATE).

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO BEIRUT.

SIR R. BEAUMONT

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N. EASTERN D.

S. EUR. D.

N. AFR. D.

U.N.D.

ARABIAN D.

AMERICAN D.

E.E.S.D.

W. EUR. D.

DEFENCE D.

P.U.S.D.

RESEARCH D. (AMERICAN SECTION)

" (SOVIET SECTION)

" (W. EUR. SECTION)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

SECRET GUARD

FLASH TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 697 7 AUGUST 1970

SECRET.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 697
OF 7 AUGUST 1970, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION (FLASH) TO
WASHINGTON, CAIRO, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, PARIS AND BEIRUT,
AND MOSCOW.
MIDDLE EAST.

COUNSELLOR AND I LUNCHEDED WITH U.S. AMBASSADOR TODAY.
THE MEAL WAS CONSTANTLY INTERRUPTED BY CALLS FROM THE STATE
DEPARTMENT AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS, WHO WERE IN AND OUT OF A
MINISTERIAL MEETING.

2. BRIEFLY THE AIM IS TO BRING THE CEASE-FIRE INTO EFFECT
AT 2200 G.M.T. TONIGHT. THE FORMULA WAS AGREED WITH BOTH
THE ISRAELIS AND THE EGYPTIANS, BUT THE ISRAELIS ARE NOW
ASKING FOR MORE EXPLICIT ASSURANCES ABOUT WEAPONS, PRINCIPALLY
MISSILES, WHICH WOULD NOT BE MOVED IN OR INTO THE CEASE-FIRE
ZONE. THEY WANT TO BE SURE THAT THE RUSSIANS, AND
PRESUMABLY THE EGYPTIANS, ACCEPT THE ASSURANCES WHICH THE
AMERICANS HAVE ALREADY GIVEN THEM ON THIS.

3. MY U.S. COLLEAGUE SEEMED CONFIDENT THAT THIS DIFFICULTY
WOULD BE OVERCOME, PARTICULARLY AS DAYAN, WHO IS PLAYING THE
MAJOR PART ON THE ISRAELI SIDE, IS ALARMED AT THE POSSIBILITY
OF MISSILE MOVEMENTS DURING THE NIGHT AND INDEED FIRST WANTED
THE CEASE-FIRE LAST NIGHT.

4. THERE WERE ALSO APPARENTLY LONG DISCUSSIONS LAST NIGHT WITH
MRS. MEIR ABOUT THE FORM IN WHICH JARRING CAN RECORD THE ISRAELI
ACCEPTANCE. THE ISRAELIS WANT TO BE COMMITTED TO THEIR OWN
VERSION RATHER THAN THE AMERICAN FORMULA, ALTHOUGH THEY ACCEPT
IN PRINCIPLE. HERE AGAIN DARBOUR IS CONFIDENT THAT DURING THE
NEXT FEW HOURS JARRING WILL BE IN A POSITION TO REPORT THAT
THE PARTIES HAVE ACCEPTED, SO THAT HE CAN THEN RESUME HIS MISSION.
I HOPE HE IS RIGHT. /5.

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

5. INCIDENTALLY WE GATHERED THAT THE CEASE-FIRE AND STAND-STILL ARE TO COVER A ZONE 50 KMS EACH SIDE OF THE CANAL. AS WELL AS THIS, AIR MOVEMENTS INCLUDING RECONNAISSANCE WILL BE FORBIDDEN IN A NARROWER ZONE 10 KMS FROM THE CANAL ON EACH SIDE. TO OFFSET THIS, THE AMERICANS ARE TO PROVIDE THE ISRAELIS WITH TWO SPECIALLY-EQUIPPED RECONNAISSANCE PHANTOMS AND WILL SUPPLEMENT THIS BY THEMSELVES SURVEYING THE AREA WITH TWO U2'S. I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU PROBABLY KNOW MOST OF THIS ALREADY.

FCO PASS F L A S H TO WASHINGTON, UKMS NEW YORK, PARIS.

MR. BARNES

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N. EASTERN D.
S. EUR. D.
N. AFR. D.
U.N.D.
ARABIAN D.
AMERICAN D.
E.E.S.D.
W. EUR. D.
DEFENCE D.
P.U.S.D.
RESEARCH D. (AMERICAN SECTION)
" (SOVIET SECTION)
" (W. EUR. SECTION)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

SECRET

OUTWASH TELETYPE

14F

SECRET

Duty Clerk,
No 10 DS.

SECRET/SECRET

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TELETYPE NUMBER 775

TO CAIRO

7 AUGUST 1973
(NED)

YOUR TELEGRAM IS 457-364 AND TELEPHONE CONVERSATION TRIPP-DEANIGHT:

WHAT FOLLOWS IN PARAGRAPHS 3 TO 5 ARE THE INSTRUCTIONS IN REPLY TO THE AMERICAN REQUEST REPORTED IN WASHINGTON TEL. NO. 2303 WHICH WE RECEIVED LATER TODAY WHEN MINISTRIAL APPROVAL HAS BEEN OBTAINED. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO AS TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR YOU TO PREPARE FOR THIS DEMARCH.

2. YOU SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOR SAY ANYTHING TO THE EGYPTIANS OR TAKE ANY ACTION UNTIL YOU HEAR OF AMERICAN APPROVAL FOR OUR MAKING THIS DEMARCH.

3. IN THE EVENT OF THE AMERICANS WISHING TO STAND BY THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL IN WASHINGTON TEL. NO. 2303, PLEASE TELL CISCO THAT BEFORE AGREEING TO THE ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED BY HIM (PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE), WE WISH TO OBTAIN DIRECTLY FROM THE EGYPTIANS THEIR AGREEMENT TO HIS PARTICIPATING TO THIS EXTENT IN THESE ARRANGEMENTS. WE ACCORDINGLY HOPE THAT CISCO WILL AGREE TO OUR MAKING AN APPROACH TO THE EGYPTIANS ON THIS SUBJECT. YOU SHOULD ALSO TELL CISCO THAT WE WILL WISH, IF EGYPTIAN APPROVAL IS OBTAINED, TO INFORM THE RUSSIANS OF OUR EXCHANGES WITH THE EGYPTIANS BEFORE THE ARRANGEMENTS TAKE EFFECT. WE ASSUME THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO OUR DOING THIS AFTER THEY THEMSELVES HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE RUSSIANS (PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE).

4. AS SOON AS CONFIRMATION IS RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON THAT THE

7-111015

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

AMERICANS AGREE TO OUR MAKING THIS APPROACH, H.M. AMBASSADOR AT CAIRO SHOULD SPEAK URGENTLY TO THE U.A.R. FOREIGN MINISTER OR HIS DEPUTY. HE SHOULD SAY THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE ASKED HIM WHETHER THEY WOULD AGREE TO AMERICAN PHOTO-RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT BEING SENT TO THE U.K. SUBSEQUENTLY BEING BASED THERE FOR THE PURPOSE OF PARTICIPATING IN THE VERIFICATION OF THE CEASEFIRE BY MEANS OF FLIGHTS WHICH WOULD BE STRICTLY CONFINED TO THE EAST BANK OF THE CANAL. WE ARE IN PRINCIPLE PREPARED TO GIVE THEIR AGREEMENT TO THESE ARRANGEMENTS, PROVIDED THE EGYPTIANS ACCEPT THEM. SIR R. DRAUMONT SHOULD SAY THAT WE ARE THEREFORE FORMALLY ASKING THE UAR TO DECIDE WHETHER THEY AGREE TO THE ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED BY THE AMERICANS, INCLUDING THE USE OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT BASED IN THE U.K. SIR R. DRAUMONT SHOULD MAKE PLAIN TO THE EGYPTIANS THAT IF, AS WE HOPE WOULD NOT BE THE CASE, THE USE OF AIRCRAFT BASED IN THE U.K. WERE TO BECOME PUBLIC, WE WOULD EXPECT THAT THE FACT THAT WE HAD OBTAINED PRIOR EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT TO OUR PARTICIPATION IN THESE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE OF GREAT VALUE. WE WOULD WISH EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT AT BOTH THESE POINTS TO BE ACCOMPANIED IN AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN US. (U.S. EMBASSY AT CAIRO SHOULD PREPARE A SUITABLE NOTE, FOR USE IF NECESSARY).

5. H.M. EMBASSY AT WASHINGTON MAY INFORM THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF THE TERMS OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS TO H.M. AMBASSADOR AT CAIRO.
ENDS.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

N.E.D.

N.E.D.

W. ARTHUR

[COPIES SENT TO No 10 Ds]

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPREP/CAT A

F L A S H FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO CAIRO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 776

8 AUGUST 1978 (HED)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO CAIRO TELEGRAM NUMBER 776 OF 8 AUGUST 1978

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON TEL AVIV AMMAN NICOSIA

HQBENE MOSCOW PARIS UKHIS NEW YORK AND BEIRUT.

YOURTELS NOS ~~858~~, ~~859~~ AND ~~860~~ AND TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH
TRIPP: CEASE FIRE.

MINISTERS DECIDED IN THE LIGHT OF VERY STRONG REPRESENTATIONS FROM
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO ACCEDE TO THE PRESSING AMERICAN REQUEST TO
QUOTE PRE-POSITION WITHOUT PREJUDICE UNQUOTE TWO U.S. AIRCRAFT IN
THE U.K. THESE AIRCRAFT WILL THEREFORE ARRIVE HERE TOMORROW
AFTERNOON.

2. CONSIDERATIONS WHICH LED TO THIS DECISION WERE:

(A) AMERICAN ASSURANCES THAT THE UAR QUOTE ACQUIESCED UNQUOTE IN
THE ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED.

(B) AMERICAN FEARS THAT DELAY IN INSTITUTING THE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD
JEOPARDISE THE CEASE-FIRE.

(C) THE FACT THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WERE INFORMING THE SOVIET
GOVERNMENT OF THESE PROPOSALS AND EXPECTED THEM TO QUOTE ACQUIESCE
UNQUOTE ALSO.

3. YOU WILL SEE FROM (A) ABOVE THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S
INTERPRETATION OF WHAT BERGUS REPORTED IS AT VARIANCE WITH WHAT
HE TOLD YOU. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION OF WHAT BERGUS
BELIEVES THE EGYPTIAN ATTITUDE TO THESE PROPOSALS REALLY IS.

4. THE AMERICANS DO NOT REPEAT NOT WISH US TO APPROACH THE UAR
GOVERNMENT ON THIS AS PROPOSED IN MY TEL NO 775 TO YOU. THEY REACTED
EVEN MORE STRONGLY TO THE SUGGESTION THAT WE SHOULD GET EGYPTIAN
AGREEMENT IN WRITING. YOU SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT THEREFORE PROCEED
WITH THIS APPROACH.

/5. WE STILL

CONFIDENTIAL

Teleprinted to Cowley
8/8

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

5. WE STILL HAVE TO CONSIDER WHAT HELP WE CAN REASONABLY GIVE THE AMERICANS IN THE LONGER TERM. FROM YOUR POINT OF VIEW WOULD YOU SEE OBJECTION TO OUR RECOMMENDING, IF EGYPTIAN AND SOVIET QUOTE ACQUIESCENCE UNQUOTE IS CONFIRMED, THAT WE ACCEDE TO THE ORIGINAL AMERICAN REQUEST OR ALTERNATIVELY, TO THE USE OF AKROTIRI, SUBJECT TO THE CYPRIOT GOVERNMENT ACQUIESCENCE? THE AMERICANS HAVE REJECTED ISRAEL AS A POSSIBLE BASE AND FEAR THAT IT WOULD TAKE TOO LONG TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO USE ANY OTHER BASE.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

N.F.D.
S.E.D.
H.A.D.
U.N.D.
W.E.D.
P.U.S.D.
ARABIAN D.
AMERICAN D.
DEF.D.
A.E.S.D.
REC.D. (SOVIER)
(AMERICAN)
(W.E.)

ADDL. DISTRIBUTION:

ARAB ISRAEL DISPUTE

Copy sent to

Sp. Capt Dixon

Refuse Ops. Run

Man of Defense

at request of R/C.

CONFIDENTIAL

FLASH CAIRO

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 861

8 AUGUST 1970

SECRET

ADDRESSED FLASH TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 861 OF 8 AUGUST 1970, REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION FLASH TO WASHINGTON, UK HIS NEW YORK,
TEL AVIV, AMMAN, IMMEDIATE PARIS, MOSCOW AND SAVER
TO BEIRUT.

GUARD

WITH REFERENCE TO MY TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH TRIPP,
WASHINGTON TEL NO 2303 AND PARA 3 OF MY TEL 857: USE OF
US AIRCRAFT FOR HIGH LEVEL OBLIQUE CONTROL OF CEASE FIRE.

AFTER TRIPPS' CALL TO ME I IMMEDIATELY
CONTACTED BERGUS TO DISCOVER THE EXTENT TO WHICH HE HAD
INFORMED EGYPTIANS OF PROPOSED U 2 FLIGHTS AND ESPECIALLY
OF BRITISH INVOLVEMENT AND WHAT HAD BEEN
THEIR REACTION. BERGUS TOLD ME THAT MOHAMED RIAD HAD
CONVEYED TO HIM THE U.A.R. ACCEPTANCE OF THE U.S.
CEASEFIRE FORMULA (TEXT IN MY TEL NO 858) AT NOON TODAY,
THE CEASE FIRE TO BE EFFECTIVE AT 0100 UAR TIME 8TH
AUGUST (2200 HRS GMT 7TH AUGUST).

2. MOHAMED RIAD HAD AT THE SAME TIME CONVEYED A FURTHER
MESSAGE IN RESPECT OF BERGUS'S DEMARCHE ABOUT US INTENTION
TO HELP ISRAEL WITH U 2 FLIGHT, SAYING THAT THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE UAR HAD REACHED THEIR DECISION TO ACCEPT THE
CEASE-FIRE TERMS BEFORE (UNDERLINED) THE AMERICANS HAD
INFORMED THEM OF THE PROPOSED U 2 FLIGHTS. THEY HAD NOT
THEREFORE BEEN ABLE TO CONSIDER THIS PROPOSAL AND THEY NOW
INTENDED OFFICIALLY TO IGNORE IT. IF ASKED HOWEVER TO GIVE

SECRET - GUARD

/AN UNOFFICIAL

AN UNOFFICIAL OPINION MOHAMED RIAD HAD SAID THE UAR AUTHORITIES CONSIDERED THE U 2 PROPOSAL TO BE UNHELPFUL; THEY COULD NOT IMAGINE THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES UNDERTAKING A SIMILAR FUNCTION ON BEHALF OF THE UAR; IT WOULD IN THE UAR VIEW REPRESENT AN UNDESIRABLE MEASURE OF SUPER-POWER INVOLVEMENT; IN SHORT , FAR FROM ALLEVIATING THE SITUATION IT MIGHT WELL EXACERBATE IT. THE UAR MESSAGE ENDED BY EMPHASIZING ONCE MORE THAT THIS EXPRESSION OF VIEWS WAS QUITE INDEPENDENT OF UAR ACCEPTANCE OF THE US CEASEFIRE PROPOSALS WHICH STOOD.

3. BERGUS ALSO TOLD ME THAT HE HAD FOR SOME DAYS BEEN SEEKING THE AGREEMENT OF THE U.A.R. GOVT. TO THE STATE DEPT INFORMING AND CONSULTING THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON THE STEPS WHICH WERE BEING TAKEN TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE AND HE HAD REMINDED MOHAMED RIAD AT EACH MEETING INCLUDING THE MEETING AT NOON TODAY THAT HE WAS AWAITING THEIR ANSWER. IN EACH INSTANCE MOHAMED RIAD HAD SAID THAT HE WAS '' WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS SUBJECT'.

4. BERGUS HAD ASSUMED THAT WHEN RIAD HAD SAID THAT, UNOFFICIALLY, THE UAR AUTHORITIES COULD NOT IMAGINE THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES UNDERTAKING SIMILAR ACTION (I.E. OBLIQUE HIGH LEVEL RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS) ON THEIR BEHALF, THIS EXPRESSION OF VIEWS HAD BEEN CLEARED WITH THE RUSSIANS BUT THIS RELUCTANCE OF THE EGYPTIANS TO LET THE AMERICANS CONSULT THE RUSSIANS ON THE GENERAL QUESTION IS NOW MAKING HIM WONDER WHETHER THE UAR GOVT ARE NOT PLAYING THE HAND ALONE.

/5. BERGUS AGAIN:

5. BERGUS AGAIN PARTICULARLY ASKED THAT WE SHOULD NOT REVEAL TO U.S. AUTHORITIES EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE SINCE HE WAS NOT INFORMED HOW MUCH SISCO WAS TELLING H.M. EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON AND TEMPER THERE WERE GETTING "MIGHTY SHORT".

FCO PLEASE PASS FLASH TO WASHINGTON, UKMI'S NEW YORK. IMMEDIATE PARIS AND SAYING TO BEIRUT.

SIR R. BEAUMONT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

N.EASTERN D.
N.AFR.D.
S.EUR.D.
U.N.D.
ARAB.D.
AMER.D.
E.EUR.& SOV.D.
W.EUR.D.
DEF.D.
P.U.S.D.
RES.D.(AMER.SEC.)
RES.D.(SOV.SEC.)
RES.D.(W.EUR.SEC.)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION: —
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

SECRET - GUARD

DDDDD

CYPHER/CAT A
FL CAIRO

S E C R E T - G U A R D
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 863

8 AUGUST 1970

SECRET

ADDRESSED FLASH TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM
NUMBER 863 OF 8 AUGUST 1970, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION FLASH TO
WASHINGTON AND HQBFNE AND IMMEDIATE TO TEL AVIV, AMMAN, NICOSIA,
MOSCOW, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, AND BEIRUT.

GUARD

YOUR TELEGRAM 776: CEASEFIRE.

IN FACT, BERGUS SHOWED ME HIS TELEGRAM TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT
AND PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 861 (NOT REPEATED TO
HQBFNE) IS A SUMMARY OF IT. IT DEPENDS ON HOW ONE INTERPRETS THE
WORD "ACQUIESCE" BUT BERGUS HIMSELF, SUMMARISING THE EGYPTIAN
REACTION TO THIS AMERICAN PROPOSAL, SAID: "THEY DID NOT (NOT)
LIKE IT AT ALL." I THINK THEREFORE WE MUST CONCLUDE THAT THE U.S.
AUTHORITIES POSSIBLY IN FULFILLMENT OF UNDERTAKINGS GIVEN TO THE
ISRAELIS, HAVE FELT IT LEGITIMATE TO TRADE ON THE OFFICIAL U.A.R.
LINE THAT THEY ARE IGNORING THIS PROPOSAL AND WILFULLY TO OVERLOOK
THE UNOFFICIAL U.A.R. EXPRESSION OF VIEWS.

2. I WILL ENDEAVOUR TO SEE BERGUS AGAIN TO CONFIRM.
SEE MY I.R.T.

FCO PLEASE PASS FLASH TO WASHINGTON AND DEFCOMCEN FOR HQBFNE AND
IMMEDIATE TO NICOSIA, PARIS AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

SIR R. BEAUMONT. /REPEATED AS REQUESTED/ /SENT TO D.C.C./
/COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.	AMERICAN DEPT.
S.E.D.	DEFENCE DEPT.
N.A.D.	E.E.S.D.
U.N.D.	RES. D. (AMER. SECT.)
W.E.D.	RES. D. (SOV. SECT.)
P.U.S.D.	RES. D. (W.E. SECT.)
ARABIAN DEPT.	

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

COPY TO:
GP. CAPT. DIXON
AIR FORCE OPS ROOM,
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE.

NNNNN

S E C R E T - G U A R D

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO. 2323

SECRET

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
8 AUGUST 1970

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO F.C.O. TELEGRAM NO. 2323 OF 8 AUGUST REPTD FOR INFO TO
CAIRO NICOSIA HOFFEN PARIS MOSCOW UKHIS NEW YORK TEL AVIV AND SAIGON
TO AMMAN AND BEIRUT.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 1741: MIDDLE EAST.
FROM MILLARD.

I SAW ALEXIS JOHNSON THIS MORNING AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED. HE
TOLD ME THAT THE U.S. EMBASSY IN ANKARA HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE
AN APPROACH TO THE TURKS AND THAT A REPLY WAS EXPECTED IN THE COURSE
OF THE DAY. MR. BERGUS IN CAIRO HAD GONE BACK TO MAHOMED RIAD LAST
NIGHT ON INSTRUCTIONS AND SAID TO HIM THAT THE AMERICANS UNDERSTOOD
THE EGYPTIAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THESE HIGH-LEVEL FLIGHTS, BUT TOOK
NOTE THAT THEY WOULD IGNORE THEM. THE U.S. WOULD NOT REFER TO THEM
IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CEASE-FIRE. BUT TO BE REALISTIC IT WAS
CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD EVENTUALLY BECOME PUBLIC. WHEN THEY DID SO,
THE STATE DEPT. INTENDED TO TAKE THE LINE THAT HAVING TAKEN THE LEAD
IN PROPOSING THE CEASE-FIRE, THE AMERICANS FELT OBLIGED TO ASSIST IN
SEEING THAT ITS TERMS WERE FULLY CARRIED OUT. FOR THIS REASON THEY
WOULD FROM TIME TO TIME BE CONDUCTING HIGH-LEVEL RECONNAISSANCE
FLIGHTS TO HELP WITH OBSERVATION. THESE WOULD BE STRICTLY LIMITED TO
THE EAST SIDE OF THE CANAL. IF PRESSED, THE STATE DEPT. WOULD SAY
THAT THEY WERE BEING CONDUCTED BY USAF U2 AIRCRAFT. AGAIN IF ASKED,
THEY WOULD SAY THERE WOULD BE NO OBJECTION TO THE SOVIET UNION
UNDERTAKING SIMILAR FLIGHTS ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE CANAL.

2. IN REPLY TO THIS COMMUNICATION, MAHOMED RIAD HAD SAID THAT HIS
PREVIOUS STATEMENT (CAIRO TELEGRAM NO. 861) STOOD. THIS STATEMENT
HAD, HOWEVER, BEEN DRAFTED AFTER THE EGYPTIAN REPLY ON THE CEASE-FIRE
PROPOSAL AND WAS SEPARATE FROM IT. HE UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY WHAT

/BERGUS

SECRET

Teleprinted to Cairo
8/8

SECRET

- 2 -

LENGUS HAD NOW SAID TO HIGHER AUTHORITY. HE THEN SEEMED ANXIOUS TO DROP THE SUBJECT. JOHNSON'S WORDS IN COMMENTING TO ME ON THIS WERE THAT QUOTE THEY INTERPRETED THE U.A.R. ATTITUDE AS BEING THAT THEY WERE NOT PARTICULARLY PLEASED BUT WERE NOT PREPARED TO MAKE AN ISSUE OF IT UNQUOTE. JOHNSON THOUGHT THAT IT SHOULD BE LEFT THAT WAY.

3. IN MOSCOW, THE U.S. AMBASSADOR SAW THE CHIEF OF THE DIVISION DEALING WITH U.S. AFFAIRS LAST NIGHT, GAVE HIM THE TEXT OF THE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL AND INFORMED HIM OF AMERICAN INTENTIONS AS REGARDS HIGH-LEVEL RECONNAISSANCE. THE OFFICIAL CONCERNED SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT QUOTE A GOOD ELEMENT UNQUOTE. HE WANTED TO BE CLEAR THAT THE U.S. AMBASSADOR WAS MERELY INFORMING HIM AND NOT EXPECTING AN IMMEDIATE ANSWER. HE TOOK NOTE OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, WITHOUT MENTIONING FURTHER THE SUBJECT OF HIGH-LEVEL FLIGHTS. THE AMERICANS THINK THAT IT IS QUITE PROBABLE THAT THEY WILL HEAR NO MORE ON THE SUBJECT. POSSIBLY H.M. AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW MAY BE ABLE TO OBTAIN BEAN'S IMPRESSIONS OF THIS INTERVIEW.

4. I ASKED WHETHER THE AMERICANS HAD INFORMED THE EGYPTIANS THAT THE AIRCRAFT WOULD BE USING BRITISH FACILITIES, EITHER IN CYPRUS OR IN THE U.K. HE SAID CERTAINLY NOT. I THEN ASKED WHETHER THEY WOULD AGREE THAT H.H. AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO SHOULD INFORM THE EGYPTIANS OF THIS. JOHNSON AT FIRST SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS UNDESIRABLE TO RUB THE EGYPTIANS' NOSES IN IT. FINALLY, HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT OPPOSE A DISCREET COMMUNICATION ON THIS POINT TO THE EGYPTIANS, THOUGH HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD NOT PRESS THEM FOR APPROVAL AND THAT WE WOULD MAKE THE APPROACH THROUGH THE CHANNEL WHICH HAD BEEN USED BY THE AMERICANS UP TO NOW, I.E. THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HIMSELF OR MAHOMED RIAD, PREFERABLY THE LATTER, SINCE THE MATTER WAS BEING HANDLED ON A VERY RESTRICTED BASIS IN CAIRO.

5. JOHNSON MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE A VERY STRONG /PREFERENCE

SECRET

SECRET

WASHINGTON TELNO 2323 TO FCO

- 3 -

PREFERENCE FOR THE USE OF CYPRUS AS THE MAIN BASE. THE REASON IS THAT THE PLANES ARE SLOW AND A GREAT DEAL OF TIME WOULD BE LOST IF THEY HAD TO FLY TO AND FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM. THEY HAD NOT FULLY THOUGHT OUT THE OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS WHEN THE MATTER WAS FIRST PUT TO ME BY SISCO ON AUGUST 6. I SAID THAT THIS WOULD PRESENT DIFFICULTIES FOR US, FOR THE REASONS GIVEN IN YOUR TELEGRAM. JOHNSON SAID THAT HE FOUND THIS RATHER DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. THE OPERATIONAL ADVANTAGES WERE CONSIDERABLE, AND AS FAR AS HE COULD SEE THE POLITICS OF THE MATTER WERE MUCH THE SAME. AS REGARDS THE RISK OF STIMULATING SOVIET INTEREST IN CYPRUS, HE EMPHASISED STRONGLY THE POINT THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT NOT FIND THE AMERICAN PARTICIPATION ALL THAT UNWELCOME. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD BE ABLE TO FORM THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF WHAT WAS GOING ON IN THE CEASE-FIRE ZONE, I.E. THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE SIMPLY DEPENDENT ON THE ISRAELIS.

6. ON TIMING, JOHNSON SAID THAT THE FIRST MISSION OUGHT IF AT ALL POSSIBLE TO BE CARRIED OUT TOMORROW AND THIS WOULD PROBABLY MEAN THAT THE U2S WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE THE U.K. TONIGHT.

7. THERE WAS A PROBLEM ABOUT WHAT SHOULD BE SAID NOW IF QUESTIONS WERE RAISED, BEFORE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED WITH US OR THE TURKS ON THE BASE OF OPERATIONS. ON THIS, THE STATE DEPT. PROPOSED TO REFUSE TO COMMENT. I SAID THAT THIS WAS CONSISTENT WITH YOUR VIEWS.

8. JOHNSON REPRESENTED TO ME STRONGLY THE RISK THAT THE CEASE-FIRE MAY COME TO GRIEF IF AGREEMENT CANNOT BE REACHED ON THIS SUBJECT. HE MADE NO SECRET OF THE FACT THAT A COMMITMENT TO THE ISRAELIS ON THESE FLIGHTS HAD BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL ELEMENT IN BRINGING THEM ALONG. WHILE SYMPATHETIC AND FRIENDLY, THE STATE DEPT. UNDOUBTEDLY FIND OUR HESITATIONS HARD TO UNDERSTAND. SEE MY L.F.T.

F.C.O. PASS FLASH CAIRO NICOSIA HQBFNE, IMMEDIATE TO PARIS MOSCOW
TEL AVIV SAVING TO AMMAN AND BEIRUT.

MR. FREEMAN

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
/COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING ST./

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.	RESEARCH D. (SOVIET SECTION)
N.A.D.	" (W. EUR. SECTION)
E.E.S.D.	" (AMERICAN SECTION)
ARABIAN D.	DEFENCE D.
S. EUR. D.	NEWS D.
AMERICAN D.	MOD (INT)
U.N.D.	
P.U.S.D.	
W. EUR. D.	

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2322

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

8 AUGUST 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO. 2322 OF 8 AUGUST 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO CAIRO TEL AVIV AMMAN NICOSIA HOBFNE MOSCO PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO BEIRUT.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 776 TO CAIRO AND CAIRO TELEGRAMS NOS. 867 AND 868 FROM MILLARD.

THERE IS NO INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN WHAT BERGUS HAS TOLD H.M. AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO AND WHAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE SAID TO ME, THOUGH CERTAINLY BERGUS HAS GIVEN SIR R. BEAUMONT A MUCH FULLER ACCOUNT. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE MADE IT QUITE CLEAR TO ME THAT THE EGYPTIANS DID NOT LIKE THE U.S. PROPOSAL TO HELP ISRAEL WITH HIGH-LEVEL RECONNAISSANCE, BUT THEY FIRMLY MAINTAIN THAT THE U.A.R. REPLY, IN WHICH THEY SAY THE KEY WORD IS QUOTE IGNORE UNQUOTE, AMOUNTS TO ACQUIESCENCE. SO FAR AS I CAN SEE, THIS IS SO. THE SECOND SENTENCE OF CAIRO TEL. NO. 863 SEEMS TO ME TO PUT THE MATTER IN RATHER A PREJUDICIAL WAY.

2. I SHOULD RECORD EXACTLY WHAT ATHERTON SAID TO ME YESTERDAY IN THE PRESENCE OF ALEXIS JOHNSON (MY TELEGRAM NO. 2317) ABOUT THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO THE EGYPTIANS ON THIS POINT. HE SAID THAT WHEN BERGUS WAS INSTRUCTED TO PUT THE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN CAIRO TELEGRAM NO. 858 TO THE EGYPTIANS, HE WAS GIVEN QUOTE CONTINGENT GUIDANCE UNQUOTE TO TELL THE EGYPTIANS WHAT THE AMERICA WOULD BE DOING TO HELP OVER HIGH-LEVEL RECONNAISSANCE, IF THIS POINT WAS RAISED. IT WAS NOT RAISED AND HE DID NOT THEREFORE DO SO WHEN THIS WAS REPORTED, THE STATE DEPARTMENT TOLD HIM TO GO BACK AND DO IT. HE MADE THIS FURTHER DEMARCHE ABOUT TWO HOURS BEFORE HE WAS AGAIN SUMMONED TO RECEIVE THE EGYPTIAN REPLY TO THE ORIGINAL DEMARCHE. MAHOMED RIAD'S REPLY THEREFORE COVERED BOTH POINTS.

3. I DO NOT THINK THAT THERE WAS ANY INTENTION ON SISCO'S PART TO MISLEAD US WHEN HE TOLD ME ON 6 AUGUST (MY TELEGRAM NO. 2313) THAT THEY HAD SPELLED OUT THE DETAILS ABOUT THE USE OF U.S.

/AIRCRAFT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

AIRCRAFT TO THE EGYPTIANS. I AM SURE THAT HE BELIEVED AT THAT TIME THAT THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN COVERED IN MR. BERGUS' ORIGINAL APPROACH. FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO CAIRO TEL AVIV AMMAN NICOSIA HQBFNE MOSCOW PARIS AND SAVING TO BEIRUT.

MR FREEMAN

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

/COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING ST./

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.
S.E.D.
N.A.D.
U.N.D.
W.E.D.
P.U.S.D.
ARABIAN D.
AMERICAN D.
DEFENCE D.
E.E.S.D.
RESEARCH D. (W. EUR. SECTION)
" (AMERICAN SECTION)
" (SOVIET SECTION)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

COPY TO: GP. CAPT. DIXON,
AIR FORCE OPS ROOM
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

CONFIDENTIAL

14
S E C R E T

CENTER/CAT.A

FLASH WASHINGTON
TELNO.2324

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
8 AUGUST, 1970

S E C R E T

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO. 2324 OF 8 AUGUST 1970 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION FLASH TO CAIRO NICOSIA HOBFNE IMMEDIATE TO PARIS
MOSCOW UKHIS NEW YORK TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO AMMAN BEIRUT.

M.I.2/T. [MIDDLE EAST]

I HAVE JUST HEARD FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THE TURKS HAVE
TURNED THE AMERICAN APPROACH DOWN FLAT. THIS, I AM AFRAID, MEANS
THAT THE ONUS IS ON US. I NEED HARDLY SAY THAT THE INTERESTS AT
STAKE, BOTH IN TERMS OF OUR RELATIONS HERE AND OF THE PROSPECTS
OF A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT, ARE VERY LARGE.

FCO PASS FLASH CAIRO NICOSIA HOBFNE IMMEDIATE PARIS MOSCOW
TEL AVIV AND SAVING AMMAN BEIRUT.

MR. FREEMAN

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

H.E.D.

N.A.D.

E.E.S.D.

ARAB. DEPT.

S.E.D.

AMERICAN DEPT.

U.N.D.

P.U.S.D.

W.E.D.

DEF. DEPT.

NEWS DEPT.

RES. DEPT. (SOVIET SECTION)
(W.E. SECTION)
(AMERICAN SECTION)

MOD (INTERNAL)

S E C R E T

GGGGG

Telephoned to Cover
8/8

CYPHOCAT A

FLASH CAIRO TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
 TELNO 864 8 AUGUST 1970
 SECRET

ADDRESSED FLASH TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 864 OF 8 AUGUST 1970, REPEATED FOR
 INFORMATION FLASH TO WASHINGTON, AND HQBFNE, IMMEDIATE
 TO TEL AVIV, AMMAN, NICOSIA, MOSCOW, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK
 AND BEIRUT

GUARD

MY I.P.T. : CEASEFIRE.

MY CONCLUSION IS THAT THERE IS A SLIGHT
 ELEMENT OF THE AMERICAN "BOUNCING US" IN THIS.
 JOHNSON'S OBVIOUS DESIRE THAT WE SHOULD NOT
 APPROACH THE EGYPTIANS AT ALL WOULD SEEM TO INDICATE IT
 (PARAGRAPH 3 OF WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 2317). HE COULD
 PERFECTLY WELL HAVE SAID: "GO AHEAD AND APPROACH THEM. YOU
 WILL GET A KIND OF NEGATIVE ACQUIESCENCE AND NOTHING MORE BUT
 AT LEAST YOU WILL BE IN THE CLEAR WITH THE U.A.R."

2. I FULLY REALISE THE IMPORTANCE TO US OF A CEASEFIRE AND A
 MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT AND THAT WE SHOULD HELP TO MAINTAIN IT, IF
 WE CAN, BUT I WOULD POINT OUT THE FOLLOWING:

(A) THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAVE NOT CONSULTED US AT ANY
 STAGE ABOUT THEIR INITIATIVE - WE ONLY KNOW WHAT SISCO HAS TOLD
 US ABOUT (1) THEIR REAL OBJECTIVES AND (II) THE EXTENT OF THEIR
 COMMITMENTS TO ISRAEL, THE U.A.R. AND U.S.S.R. IT SEEMS CLEAR WE
 HAVE NOT GOT THE WHOLE STORY BY ANY MEANS.

(B) THAT WHEREAS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MAY HAVE UNDERTAKEN
 COMMITMENTS TO ISRAEL ON THIS SPECIFIC PROJECT AND THE U.A.R.
 MAY INDEED ACQUIESCE IN THEM, H.M.G. HAVE UNDERTAKEN NO SUCH
 COMMITMENTS AND THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE PROJECT WILL APPEAR TO
 THE U.A.R. AUTHORITIES AS, AT BEST, GRATUITOUS. THE U.A.R.
 AUTHORITIES WILL ALREADY HAVE TRANSCRIPTS OF MY TELEPHONE
 CONVERSATIONS WITH TRIPP AND THEIR SUSPICIONS OF OUR ROLE WILL
 PROBABLY BE AROUSED.

/(C) THAT

SECRET - GUARD

S E C R E T - G U A R D

(C) THAT WITH BITTER MEMORIES OF 1967, WE MAY LEGITIMATELY FEAR, IF THE CEASEFIRE OR U.S. INITIATIVE WERE TO BREAK DOWN AND THE EGYPTIANS RECEIVE A MILITARY SETBACK (E.G. A RESUMPTION OF ISRAELI DEEP PENETRATION), A SCAPEGOAT WILL BE NEEDED AND A MEANS FOR NASSER TO BUY HIMSELF BACK INTO THE ARAB COMMUNITY. IT MAY WELL BE ALLEGED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT THE U-2'S WERE NOT ONLY OBSERVING THE CEASEFIRE BUT ACTIVELY SPYING ON BEHALF OF ISRAEL, I.E. THAT IT WAS ANGLO-AMERICAN CONNIVANCE WITH ISRAEL. THIS COULD LEAD TO A SHARP DETERIORATION IN ANGLO-ARAB RELATIONS, AND, AS IN 1967, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND PRESSURES BY THE ARAB COUNTRIES ON PRESIDENT MAKARIOS TO RESCIND THE CYPRUS BASES AGREEMENT: IN SHORT TO SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR US FROM WHICH U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL BE LARGELY IMMUNE TO WHICH IT CAN AFFORD TO BE INDIFFERENT AS IN 1967. IT HAS IN THE PAST BEEN SUGGESTED IN THE PRESS THAT U.S. FORCES MIGHT TRY TO USE CYPRUS TO HELP THE ISRAELIS NOW WHEELUS IS DENIED THEM.

3. I WOULD THEREFORE MUCH PREFER (IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE):

(I) THAT THE ISRAELIS DO THEIR OWN RECONNAISSANCE WITH THE AID OF THE AIRCRAFT PROVIDED BY THE U.S.

(PARA 5 OF TEL AVIV TELEGRAM 697)

(II) THAT RECOVERY AND REFUELLING OF U 2 FLIGHTS, IF ANY, TAKE PLACE IN TURKEY (I WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF THE TURKS HAVE NOT ALREADY SAID ''NO'').

(III) THAT IF CYPRUS IS TO BE USED WE AT LEAST INFORM THE U.A.R. AUTHORITIES OURSELVES THAT WE ARE UNDERTAKING THIS SERVICE TO THE AMERICANS IN CYPRUS AT THEIR REQUEST.

/FCO

S E C R E T - G U A R D

S E C R E T - G U A R D

CAIRO TELEGRAM NO. 864 TO F.C.O.

- 3 -

FCO PLEASE PASS FLASH TO WASHINGTON AND DEFCONCEN FOR HQBFNE,
AND IMMEDIATE TO NICOSIA, PARIS AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

SIR R. BEAUMONT

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

/SENT TO D.C.C./

/COPIES SENT TO NO. 10. DOWNING STREET/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.
S.E.D.
N.A.D.
U.N.D.
W.E.D.
P.U.S.D.
ARABIAN DEPT.
AMERICAN DEPT.
DEFENCE DEPT.
E.E.S.D.
RES. D. (AMER. SECT.)
RES. D. (W.E. SECT.)
RES. D. (SOV. SECT.)
RES. D. (S.E. SECT.)
MOD INTERNAL

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

S E C R E T - G U A R D

NNNNN

S E C R E T - G U A R D

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1761

TO WASHINGTON

8 AUGUST 1973. (NED)

SECRET.

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 1761 OF 8 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO CAIRO NICOSIA HQDFHE TEL AVIV MOSCOW PARIS UKHIS NEW YORK AND SAYING TO AMMAN BEIRUT.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO ~~3317~~ AND CAIRO TELEGRAMS NOS ~~361~~ AND ~~363~~:

MIDDLE EAST.

WE FULLY RECOGNISE THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT DOING ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT JEOPARDISE THE CELEFIRE, WHICH IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE. WE ARE ANXIOUS TO HELP THE AMERICANS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OVER THE U.S.S., AS INDEED OUR AGREEMENT TO ACCUDE TO THEIR REQUEST OVER PRE-POSITIONING THESE AIRCRAFT QUOTE WITHOUT PREJUDICE UNQUOTE INDICATES. WE ALSO RECOGNISE THE FORCE OF WHAT YOU SAY ABOUT THE LIKELY REACTION IN WASHINGTON TO A REFUSAL BY US TO MEET THE U.S. REQUEST. WE MUST, HOWEVER, KNOW MORE ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND WE MUST CONSIDER CAREFULLY ARAB REACTIONS TO OUR AGREEING TO THIS PROPOSAL.

2. YOU SHOULD ACCORDINGLY SPEAK AT ONCE TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT STRESSING THAT WE WANT TO DO ALL WE CAN TO HELP. UNLESS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ON RECONSIDERATION FAVOUR TURKEY AS A BASE FOR THESE AIRCRAFT, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER FAVOURABLY THE PROPOSAL THAT THE AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE BASED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, SUBJECT TO OUR RECEIVING SATISFACTORY ASSURANCES ON THE FOLLOWING TWO POINTS:

(I) THAT THE SOVIET UNION ACQUIESCES IN THIS PROPOSAL IN TERMS WHICH WE CONSIDER SATISFACTORY:

(II) THAT WE ARE SURE THAT THE EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES ARE AWARE THAT A BRITISH BASE WILL BE USED FOR THIS OPERATION: THEY WILL CERTAINLY BECOME AWARE OF THIS FACT AT SOME STAGE. WE SHOULD MUCH PREFER THAT THE U.A.R. GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THIS BY H.M. AMBASSADOR SPEAKING AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. /3.

SECRET

Teleprint to Cover
8/8

SECRET

- 2 -

3. AS REGARDS CYPRUS, WE NOTE THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S ORIGINAL PREFERENCE WAS FOR A BASE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM. IN OUR VIEW, THE USE OF THE SOVEREIGN BASE AREAS WOULD POSE THE SAME PROBLEMS AS A BASE IN THE U.K., WITH THE ADDITIONAL DISADVANTAGES RESULTING FROM CURRENT SOVIET INTEREST IN CYPRUS. WE THEREFORE DO NOT THINK THAT YOU NEED PURSUE THE QUESTION OF A CYPRUS BASE WITH THE AMERICANS, AND YOU SHOULD DISCOURAGE ANY RENewed INTEREST THEY MAY EXPRESS IN THE USE OF CYPRUS AS A MAIN BASE.

4. AS REGARDS REFUELLING AND RECOVERY FACILITIES IN CYPRUS, WE FORESEE NO SPECIAL DIFFICULTIES BUT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO INFORM THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT OF THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS. IN DOING THIS, WE WOULD WISH TO MENTION THAT WE HAD RECEIVED SATISFACTORY ASSURANCES ON THE TWO POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE.

5. WE PRESUME THAT THE AMERICANS ARE SAYING NOTHING PUBLICLY AT THIS STAGE ABOUT THE USE OF U.S. SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS, WE PROPOSE TO TAKE THE LINE THAT WE DO NOT (REPEAT NOT) COMMENT PUBLICLY ON MATTERS OF THIS KIND. IF HOWEVER THE AMERICANS HAVE A FALL-BACK POSITION FOR USE IF COMMENT CANNOT BE AVOIDED WE NEED TO KNOW WHAT IT IS. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE SHOULD SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE ON THIS.

6. SEE MY I.F.T.

DOUGLAS-HOME

/COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.
N.A.D.
E.E.S.D.
ARABIAN D.
S.E.D.
AMERICAN D.
U.N.D.
P.U.S.D.
W.E.D.
RESEARCH D. (SOVIET SECTION)
" (W.E. SECTION)
" (AMERICAN SECTION)
DEFENCE D.
NEWS D.
MOD (INT)

SECRET

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A

F L A S H FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1762

8 AUGUST 1973 (NED)

SECRET

M.I.P.T. : MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR MILLARD FROM HAYMAN.

IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO CONSULT THE PRIME MINISTER, WHO IS NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL 18.30 HOURS BRITISH STANDARD TIME, IN THE LIGHT OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S REPLY TO THE POINTS RAISED IN M.I.P.T., WHICH WAS APPROVED BY MINISTERS.

GRATEFUL FOR REPLY IF POSSIBLE BY 1700 HOURS B.S.T.

DOUGLAS-HONE

/COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING ST./

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

N.A.D.

E.E.S.D.

ARABIAN D.

S.E.D.

AMERICAN D.

U.N.D.

P.U.S.D.

W.E.D.

RESEARCH D. (SOVIET SECTION)

"

(V.E. SECTION)

"

(AMERICAN SECTION)

DEFENCE D.

NEWS D.

MOD (INT)

SECRET

CYPHER CAT 'A'

SECRET - GUARD

FLASH CAIRO

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 866

8 AUGUST 1970

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE FLASH,
TELEGRAM NUMBER 866 OF 8 AUGUST, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
FLASH TO WASHINGTON, HQBFNE, AND IMMEDIATE TO TEL AVIV,
AMMAN, NICOSIA, MOSCOW, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, BEIRUT.

OBLIQUE HIGH-LEVEL RECONNAISSANCE

1. SPOKE AGAIN TO BERGUS. . PARA 2 OF MY TEL NO.
861 IS AN ACCURATE SUMMARY OF A TELEGRAM SENT BY HIM RECORDING
HIS INTERVIEW WITH MUHAMMAD RIAD AT MIDDAY ON 7 AUGUST.

2. MR. BERGUS TOLD ME THAT THIS MORNING HE HAD ON
INSTRUCTIONS SEEN MUHAMMAD RIAD AGAIN AND TOLD HIM THAT THE
STATE DEPARTMENT HAD NOTED THE FACT THAT THE UAR GOVERNMENT
INTENDED TO IGNORE THE COMMUNICATION MADE TO THEM ON THE
SUBJECT OF OBLIQUE HIGH-LEVEL RECONNAISSANCE BY THE
UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT, AND, SINCE THEY ALSO NOTED THAT
THE UAR'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE WAS NOT IN ANY WAY
CONDITIONAL UPON AN AGREED POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT, THEY WOULD
NOT EXPECT AN OFFICIAL ANSWER FROM THE UAR SIDE: BUT THE
UAR WERE INFORMED THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT INTENDED
TO CARRY OUT THESE RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS. MR. BERGUS
SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO ADD THAT THE UNITED
STATES AUTHORITIES WOULD ENDEAVOUR TO KEEP THE FACT OF
THESE FLIGHTS SECRET, BUT THAT IF THEY WERE DISCOVERED,
THEY WOULD ADMIT THAT THEY WERE TAKING PLACE: IF PRESSED,
THEY WOULD SAY THAT THEY WERE CONFINED TO THE ISRAELI HELD
TERRITORY (PRESUMABLY MORE THAN 10 KILOMETRES BACK FROM
THE CANAL): AND IF FURTHER PRESSED THEY WOULD SAY THAT THEY
WOULD NOT OBJECT TO THE RUSSIANS UNDERTAKING SIMILAR
FLIGHTS ON BEHALF OF THE UAR. MUHAMMAD RIAD, WHO HAD
RECEIVED THIS COMMUNICATION, MADE THE FOLLOWING THREE POINTS:

SECRET - GUARD

/(1) THE

- (1) THAT THIS DID NOT AFFECT THE UAR'S VIEWS:
- (2) THAT THE UAR GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSALS FOR THE CEASEFIRE BEFORE TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THIS MATTER : AND
- (3) THAT HE WOULD INFORM HIS SUPERIORS OF THIS LATEST AMERICAN APPROACH .

3. MR . BERGUS ALSO TOLD ME THAT THROUGH MOHAMED RIAD PRESIDENT NASSER HAD ASKED PARTICULARLY THAT DETAILS OF THE CEASEFIRE CONDITIONS SHOULD NOT BE PUBLISHED. ACCORDINGLY, NO DETAILS HAD BEEN PUBLISHED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHEN ANNOUNCING THE NEWS, BUT SECRETARY ROGERS HAD TELEPHONED PERSONALLY LAST EVENING (THE 7TH) TO SAY THAT WHILE THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WOULD UNDERTAKE NOT TO LEAK THE CONDITIONS, AND WOULD TRY TO PERSUADE OTHERS NOT TO DO SO, THEY COULD NOT GIVE ANY UNDERTAKING IN RESPECT OF THIRD PARTIES.

SEE M.I.F.T.

FCO PLEASE PASS FLASH TO WASHINGTON AND DEFCONCEN FOR HQBFNE AND IMMEDIATE TO NICOSIA, PARIS AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

SIR R. BEAUMONT

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
/SENT TO D.C.C./

/COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.
S.F.D.
N.A.D.
U.N.DEPT.
W.E.D.
P.U.S.D.
ARABIAN DEPT.
AMERICAN DEPT.
DEFENCE DEPT.
E.E.S.D.
RES. D. (AMER. SECT.)
RES. D. (W.E. SECT.)
RES. D. (SOV. SECT.)
RES. D. (S.E. SECT.)
MOD INTERNAL

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

S E C R E T - G U A R D

NNNNN

CYPHER CAT A

SECRET GUARD

FLASH CAIRO

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 867

8 AUGUST 1970

SECRET

ADDRESSED FLASH TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
TELEGRAM NUMBER 867 OF 8 AUGUST 1970, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
FLASH TO WASHINGTON, HQBFNE AND IMMEDIATE TO TEL AVIV,
AMMAN, NICOSIA, MOSCOW, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, BEIRUT.

GUARD

M. L. P. T.

THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAVE
NOW RUBBED IN BY A SECOND DEMARCHE THE FACT THAT THE UAR
GOVERNMENT IS INFORMED OF THE PROPOSED FLIGHTS SEEMS TO ME
TO MAKE IT ALL THE MORE NECESSARY FOR HM GOVERNMENT TO LET THE
UAR GOVERNMENT KNOW OF THE EXTENT OF BRITISH INVOLVEMENT
IN THIS MATTER. THIS, AS I HAVE SAID TO MR. TRIPP ON
THE TELEPHONE, AND AS I HAVE STATED IN MY TEL. NO. 864,
IS IN MY VIEW THE MINIMUM ACTION WE CAN TAKE TO PROTECT
OUR INTERESTS AND TO MITIGATE RISKS WHICH ARE MUCH
GREATER FOR US THAN FOR THE AMERICANS.

FCO PLEASE PASS FLASH TO WASHINGTON AND DEFCOMCEN FOR
HQBFNE AND IMMEDIATE TO NICOSIA, PARIS AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

SIR R. BEAUMONT

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
/SENT TO D.C.C./
/COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING ST./

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.
S.E.D.
N.A.D.
U.N.D.
W.E.D.
P.U.S.D.
ARABIAN D.
AMERICAN D.
DEFENCE D.
E.E.S.D.
RESEARCH D. (AMERICAN SECTION)
" (W.E. SECTION)
" (SOVIET SECTION)
" (S.E. SECTION)

MOD (INT)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

SECRET GUARD

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG S E C R E T

FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1763

8 AUGUST 1970 (N.E.D.)

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 1763 OF 8 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO NICOSIA, CAIRO, HQBFNE, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW, PARIS, UKNIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO AMMAN BEIRUT AND TRIPOLI. YOUR TELS NOS 2323 AND 2324 : MIDDLE EAST.

IT IS UNSATISFACTORY THAT WE CANNOT OURSELVES ASCERTAIN THE DEGREE OF SOVIET ACQUIESCENCE IN THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL. BUT IN THE LIGHT OF THE VARIOUS ARGUMENTS SET OUT IN YOUR TELEGRAMS AND BECAUSE OF THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF OUR DOING NOTHING WHICH MIGHT BE HELD TO JEOPARDISE THE CEASE FIRE, MINISTERS HAVE NOW AGREED TO THE PROPOSAL THAT TWO U2 HIGH LEVEL RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT SHOULD OPERATE FROM THE SOVEREIGN BASE AREAS IN CYPRUS.

2. THEIR AGREEMENT IS HOWEVER CONDITIONAL UPON US ACCEPTANCE OF THE FOLLOWING POINTS :

(1) PRESIDENT MAKARIOS SHOULD BE INFORMED FIRST OF THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT, AND THE AIRCRAFT SHOULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) PROCEED TO CYPRUS UNTIL HE HAS BEEN SO INFORMED . NICOSIA SHOULD NOW TAKE ACTION ON THE LINES PROPOSED IN TELECON HAYMAN/SCOTT. SCOTT SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UAR ARE AWARE THAT AMERICAN HIGH LEVEL RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT MAY BE USED FROM TIME TO TIME TO HELP WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASE FIRE. THEIR ACTIVITIES WILL BE STRICTLY LIMITED TO THE EAST SIDE OF THE CANAL. HMG FEEL THAT THEY WOULD BE FAILING IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL DUTY IF THEY DID NOT OFFER THEIR COOPERATION IN THIS WAY AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CEASE FIRE AND TO THE CHANCE OF A MIDDLE EAST

/SETTLEMENT

S E C R E T

*Teleprinted to Comms
9/8*

S E C R E T

- 2 -

SETTLEMENT:

(2) THE AMERICANS SHOULD MAKE A SUPPORTING APPROACH TO THE PRESIDENT THROUGH THEIR EMBASSY IN NICOSIA.

(111) THE AMERICANS SHOULD SUBSEQUENTLY INFORM THE RUSSIANS THAT THEY WILL BE OPERATING THE U2 FLIGHTS FROM CYPRUS.

3. WE ALSO CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT THAT THE UAR GOVT SHOULD BE INFORMED THAT A BRITISH BASE IS TO BE USED FOR THIS OPERATION. H M AMBASSADOR CAIRO SHOULD THEREFORE SPEAK TO EITHER MAHMOUD RIAD OR MOHAMMED RIAD (BUT PREFERABLY THE LATTER), AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER PRESIDENT MAKARIOS HAS BEEN INFORMED.

4. LINE TO BE TAKEN WITH THE PRESS. WE SHALL WITHHOLD ALL COMMENT FOR THE TIME BEING. WHEN THE STORY BREAKS, WE SHALL SAY, THAT THE BASING OF THESE AIRCRAFT AT AKROTIRI IS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CEASE FIRE ARRANGEMENTS,. THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE LIMITED IN TIME TO THE DURATION OF THE CEASE FIRE.

5. IF THEY FIND IT NECESSARY TO COMMENT AT ALL, WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT COULD BE PERSUADED TO TAKE THE SAME LINE, BUT THIS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO ANY COMMENTS FROM NICOSIA.

6. CHARGE D'AFFAIRES NICOSIA SHOULD REPORT AS SOON AS ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN WITH THE PRESIDENT.

DOUGLAS-HOME

/COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

ARABIAN DEPT.

N.A.D.

E.E.S.D.

S.E.D.

AMERICAN DEPT.

U.N.D.

P.U.S.D.

W.E.D.

DEFENCE DEPT.

NEWS DEPT.

RES. D. (W.E. SECT.)

RES. D. (S.E. SECT.)

RES. D. (AMER. SECT.)

RES. D. (SOV. SECT.)

MOD INTERNAL

S E C R E T

NNNNN

SYNTHETIC CAT-A-

SECRET

F L A S H WASHINGTON

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2333

8TH AUGUST, 1974.

SECRET.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 2333 OF 8/8 AND REF NICOSIA CAIRO HOBFRE
TEL AVIV MOSCOW PARIS UKRIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO AMMAN BEIRUT
AND TRIPOLI.

FROM MILLARD

YRTELNO 1763.

I HAVE SO INFORMED STATE DEPARTMENT. UNFORTUNATELY THEY HAVE
JUST HAD A CALL FROM THE ISRAELIS TO SAY THAT EVIDENCE OF A
VIOLATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE HAS BEEN DETECTED. THIS APPARENTLY
CONSISTS OF A BATTERY OF SAMS HAVING BEEN MOVED INTO A NEW SITE
WITHIN 15 KILOMETRES OF THE CANAL TODAY. THE ISRAELIS HAVE ASKED
THE AMERICANS TO MAKE GOOD THEIR UNDERTAKINGS BY CARRYING OUT A
RECONNAISSANCE TO CHECK THIS EVIDENCE.

2. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS, THE AMERICANS ASK WHETHER THE U2S
COULD TAKE OFF FROM ENGLAND EARLY TOMORROW MORNING. THEY WOULD
PROCEED DIRECT TO THEIR OBJECTIVE AND CARRY OUT THEIR MISSION,
RETURNING TO CYPRUS TO REFUEL THEREAFTER. IF NECESSARY THEY COULD
AFTER REFUELLING RETURN TO THE U.K. THE AMERICANS PUT FORWARD
THIS REQUEST WITH CONSIDERABLE RELUCTANCE, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT
THEY WOULD NOT HAVE DONE SO IF THE ISRAELIS HAD NOT ALLEGED A
VIOLATION. THEY POINT OUT THAT IF A VIOLATION HAS TAKEN PLACE,
IT IS IMPORTANT TO nip it in the bud AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE TO
DISCOURAGE REPETITIONS.

3. I SAID THAT THIS WAS VERY DIFFICULT. MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE THAT
THE AIRCRAFT COULD NOT TAKE OFF UNTIL THE ARCHBISHOP HAD BEEN
INFORMED AND I DOUBTED WHETHER YOU WOULD AGREE TO ANY CHANGE.

I UNDERTOOK SIMPLY TO REPORT WHAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD SAID.

4. ON TIMING, AIRCRAFT WOULD HAVE TO TAKE OFF AT ABOUT 0530 LONDON
TIME. CERTAIN PREPARATIONS HAVE TO BE MADE IN ADVANCE AND THIS
WOULD MEAN THAT CLEARANCE FOR THE OPERATION WOULD HAVE TO BE
GIVEN NOT LATER THAN 0230 LONDON TIME. THEREAFTER THE OPERATION
COULD STILL BE CALLED OFF ANY TIME BEFORE TAKE-OFF.

5. THE AMERICANS OF COURSE ACCEPT POINTS 2 AND 3 IN YOUR TELEGRAM,
AND ARE INSTRUCTING THEIR POSTS ACCORDINGLY. /6.

SECRET

Teleprinted to Cairo
9/8

SECRET

- 2 -

6. I HAVE JUST HEARD FROM THE RESIDENT CLERK THAT THE ARCH-BISHOP SHOULD BE INFORMED BY 1100 A.M. LONDON TIME TOMORROW. IT OCCURS TO ME THAT IF YOU WERE WILLING TO MEET THIS FURTHER AMERICAN REQUEST, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DO SO, WITHOUT INCONSISTENCY WITH YOUR POINT 1 SINCE THE AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT ACTUALLY ARRIVE IN CYPRUS UNTIL WELL AFTER THE ARCHBISHOP HAD BEEN INFORMED.

FCO PASS FLASH NICOSIA IMMEDIATE CAIRO HQBFNE TEL AVIV MOSCOW AND PARIS AND SAVING ANNAN BEIRUT AND TRIPOLI.

MR. FREEMAN

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

/COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.F.D.
ARABIAN D.
N.A.D.
E.E.S.D.
S.E.D.
AMERICAN D.
U.N.D.
P.U.S.D.
W.E.D.
DEFENCE D.
NEWS D.
RESEARCH D. (W.E. SECTION)
" (S.E. SECTION)
" (AMERICAN SECTION)
" (SOVIET SECTION)
MOD (INT)

SECRET

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1765

9 AUGUST 1970 (NED)

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 1765 OF 9 AUGUST REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO NICOSIA HQBENE CAIRO TEL AVIV MOSCOW PARIS
UKMIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO AMMAN BEIRUT TRIPOLI.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 2330.

WE AGREE THAT AIRCRAFT SHOULD TAKE OFF FROM ENGLAND EARLY
TOMORROW MORNING, BUT IF, WHEN HE IS INFORMED, THE ARCHBISHOP
RAISES OBJECTION, THE AIRCRAFT MUST RETURN TO BRITAIN.

DOUGLAS-HOME

/COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING ST./

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.
ARABIAN D.
N.A.D.
E.E.S.D.
S.E.D.
AMERICAN D.
U.N.D.
P.U.S.D.
W.E.D.
DEFENCE D.
NEWS D.
RESEARCH D. (W.E. SECTION)
" (S.E. SECTION)
" (AMERICAN SECTION)
" (SOVIET SECTION)
MOD (INT)

SECRET

Teleprint to Cover 9/8

CYPHER/CAT A

SECRET

F L A S H FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 777

TO CAIRO
9 AUGUST 1970

SECRET.

ADDRESSED TO CAIRO TELEGRAM NUMBER 777 OF 9 AUGUST, REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO NICOSIA, WASHINGTON.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER ~~1785~~ TO WASHINGTON: MIDDLE EAST.

SECOND OF TWO AIRCRAFT IS DUE TO TAKE OFF FROM U.K. AT 00.30
G.M.T. ON 10 AUGUST. WE UNDERSTAND THAT IT WILL CARRY OUT
RECONNAISSANCE AND LAND AT AKROTIRI AT APPROX 10.20 G.M.T.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.
N.A.D.
S.E.D.
ARAB. D.
E.E. & S.D.
AMERICAN D.
U.N.D.
P.U.S.D.
W.E.D.
DEF. D.
NEWS D.
RESEARCH D. (W.E. SECT.)
(AMERICAN SECT.)
(SOVIET SECT.)
M.O.D. (INTERNAL)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

COPY TO:
GRP. CAPT. DIXON, AIR OF
ROOM, M.O.D./I.

SECRET

FM FROM CHRISTOPHER ROBERTS

PLEASE SEE THE TEXT OF THE TELEGRAM DESPATCHED AFTER YOUR DISCUSSION WITH HAYMAN AND A FURTHER EXCHANGE OF TELEGRAMS WITH WASHINGTON WHICH TOOK PLACE DURING THE NIGHT.

I UNDERSTAND THAT THE TWO AIRCRAFT ARE LEAVING BRITAIN AT 2530 HOURS TO INSPECT CEASEFIRELINE AND WILL NOT ARRIVE IN CYPRUS UNTIL AFTER 1100 HOURS BRITISH TIME, BY WHICH TIME MESSAGE FROM OUR HIGH COMMISSIONER IN NICOSIA SHOULD HAVE REACHED ARCHBISHOP (WHO IS IN TROODOS MOUNTAINS).

TELEGRAM NUMBER 495

9 AUGUST 1970

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELEGRAM NUMBER 495 OF 9 AUGUST
R.F.I. TO WASHINGTON CAIRO HQBFNE TEL AVIV MOSCOW PARIS
AND UKMIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO AMMAN BEIRUT AND TRIPOLI.

YOUR TELEGRAM 1763 TO WASHINGTON. MIDDLE EAST.

IN ABSENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTER AND ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER
SCOTT SPOKE TO ONLY AVAILABLE SENIOR OFFICIAL (PILAVACHI
COUNSELLOR MFA) LAST NIGHT AS INSTRUCTED IN TELECON HEYMAN/
SCOTT. PILAVACHI UNDERTOOK TO PASS INFORMATION TO ARCHBISHOP
SPEEDILY AND CONFIRMED TO SCOTT AT 2300 HOURS GMT TODAY
THAT THIS HAD BEEN DONE.

2. AMERICAN AMBASSADOR HAS DECIDED TO MAKE SUPPORTING APPROACH
(POINT 2 IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE) IMMEDIATELY AT
HIGHEST AVAILABLE OFFICIAL LEVEL WITHOUT AWAITING INSTRUCTIONS.

3. THERE HAS BEEN NO REACTION SO FAR FROM ARCHBISHOP BUT
ILAVACHI GAVE NO INDICATION OF ANY LIKELY ADVERSE REACTION
WHEN SCOTT SPOKE TO HIM.

F C O PASS FLASH WASHINGTON CAIRO TEL AVIV MOSCOW PARIS AND
UKMIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO AMMAN BEIRUT AND TRIPOLI.

MR. RAMSBOTHAM

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

/COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

N.E.D.

ARABIAN DEPT.

N.A.D.

E.E.S.D.

S.E.D.

AMERICAN DEPT.

U.N.D.

P.U.S.D.

W.E.D.

DEFENCE DEPT.

NEWS DEPT.

RES. D. (W.E. SECT.)

RES. D. (S.E. SECT.)

RES. D. (AMER. SECT.)

RES. D. (SOV. SECT.)

MOD INTERNAL

S E C R E T

NNNNN

11 USCON 10/1
ADVANCE COPIES - MIDDLE EAST

PS

PUS

Minister of State Mr. Godber

Mr. Hayman

Sir W. Luce

Hd. of Near Eastern Dept.

Hd. of North African Dept.

Hd. of Arabian Dept.

Hd. of UN Dept.

Hd. of American Dept.

Hd. of Eastern European & Soviet Dept.

Defence Dept. (2)

PUSD

News Dept.

~~LLC 708/10~~ FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE ~~GR 010~~

CYPHER CAT 'A'

FLASH MOSCOW

TELEGRAM NO. 917

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

10 AUGUST 1970

S E C R E T.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 917 OF 10/8 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION (FLASH) TO WASHINGTON, CAIRO, AND NICOSIA AND (IMMEDIATE) TO HQDFNE, PARIS, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO AMMAN AND BEIRUT.

[sic]
WASHINGTON TEL. NO. 1716 : MIDDLE EAST/U2 FLIGHTS.

FROM THE TELEGRAMS WHICH I HAVE SO FAR RECEIVED, I AM NOT QUITE SURE HOW THIS STANDS, BUT IF YOU DECIDE TO INSTRUCT H.M. AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO TO APPROACH THE EGYPTIAN MFA (CAIRO TEL. 860), YOU WILL NO DOUBT WISH ME TO TAKE SIMILAR ACTION WITH KOZYREV, THE SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER WHO IS IN CHARGE OF MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS IN THE ABSENCE OF VINOGRADOV. AS SEEN FROM HERE, THERE IS GOOD REASON TO EXPLAIN OUR POSITION CLEARLY TO THE RUSSIANS ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THEIR SENSITIVITY OVER ALLEGED ANGLO-AMERICAN DESIGNS ON CYPRUS.

2. THE U.S. EMBASSY (WHO SAY THAT THE SCHEDULED U2 FLIGHT DID NOT TAKE PLACE ON 9 AUGUST, BUT THAT THERE MIGHT BE ONE ON

10 AUGUST, 1970, BY MESSAGE FROM THE SOVIET MFA AND

DID NOT TAKE PLACE ON 9 AUGUST, BUT THAT THERE MIGHT BE ONE ON 10 AUGUST) HAD HEARD NOTHING BY MIDDAY FROM THE SOVIET MFA AND ARE APPARENTLY UNDER INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO CONTACT THE MINISTRY UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS (FLASH) TO WASHINGTON AND NICOSIA AND (IMMEDIATE) TO PARIS , UKNIS NEW YORK AND DEFCOMCEN AND SAVING TO AMMAN AND BEIRUT.

DEFCOMCEN PLEASE PASS HQBFNE (IMMEDIATE).

MR.R.EDMONDS.

NNNN

100011

ADVANCE COPIES - MIDDLE EAST

(14)

Dep^{he} - dist

PS

~~PUS~~ Sir L Monson

Minister of State Mr. Godber

Mr. Hayman

Sir W. Luce

Hd. of Near Eastern Dept.

Hd. of North African Dept.

Hd. of Arabian Dept.

Hd. of UN Dept.

Hd. of American Dept.

Hd. of Eastern European & Soviet Dept.

Defence Dept. (2)

PUSD

News Dept.

CYPHER/CAT'A

FLASH WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NO. 2336

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

16 AUGUST 1970

SECRET.

ADDRESSED TO F.C.O. TELEGRAM NO. 2336 OF 16 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW CAIRO NICOSIA H.Q.B.F.N.E. PARIS TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO AMMAN AND BEIRUT.

FROM MILLARD.

MOSCOW TELEGRAM NO. 917 : MIDDLE EAST.

ATHERTON HAS JUST RUNG ME UP TO SAY THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN HOLDING THEIR INSTRUCTIONS TO MOSCOW PENDING CONFIRMATION THAT H.M. AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO HAD TAKEN ACTION AND THAT WE WANTED THEM TO GO AHEAD. I CONFIRMED THIS AND THEY ARE INSTRUCTING THE U.S. EMBASSY IN MOSCOW ACCORDINGLY.

F.C.O. PASS FLASH MOSCOW IMMEDIATE CAIRO NICOSIA H.Q.B.F.N.E. PARIS TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO AMMAN AND BEIRUT.

MR. FREEMAN.

SENT AT

30
RUS Sir L. Mowson

Minister of State Mr. Godber

Mr. Hayman

Sir W. Luce

Hd. of Near Eastern Dept.

Hd. of North African Dept.

Hd. of Arabian Dept.

Hd. of UN Dept.

Hd. of American Dept.

Hd. of Eastern European & Soviet Dept.

Defence Dept. (2)

PUSD

News Dept.

CYPHER CAT/A

IMMEDIATE NICOSIA

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 497
SECRET

12 AUGUST 1970

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELEGRAM NUMBER 497 OF 12 AUGUST
R F I WASHINGTON CAIRO HQ DFHE TEL AVIV MOSCOW PARIS
AND UKNIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO AMMAN BEIRUT AND TRIPOLI.

NY TELEGRAM NUMBER 495: MIDDLE EAST.

T
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TOOK SUPPORTING ACTION YESTERDAY WITH
DIRECTOR GENERAL MFA. VENIAMIN GAVE NO REACTION, BUT SEEMED
TO HAVE IT IN MIND THAT HIS ADVICE TO ARCHBISHOP MIGHT BE
NOT TO COMMENT IN ANY WAY ON THE INFORMATION I HAD PASSED
TO HIM. TODAY THERE HAS STILL BEEN NO REACTION FROM
ARCHBISHOP (WHO RETURNS TO NICOSIA THIS EVENING), AND
SINCE HE KNEW FIRST AIRCRAFT WOULD REACH AKROTIRI YESTERDAY
IT NOW SEEMS EVEN LESS LIKELY THAT CYPRUS GOVERNMENT WILL
PRESS US NOT TO AGREE TO USE OF SBAS FOR THIS PURPOSE.

2. STORY MAY BREAK SOON IN CYPRUS, SINCE USAF AIRCRAFT HAVE
ALREADY BEGUN TO ARRIVE AT AKROTIRI AND CAN BE OBSERVED,
THOUGH NOT FROM CLOSE RANGE, BY THE PUBLIC. IN ADDITION TO
THE LINE TO TAKE WITH THE PRESS GIVEN IN PARA 4 OF YOUR
TELEGRAM 1723 TO WASHINGTON, WE SHOULD NEED TO DEAL HERE
WITH QUESTIONS ON WHETHER THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT WAS
CONSULTED OR INFORMED. IF ASKED WHETHER OTHER GOVERNMENTS
WERE CONSULTED OR INFORMED, WE THEREFORE PROPOSE TO SAY
THAT THESE MATTERS ARE HANDLED IN CONFIDENCE AS BETWEEN
GOVERNMENTS, AND TO ADD UNATTRIBUTABLY THAT THE CYPRUS
GOVERNMENT WAS INFORMED IN ADVANCE.

ADVANCE COPIES - MIDDLE EAST

PS

PUS

Minister of State Mr. Godber

Mr. Hayman

Sir W. Luce

Hd. of Near Eastern Dept.

Hd. of North African Dept.

Hd. of Arabian Dept.

Hd. of UN Dept.

Hd. of American Dept.

Hd. of Eastern European & Soviet Dept.

Defence Dept. (2)

PUSD

News Dept.

LWT 10/8/70

CYPHER CAT/A

IMMEDIATE CAIRO TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 865 10 AUGUST 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDED IMMEDIATE FOR TEL. NO. DATED 10/8/70 RELAYED FOR INFO
(IMMEDIATE) TO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, NICOSIA, ROME, MOSCOW,
PARIS, LONDON AND NEW YORK.

REPEATED SAVING TO:- AMMAN, BEIRUT AND TRIPOLI.

MR. MUHAMMAD FIAD WHEN I SAW HIM LAST NIGHT SAID THAT THE
UAR AUTHORITIES HAS NOTIFIED THE AMERICANS OF THREE VIOLATIONS
OF THE CEASE-FIRE BY THE ISRAELIS BEFORE 1300 HOURS LOCAL
TIME YESTERDAY. ONE WAS A BURST OF FIRE AT A SENTRY TEN
KILOMETRES SOUTH OF SUEZ. THE SECOND WAS AN OVERFLIGHT BY
ISRAELI AIRCRAFT OVER SUEZ WHICH LASTED FOURTEEN MINUTES AND
WAS WITNESSED BY MEMBERS OF THE FOREIGN PRESS AT 1100 HOURS
AND THE THIRD WAS IN THE SAME LOCATION AS THE FIRST AND
OCCURRED WHEN AUTOMATIC WEAPONS WERE FIRED BY THE ISRAELI
SIDE AT 1220 HOURS.

FOR PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, NICOSIA, PARIS AND
LONDON AND NEW YORK.

FOR PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO DEFENCE COORDINATOR FOR ROME.

(14 Middle East)

10/8/70

Min. Secret

ADVANCE

FOR PLEASE PASS SAVING TO AMMAN, FIRST AND TRICKI.

END +

.....

31

14

++

Advance.

CYPHER

DWF E03/10
LWY 921/10
CYPHER CAT/A

FLASH FCO GR 300

UNEDITED COPY

FLASH CAIRO TO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 869

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
10 AUGUST 1970

SECRET

ADDSO TO FLASH FCO TELNO. 869 DATED 10/8/70 REPEATED FOR INFO
(FLASH) TO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, NICOSIA AND HQBFNE
(IMMEDIATE) TO MOSCOW, PARIS, AND UKHIS NEW YORK.
REPEATED SAVING TO :- AMMAN, BEIRUT AND TRIPOLI.

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 1763 TO WASHINGTON.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH TELEPHONE CALL RECEIVED FROM MR. EGERTON
AT 12 NOON BST TODAY (9 AUGUST) I CALLED ON MR. MUHAMMAD
RIAD REPEAT MUHAMMAD RIAD AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AT 1700 BST THIS EVENING AND SPOKE TO HIM IN ACCORDANCE WITH
INSTRUCTIONS . (COPY OF SPEAKING NOTES BY BAG). MR. RIAD
WINCED AND SAID THAT HE WOULD PASS ON THIS INFORMATION TO
HIGHER AUTHORITY. HE THEN WENT OVER THE HISTORY OF THIS
AFFAIR EXACTLY AS REPORTED IN PARA 2 OF MY TELEGRAM NO. 861
SAVE THAT HE GAVE EXACT TIMINGS. HE SAID THAT MR. BERGUS
HAD CONVEYED THE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS TO HIM AT 2130 HOURS
LOCAL TIME ON 6 AUGUST AND HAD REQUESTED AN ANSWER BY NOON
ON THE 7TH. ONLY AT 1030 HOURS ON THE 7TH HAD HE PUT FORWARD
THE SUGGESTION ABOUT HIGH LEVEL RECONNAISSANCE BY AMERICAN
AIRCRAFT. IT HAD THEREFORE NOT BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT
BY THE UAR AUTHORITIES.

2. MR. RIAD ASKED PARTICULARLY ABOUT PRESIDENT MAKARIOS' REACTIONS AND I HAD TO EXPLAIN THAT OWING TO A HOLDUP IN OUR COMMUNICATIONS, I COULD NOT GIVE HIM ANY ASSURANCE ON THIS BUT MY BACKGROUND INSTRUCTIONS MADE IT SEEM LIKELY HE HAD CONSULTED AND HAD NOT OBJECTED.

3. ALTHOUGH IT IS THUS SO GOOD SO FAR, I AM NOT CONVINCED
WE ARE PERMANENTLY HOME AND DRY. THIS WHOLE EXERCISE COULD
STILL TURN OUT VERY NASTY AND VERY COSTLY FOR BRITAIN AS
EXPLAINED IN MY TELNO. 884. THE FACT THAT THE EGYPTIANS
WILL GET TO KNOW THAT THE TURKS REFUSED AND THE RUSSIANS
DISAPPROVED ENHANCES EVENTUAL RISKS TO US AND OUR STAKE IN
M.E. AT LITTLE IMMEDIATE COST TO THE AMERICANS.

FCO PLEASE PASS FLASH TO WASHINGTON, NICOSIA AND DEFENCE CONCEN.
IMMEDIATE TO PARIS AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

PLEASE PASS SAVING TO AMMAN, BEIRUT AND TRIPOLI

DEFENCE CONCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH TO HQBFNE.

BEAUMONT +

11111111

UNEDITED

cdem

ADVANCE COURSE

PS

115

Si l'ensemble

~~Index~~ of Star FS/Doggett

BY The Hon. Secy.

Finch

$\{t \mid \exists x \in D$

215

Krabbe's

UNION

Q. 2

ACSD

Net

American

FEED

(Dept)

14

0242

PRIME MINISTER

Middle East Cease-Fire Surveillance

I attach the latest telegrams on this subject.
The position is as follows:-

- (i) The U.A.R. have been told about the use of Cyprus (Cairo telegram No. 869). Mr. Muhammad Riad is described as having "winced" but there was no more violent reaction. The Ambassador describes the position as "so good so far but we are not yet home and dry".
- (ii) In deference to the Americans we are not *yet* speaking to the Russians ourselves, but the American Ambassador in Moscow is to tell them that the flights are operating from Cyprus. When we have learnt the result of the U.S. approach to the Russians, we will reconsider the position *(see the draft tel. to Moscow which has now been sent)*.
- (iii) There has still been no reaction from Archbishop Makarios. It is assumed that he is checking with the Russians and the U.A.R. and that we will get a reply tomorrow. (The Cypriot Official through whom the message was passed gave no indication to suggest a likely adverse reaction).
- (iv) Meanwhile, the first two aircraft have arrived at Akrotiri, having, I understand, flown one surveillance flight each in the course of their *(Niconia Lt N°497)* journey from here. You will recall that we told the Americans that the flights could not be allowed to land in Cyprus if the Archbishop "raises objection". It seems to me that the Archbishop may

SECRET

- 2 -

well have decided that the best way out for him is to appear to be the victim of a fait accompli and that this also is part of the explanation of the delay in his reply.

M.

August 10, 1970

SECRET

DEPARTMENT

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIORITY MARKINGS

Flash
Immediate }
Priority
Routine

(Date) _____

Despatched _____

FLASH

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

En Clair.
Code
Cypher

[Security classification
—if any]

SECRET

[Privacy marking
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

Addressed to MOSCOW

telegram No. (date)

And to

repeated for information to FLASH: WASHINGTON, CAIRO, NICOSIA,
IMMEDIATE: HQBFNE, PARIS, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK

Saving to AMMAN, BEIRUT.

Your telegram No. 917 and Washington tel No.
2336: Middle East-U.2 Flights.

We do not repeat not wish you to approach the
Russians about this.

2. Paragraph 3 of Washington Telegram No. 2323
shows that this is an extremely sensitive topic with
the Russians. It now appears (Washington tel No.
2336) that your U.S. colleague is being instructed
to tell the Russians that they are operating the
U.2 flights from Cyprus (para. 2 (iii) of my tel.
No. 1763 to Washington).

3. You should remain in close touch with Beam.
When you have learned from him the Soviet response
to his latest approach, we shall wish to consider
whether—and if so in what terms—you should say
something to the Russians.

Draft Telegram to:—
MOSCOW

No.

(Date)

And to:—

M. J. F. man.
J. L. F. man.

Repeat to:—

Flash:
Washington
Cairo
Nicosia
Immediate:
HQBFNE
Paris
Tel Aviv

Saving to:—

UKMIS New York

Saving to:

Amman
Beirut

Departmental

Distribution:—

NED; NAD; EESD;
Arabian; S.Eur.D;
American; U.N.D;
P.U.S.D; W.E.D;
Research D. (Soviet)

(W.Eur)
~~Copies to~~—(American)

Defence;
News D;
MOD (Int.)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

SECRET

Handwritten: Middle East
File B/F 1/18

August 11, 1970

Middle East Cease-Fire Surveillance

I have told the Prime Minister of the position on this question, basing myself on the telegrams which you sent to me yesterday evening and, in particular, Cairo telegram No. 869, Nicosia No. 497 and the telegram to Moscow instructing our Ambassador not to approach the Russians but to keep in close touch with Mr. Deam. I understand that there has been no significant development today and that a reply has still not been received from Archbishop Makarios.

The Prime Minister has said that in return for the co-operation which we are giving to the Americans he hopes that it will be possible to ensure that we receive from them as full information as possible about the results of the surveillance.

(sgd) P.J.S. MOON

N.J. Barrington, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. GUIDANCE 141

TO CREE IN MISSIONS
12 AUGUST 1974 (16)

SECRET

MIDDLE EAST - USAF U2S

M.I.P.G.T.

THIS GUIDANCE IS STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION ONLY. IF, HOWEVER, NEWS OF THE U2S BREAKS, POSTS MAY USE THE CONTINGENCY LINE CONTAINED IN PARA.3. POSTS (PARTICULARLY NICOSIA) MAY FIND IT NECESSARY TO DRAW ON THIS PARAGRAPH BEFORE, AS THEY MAY REASONABLY BELIEVE, NEWS DEPARTMENT HAVE USED IT, BUT IF SO SHOULD REPORT THEIR ACTION BY FLASH TELEGRAM. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF NICOSIA POSTS SHOULD NOT USE PARA. 4 UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED.

2. THE AMERICANS ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ORGANISING THE CEASEFIRE. THEY ORIGINALLY PROPOSED TO THE EGYPTIANS THAT FOR THE PURPOSE OF VERIFYING OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE EACH SIDE WOULD RELY ON ITS OWN NATIONAL MEANS, INCLUDING RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, WHICH WOULD BE FREE TO OPERATE WITHOUT INTERFERENCE UP TO 10 KILOMETRES FROM THE CEASEFIRE LINE ON ITS OWN SIDE OF THAT LINE. THE AMERICANS SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD THE EGYPTIANS AND OURSELVES THAT THEY INTENDED TO USE USAF U2S TO HELP ISRAEL WITH AIR RECONNAISSANCE. THEY ASKED WHETHER TWO OF THESE AIRCRAFT COULD BE STATIONED AT OUR SOVEREIGN BASE IN AKROTIRI, CYPRUS. WE AGREED TO THIS, PROVIDED THE AMERICANS INFORMED THE RUSSIANS. WE TOLD THE CYPRIOTS AND EGYPTIANS OF WHAT WAS PROPOSED. THE CYPRIOTS HAVE NOT REACTED: THE EGYPTIANS HAVE REACTED NON-COMMITTALLY.

3. WE DO NOT WISH TO DRAW ATTENTION TO OUR INVOLVEMENT IN THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CEASEFIRE. IF THE NEWS BREAKS, NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL SAY ON THE RECORD THAT, AT THE REQUEST OF THE US GOVERNMENT, HMG HAVE AGREED AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CEASEFIRE IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO MAKE AVAILABLE REFUELLING AND

/OTHER

SECRET

SECRET

OTHER FACILITIES FOR CERTAIN US RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT FOR THE DURATION OF THE CEASEFIRE. THEY WILL ADD IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS THAT THE CYPRUS AND EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENTS WERE INFORMED IN ADVANCE BUT THAT SUCH MATTERS MUST BE REGARDED AS IN CONFIDENCE BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS.

4. PROVIDED WE HAVE HEARD THAT THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT HAS NO OBJECTION, NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL ALSO SAY UNATTRIBUTABLY IF QUESTIONED THAT THE FACILITIES ARE AT AKROTIRI.

DOUGLAS-HOME

BY TELEGRAPH:

MOSCOW TEL AVIV CAIRO NICOSIA

[ALL FLASH]

ANKARA U.K.MIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON
AMMAN BEIRUT JERUSALEM ADDIS ABABA
DJAKARTA RAWALPINDI KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE H.C.

[ALL IMMEDIATE]

BONN BRUSSELS U.K.DEL NATO PARIS
OTTAWA CANBERRA WELLINGTON

[ALL PRIORITY]

AND SAVING TO CERTAIN OTHER POSTS

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION
G.I.P.D.

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
GUIDANCE

SECRET

Foreign and Commonwealth Office document

Reference FCO DIPLOMATIC REPORT NO. 421/70
(NEM 3/408/1)
Description FOURTEEN DAYS THAT SHOOK
ISRAEL (British Ambassador to
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary)
Date 14 AUGUST 1970

The above FCO document, which was enclosed on this file has been removed and destroyed.

Such documents are the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. When released they are available in the appropriate FCO CLASSES.

Signed CL Wayland

Date 6/6/00

PP J R Green
Prime Minister's Office Records
Hepburn House
Marsham Street

SECRET

Middle East 34



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

17 August, 1970

P.A. M.
21/8
Prime Minister.
M.
18/8

A 20/8

Dear Peter,

Middle East Cease Fire Surveillance

With reference to your letter of 11 August we have still not received any reply from Archbishop Makarios. We think, therefore, we may assume that he does not object to the use of the S.B.A.s.

In your second paragraph you said that the Prime Minister hoped it would be possible to ensure that we received from the Americans as full information as possible about the results of their surveillance. The situation is that the Americans have agreed to provide us with information from their surveillance operations. So far, the information has been inconclusive, as it does not enable us to ascertain whether changes on the ground within the 50 mile zone on the UAR side of the canal, which the Israelis have reported, took place before or after the cease-fire came into effect at midnight on 7 August. We expect more positive results early ~~this~~ week.

Yours ever
L. McClure

P. J. S. Moon, Esq.,
10 Downing Street.

SECRET

S E C R E T

34A
SECRETARY OF STATE'S FILE

CYPHER CAT 'A'

FLASH CAIRO

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 899

21 AUGUST 1970

SECRET

M.I.P.T.

AS YOU WILL SEE, THERE HAS BEEN NO REFERENCE TO CYPRUS IN THE STORY AS IT HAS BROKEN SO FAR IN CAIRO. WE ARE NOT, THEREFORE, USING THE LINE IN YOUR GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NO.141, BUT ARE STALLING WITH JOURNALISTS. I SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHAT LINE YOU PROPOSE TO TAKE ON THE DAILY MAIL STORY. :

SIR R. BEAUMONT

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

N.EASTERN D.
N.A.D.
ARAB.D.
E.EUR.& SOV.D.
U.N.D.
S.EUR.D.
AMER.D.
W.EUR.D.
DEF.D.
NEWS D.
P.U.S.D.
RES.D.(W.EUR.SEC.)
RES.D.(AMER.SEC.)
RES.D.(SOV.SEC.)

S E C R E T

DDDDDD

EN CLAIR

FLASH CAIRO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 898

URGENT
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
21 AUGUST 1978

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED FLASH TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 898 OF 21 AUGUST 1978, REPEATED IMMEDIATE
TO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, UNHIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, HQBFNE
AND SAVING TO PARIS, AMMAN

UNDER A BANNER HEADLINE, AHRAH TODAY REPORTS THAT THE
U.A.R. INFORMED THE UNITED STATES THAT IT REJECTED
RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS BY SATELLITE OR U2 AIRCRAFT WHEN IT
LEARNT THAT THE UNITED STATES INTENDED TO DO THIS. AHRAH
ADDS THAT THIS INTENTION ONLY BECAME CLEAR AFTER AGREEMENT
HAD BEEN GIVEN TO THE CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS. THE U.A.R.
IS ALSO SAID TO HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT ACTIONS OF THIS SORT
BY THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS ASSISTANCE TO
ISRAEL WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED THE FULL SERVICES OF
UNITED STATES SATELLITES.

2. THE UNITED STATES IS SAID TO HAVE INFORMED EGYPT THAT
SHE COULD ASK THE SOVIET UNION FOR HELP IN WATCHING THE
ISRAELI SIDE OF THE CEASE-FIRE LINE, AND THE U.A.R. IS
SAID TO HAVE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN REPLY:

- (1) THE TEMPORARY CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS SPECIFIED
THAT EACH SIDE SHOULD USE ITS OWN MEANS FOR
ENSURING THAT THE OTHER SIDE ADHERED TO THE
CEASE - FIRE ARRANGEMENTS. THE USE OF UNITED
STATES SATELLITES OR HIGH LEVEL RECONNAISSANCE AIR-
CRAFT EVEN THOUGH OPERATING DEEP OVER THE ISRAELI
SIDE MEANS THAT THE UNITED STATES IS CARRYING OUT
SURVEILLANCE FOR ISRAEL, AND THAT THIS HAS THE
SERIOUS IMPLICATION THAT ISRAEL IS GETTING
SUPPLEMENTARY ADVANTAGES OTHER THAN MERELY
SURVEILLANCE.

/(11) UNITED

- (II) UNITED STATES ACTION OF THIS SORT IS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE U.A.R. AT THIS CRITICAL AND DELICATE STAGE, THE U.A.R. CANNOT IMAGINE ASKING THE SOVIET UNION TO HELP HER IN SURVEILLANCE OVER THE ISRAELI SIDE.
- (III) THE INTRODUCTION OF THE TWO GREAT POWERS IN THIS WAY COULD PUT EVERYTHING INTO AN EXTREMELY COMPLICATED SITUATION AND COULD LEAD TO SERIOUS DIFFICULTY IN SERVING THE INTERESTS OF WORLD PEACE.

3. AHRAH ALSO CARRIES TODAY A UPI PIECE FROM LONDON QUOTING THE DAILY MAIL AS SAYING THAT AN SR 71 HIGH RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT LEFT THE U.S. BASE AT HEYFORD ACCOMPANIED BY TWO U2 AIRCRAFT ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE CEASE-FIRE.

FCO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
AND SAVING TO PARIS AND AMMAN.

DEFCONCEN PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO HQBFNE.

SIR R. BEAUMONT [REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION
NEAR EASTERN DEPT

CYPHER CAT 'A'

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 736 20 AUGUST 1970

C O N F I D E N T I A L.

ADDRESSED F.C.O. TEL NO 736 OF 20 AUGUST RPTD FOR
INFO TO WASHINGTON, UKHIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO BEIRUT,
AMMAN, HQBFNE, PARIS, MOSCOW.

JARRING MISSION.

LOURIE TOLD ME TODAY THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD NOW
SENT A REPLY TO JARRING SAYING THAT MR. EBAN WOULD PREFER THAT
TALKS SHOULD BE AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL AND THAT THEY
SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN A MEDITERRANEAN OR EUROPEAN
CAPITAL, SINCE THERE WOULD BE NEED FOR CONSTANT
CONSULTATION WITH THE CABINET AND IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT
TO TRAVEL TOO FAR EACH TIME. NEVERTHELESS, IN VIEW OF THE
PREFERENCES EXPRESSED BY EGYPT AND JORDAN, MR. EBAN
WOULD CONSULT THE CABINET AGAIN.

2. LOURIE THOUGHT THAT THE CABINET DISCUSSION WOULD
TAKE PLACE ON SUNDAY, AND HE EXPECTED THAT IN THE
END ISRAEL WOULD AGREE TO TALKS IN NEW YORK AT THE
LEVEL OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES. BUT THIS WAS NOT
YET THE OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT POSITION.

3. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT LET THE
DIFFICULTIES OVER THE CEASE-FIRE INTERFERE WITH THE
OPENING OF TALKS, ALTHOUGH WHAT HAD HAPPENED
OBVIOUSLY CAST DOUBT ON EGYPTIAN SINCERITY. ON THE CEASE-
FIRE EXCHANGES, HE SAID THAT WHAT HAD REALLY RILED THE ISRAELIS
WAS LAIRD'S STATEMENT, CASTING DOUBT ON THEIR CREDIBILITY
AT THE VERY TIME WHEN AMERICAN AND ISRAELI EXPERTS WERE
DISCUSSING THE EVIDENCE TO SEE IF THEY COULD REACH A
COMMON POSITION. THE LATEST AMERICAN STATEMENT HOWEVER
WENT SOME WAY TO MEET THE ISRAELI POSITION,
THE ISRAELIS WERE GRATIFIED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE
TAKING THE MATTER UP WITH THE RUSSIANS AND HE HOPED
THAT AMERICAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS COULD NOW GRADUALLY SIMMER
DOWN TO NORMAL AS THEY DID NOT WANT A ROW WITH THE
AMERICANS.

CONFIDENTIAL

/s/ JARRING

CONFIDENTIAL

CYHER CAT/A

FLASH WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO. 2452

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
20TH AUGUST, 1970.

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO F.C.C. TEL. NO. 2452 OF 21/8 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
(IMMEDIATE) TO TEL AVIV, CAIRO, NICOSIA, AND URMIS NEW YORK AND
SAVING TO BEIRUT, AMMAN, PARIS, AND MOSCOW.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. GUIDANCE 141: USE OF U-2S IN CEASE FIRE
ARRANGEMENTS.

JIM ANDERSON, STATE DEPARTMENT CORRESPONDENT FOR WESTINGHOUSE
BROADCASTING, TELEPHONED US THIS AFTERNOON TO SEEK CONFIRMATION OF
A STORY HE HAD BEEN GIVEN BY QUOTE A WELL PLACED SOURCE WHO
SHOULD KNOW THE FACTS, UNQUOTE THAT THE BRITISH WERE PLAYING A
SUBSTANTIVE ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EASTERN CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS.
HE EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD GIVEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SUPPORT TO THE
U.S. INITIATIVE FROM THE OUTSET AND HAD PARTICULARLY WELCOMED THE
CEASE-FIRE. ANDERSON BRUSHED THIS ASIDE, HOWEVER, AND ASKED SPEC-
IFICALLY WHETHER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WERE GIVING PRACTICAL ASS-
ISTANCE WITH THE SURVEILLANCE ARRANGEMENTS. WE REPLIED THAT WE
WERE NOT WELL PLACED TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION AND SUGGESTED THAT HE
SHOULD REDIRECT HIS ENQUIRY VIA HIS LONDON OFFICE TO YOU.

2. WASHINGTON PRESS SPECULATION HAS BEEN EDGING NEARER AND NEARER
TO DISCLOSURE OF BASE FACILITIES FOR U-2 AIRCRAFT IN THE PAST FEW
DAYS AND IT NOW LOOKS AS IF ANDERSON HAS COME TO HEAR ABOUT OUR
ROLE.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO TEL AVIV CAIRO NICOSIA AND SAVING TO BEIRUT
AMMAN PARIS AND MOSCOW.

MR FREEMAN.

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.	W.E.D.
N.A.D.	DEFENCE DEPT.
ARABIAN D.	NEWS. DEPT.
E.E.S.D.	RES. D. (SOV. SECT.)
S.E.D.	RES. D. (S.E. SECT.)
AMERICAN DEPT.	RES. D. (AMER. SECT.)
U.N.D.	RES. D. (W.E. SECT.)
P.U.S.D.	MOD INTERNAL

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN

SECRET

35. A.

or will be

43. News Department are taking the following attitude in reply to questions:

QUESTION:

- (i) What is H.M.G.'s attitude to the news that the Americans are using high level reconnaissance aircraft for surveillance in the cease-fire?

ANSWER:~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

The cease-fire in the Middle East was arranged by the Americans as an integral part of their initiative of 19 June. The practical arrangements have been made between the Americans and the parties to the dispute. We welcome the fact that it was possible to bring about the cease-fire. It has so far lasted for nearly two weeks and we attach great importance to its continuance. The most important thing now is for talks under Dr. Jarring's auspices to start as soon as possible.

QUESTION:

- (ii) Are H.M.G. involved?

ANSWER:

In reply to earlier questions of this nature we have pointed out that we are in continuing contact with the Americans on all arrangements for movement of aircraft through this country. You may take it that on this occasion we were informed and gave such assistance as was necessary.

QUESTION:

- (iii) What sort of assistance were you asked to give and what sort of assistance have you given?

ANSWER:

That sort of information is confidential.

/QUESTION:

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

QUESTION:

Is there any truth that we have granted facilities in Cyprus?

ANSWER:

I am afraid I can give you no further information.

QUESTION:

What is our attitude to Egyptian objections to the involvement of the United States in arrangements for monitoring the cease-fire?

ANSWER:

All arrangements connected with the cease-fire ~~have~~ we understand, ~~have~~ been made by the United States Government with the Governments concerned. If you have got any questions about this, you should ask the Americans.

They have today used the material in the answers to questions ~~(i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v)~~ above.

4. You should volunteer nothing on this subject. In answer to questions, you have discretion to draw on the above-mentioned answers. You should, however, refuse to be drawn any further.

(i), (ii), (iii) and (v)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

DRAFT GUIDANCE FORM

Note: The following pattern should be used in drafting (except for very short Guidances):

ADVANCE COPY

- (1) The Problem
- (2) Instructions for use
- (3) Talking points, if any
- (4) Supporting material subdivided (a) to be used freely, (b) for use with reliable contacts, (c) for your own information only

IG

(2 pages detached and with submission to the Prime Minister)

PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

Top Secret
~~Secret~~
~~Confidential~~
Restricted
Unclassified

Flash
Immediate
Priority
Routine
SAVING

From Foreign Office and Commonwealth Office to Certain Missions and Dependent Territories

Guidance No. 147

Date 21.8.70.

For Clarity
Code
Cypher

Mr Savage.

To All recipients of Guidance

141

either Flash or Immediate

J.P. Giff

21.8.

(No 10. and interested to the recipient of copy to be sent to the Prime Minister - 141)

Distribution:

FO/CO/WH

Copies to:

SUBJECT: Middle East: USAF U2s.

This Guidance Telegram supersedes my Guidance Telegram No. 141 of 12 August.

2. We have received the following report from

H.M. Ambassador in Cairo:


BEGINS: (A)

"Under a banner headline, Ahram today (21 August) reports that the U.A.R. informed the United States that it rejected reconnaissance flights by satellite or U2 aircraft when it learnt that the United States intended to do this. Ahram adds that this intention only became clear after agreement had been given to the cease-fire arrangements. The U.A.R. is also said to have made it clear that actions of this sort by the United States would be interpreted as assistance to Israel who had previously obtained the full services of United States satellites.

"The United States is said to have informed Egypt that she could ask the Soviet Union for help in watching the Israeli side of the cease-fire line, and the U.A.R. is said to have made the following points in reply:

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

SECRET - COVERING TOP SECRET



Copy No. 1 of 4 copies
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

PA. M
22/8

Prime Minister,
This does not add very
much to what is public
knowledge. But it is
satisfactory that the Americans
are passing us information.
Dew Peter.

21 August, 1970

M.

21/8

Middle East Cease Fire Surveillance

In my letter of 17 August, I said that we were expecting that the Americans would let us have information about military movements in the standstill zone to the west of the Suez Canal, based on American surveillance operations.

2. We have now received some American information from this source. Taken together with other evidence available to us, in particular that summarised in our IIC(A) Weekly Summary of Intelligence Supplements Nos 61 and 62 of 20 August (copies of which are enclosed for ease of reference) this indicates that since the ceasefire came into effect on 7 August, there have been some movements of SAM air defence missiles in the standstill zone which contravene the ceasefire agreement. However, the evidence is highly complex and by no means all of it is conclusive. To explain the situation satisfactorily, an oral presentation might be arranged at the Prime Minister's convenience. Perhaps you could let me know whether you would like to take up this suggestion.

3. I shall show the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary a copy of this letter.

Yours ever,
I. McCluney.

(I. McCluney)

P. J. S. Moon, Esq.,
10, Downing Street.

SECRET - COVERING TOP SECRET

S E C R E T

CYPHER/CAT A

F L A S H FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 808

TO CAIRO
21 AUGUST 1970
(NE)

SECRET.

ADDRESSED TO CAIRO TELEGRAM NO 808 OF 21 AUGUST REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV NICOSIA AMMAN BEIRUT TRIPOLI KHARTOUM
ALGIERS BAGHDAD KUWAIT BAHRAIN JEDDA BENGHAZI TUNIS RABAT
WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELS 898 AND 899: U.A.R./ISRAEL.

CEASE-FIRE.

NEWS DEPARTMENT HAVE NOT SO FAR HAD ANY QUESTIONS ON THE DAILY
MAIL STORY. IF THEY DO THEY WILL REFER QUESTIONS TO THE AMERICANS,
ON THE GROUNDS THAT SUCH QUESTIONS ARE CONCERNED WITH AN AMERICAN
OPERATION.

2. IN THE LIGHT OF AL AHAM STORY (YOUR TELNO 898) WE ARE ISSUING
NEW GUIDANCE. WE NO LONGER PROPOSE TO USE THE LINE IN PARAS 3
AND 4 OF GUIDANCE NO. 141. IF QUESTIONED ABOUT HMG'S INVOLVEMENT
NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL MINIMISE OUR INVOLVEMENT AND REFUSE TO BE
DRAWN ON DETAIL. IF ASKED POINT BLANK ABOUT THE USE OF CYPRUS
THEY WILL REFUSE TO COMMENT.

DOUGLAS-HOME

F.C.O./WHI. DISTRIBUTION:
N.EASTERN D.

S E C R E T

DDDDD

CONFIDENTIAL

Handwritten notes:
Thinking of it
in the context of the
decision
22/8

PRIME MINISTER

Middle East Ceasefire

The Ahram Report is very much the kind of UAR reaction which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office feared when the US request for the use of facilities here and in Cyprus was first made, and it was this which caused them to be extremely cautious in their initial reaction to that request.

In reply to enquiries about the Ahram Report the Foreign and Commonwealth Office are saying as little as possible (see the paper attached at Flag A). Posts overseas have been instructed to take the same line.

For the moment, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office judgment is that the Ahram Report is intended to establish the UAR position "for the record" and the UAR do not seriously intend to try to interfere with the air surveillance. The Americans who have had no formal protest from the UAR share this view. Various possible advantages can be seen from the UAR point of view; to distract attention from the allegations of their breaches of the ceasefire; to discourage the Americans from pursuing those allegations; or even in the longer term, to store up an excuse for breaching the ceasefire arrangements should they wish to do this in the future.

Handwritten signature: M.

August 22, 1970.

August 24, 1970

Middle East Ceasefire

The Prime Minister has seen the telegrams about the Ahram report on the question of surveillance of the Middle East ceasefire and in particular Cairo telegram No. 898 of August 21. I have told the Prime Minister of the line which is being taken in reply to Press enquiries and of our provisional assessment that the Ahram report is intended to establish the U.A.R. position "for the record". The Prime Minister has asked to be kept informed if any difficulties develop. I should be grateful if you would keep this in mind.

Sgd. PJSM

I. McCluney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET/CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM NO. 445 DATED 2 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

I have put your enquiry to the FCO. Meanwhile you may like to see the two attached telegrams, which provide part of the answer.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 445 DATED 2 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION FLASH TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW BAGHDAD AND IMMEDIATE TO CAIRO BEIRUT PARIS TEL AVIV DI4 JIS(NE) AND JIS CULF.

FOLLOWING THE ATTEMPT ON KING HUSSEIN'S LIFE YESTERDAY EVENING (ABOUT WHICH I AM TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY) ZAID RIFAI TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT ON THE KING'S RETURN FROM THE AIRPORT HE FOUND AN IRAQI 'ULTIMATUM' DEMANDING THAT THE JORDAN ARMY STOP FIRING AT THE FEDAYEEN OTHERWISE THE IRAQI EASTERN COMMAND WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ACTION. THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT, SAID RIFAI, HAD ALREADY INFORMALLY REJECTED THE ACCUSATION AND RETORTED THAT THEY HELD THE IRAQIS RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY DETERIORATION IN THE SITUATION, THAT THEY WERE INFORMING ARAB GOVERNMENTS OF THE IRAQI THREATS, AND THAT IF IRAQI FORCES IN JORDAN INTERFERED IN ANY WAY, THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD 'HAVE TO CONSIDER WHAT ACTION TO TAKE'. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS IN FACT SINCE INFORMED THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR THAT A FORMAL REPLY TO HIS GOVERNMENT'S NOTE WILL BE SENT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CABINET MEETING WHICH IS DUE TO BE HELD AT 0900 LOCAL TIME TODAY.

2. ZAID RIFAI WENT ON TO ASK THAT H.M.G., THE AMERICANS AND THE FRENCH SHOULD IF POSSIBLE CONCERT WITH THE RUSSIANS A JOINT STATEMENT SUPPORTING THE JORDANIAN POSITION AND CONDENNING IRAQI INTERVENTION. HE WAS PARTICULARLY INSISTENT THAT THE RUSSIANS SHOULD BE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS GESTURE.

MY AMERICAN AND FRENCH COLLEAGUES HAVE RECEIVED A SIMILAR REQUEST. ACCORDING TO THE LATTER THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR, WHOM HE TELEPHONED, HAS NOT.

3. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE HAS ALREADY CONVEYED ZAID RIFAI'S REQUEST TO HIS GOVERNMENT WHO HAVE REPLIED THAT WHILE THEY DO NOT WISH TO GET INVOLVED THEY ARE INSTRUCTING THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW TO ASK THE RUSSIANS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO COOL DOWN THE IRAQIS. MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE HAS NOT SO FAR REPORTED BUT IS DOING SO TODAY.

/s/ RIFAI,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

4. RIFAI, TO WHOM I SPOKE AGAIN THIS MORNING, IS TODAY MORE RELAXED AND REPORTS THAT THERE HAS SO FAR BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT BY IRAQI TROOPS IN JORDAN. KING HUSSEIN IS UNSCATHED.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO DIA JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

FCO PASS FLASH TO WASHINGTON AND IMMEDIATE TO PARIS AND DEFCONCEN.
MR. PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED. SENT TO D.C.C.]

F.C.O./WHI. DISTRIBUTION:
N.EASTERN D.

CONFIDENTIAL

DDDDDD

CONFIDENTIAL

Dis No 10 15

CYPHER CAT.A.

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 248

TO AMMAN
2 SEPTEMBER 1970
(NE)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NO 248 OF 2 SEPTEMBER REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, BEIRUT,
PARIS, TEL AVIV, JIS (NE), JIS (GULF)

YOUR TELNO 445: JORDAN AND IRAQ.

WE SEE NO PROSPECT AT ALL OF THE FOUR POWERS BEING READY
TO ISSUE A JOINT STATEMENT OF THE KIND WHICH ZAID RIFAI APPEARS
TO HAVE IN MIND.

2. WE ARE GLAD THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE INSTRUCTED THE
US AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW TO ASK THE RUSSIANS TO EXERCISE A
MODERATING INFLUENCE OVER THE IRAQIS. WE DOUBT WHETHER PARALLEL
ACTION BY OURSELVES WOULD ADD SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE FORCE OF THESE
AMERICAN REPRESENTATIONS. IF, HOWEVER, YOU JUDGE THAT IT WOULD BE
USEFUL IN TERMS OF OUR OWN RELATIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN AND HIS
GOVERNMENT FOR HM ABASSADOR IN MOSCOW TO SPEAK TO THE RUSSIANS,
WE WOULD CONSIDER WHETHER TO INSTRUCT HIM ACCORDINGLY.

3. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

N.A.D.

ARAB. DEPT.

U.N.(POL) D.

W.E.D.

AMERICAN DEPT.

E.E.S.D.

RES. DEPT. (SOVIET SECTION)

(AMERICAN SECTION)

(W.E. SECTION)

CONFIDENTIAL

GGGGG

When the Cabinet last considered the Middle East on 7th July, 1970 (CM(70) 4th Conclusions) neither the Arab Governments nor Israel had responded to the United States initiative, which then appeared to have small prospect of success. In the latter part of July, however, both the UAR and Jordan (the former possibly under some Soviet pressure) indicated their acceptance of the American initiative; and Israel followed their example in early August. A 90 days cease-fire thereupon took effect from 7th August. The initial atmosphere was markedly suspicious, particularly on the Israeli side, with repeated assertions that, in contravention of the agreed arrangements, the UAR had re-occupied or installed missile sites within the cease-fire zone. (There was probably some element of truth in this; but the Israelis had also transgressed by aerial reconnaissance flights over the same zone). The United States refused to pay undue heed to the Israeli claims; and after a period of uncertainty and recriminations the cease-fire was maintained and Ambassador Jarring was able to initiate his (separate) discussions with the representatives of Israel, Jordan and Egypt on 25th August. Even so, it was a slow and very uneasy start; and the latest developments in this wrangle about the interpretation of the cease-fire have cast fresh clouds over the prospect. The Cabinet will wish to know how the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary sees the situation, given that both the United States and the Soviet Union seem to be still in favour of an Arab/Israeli settlement but the field for dispute on the basic problems (the disposal and resettlement of refugees, the evacuation and restoration of territory and the establishment of a guaranteed peace) is very wide. Is there anything which we can contribute to the Four Power discussions, which are intended to provide Dr. Jarring with agreed guidance?

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

F L A S H U K MISSION NEW YORK

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1832

3 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 1832 OF 3 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PARIS, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, BEIRUT, CAIRO AND TEL AVIV.

MY TELNO 1825: MIDDLE EAST.

FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE SPOKE SEPARATELY THIS MORNING TO BUFFUM, OVINNIKOV AND MYSELF. HE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WERE DEEPLY WORRIED BY THE SITUATION IN JORDAN AND PARTICULARLY BY THE IRAQI INTERVENTION. THEY THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF THE FOUR WERE TO MEET AT ONCE AND RESPOND TO THE APPEAL ADDRESSED TO THEM AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES BY KING HUSSEIN. THE FOUR WOULD SEND HIM A SYMPATHETIC REPLY AND AN APPEAL TO THE IRAQIS TO REFRAIN FROM ANYTHING WHICH WOULD ENDANGER THE JARRING TALKS OR WOULD CONSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER STATE.

2. I SAID THAT I WOULD CONSULT YOU BUT FORESAW DIFFICULTIES. I THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD AGREE TO ANY ACTION AIMED AT IRAQ ALONE. THEY WOULD SURELY WISH TO BALANCE IT WITH REPRESENTATIONS TO ISRAEL NOT TO HOLD UP THE TALKS ANY LONGER. I THOUGHT WE SHOULD BE IN FOR A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE WHOLE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND I WAS NOT SURE WHETHER WE WOULD WISH TO DO THIS WITHOUT MORE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF OUR AIMS. HOWEVER, WE WOULD CONSIDER VERY CAREFULLY THE POSSIBLE MERITS SINCE IT WOULD LOOK VERY BAD IF THE FOUR APPEARED TOTALLY INACTIVE.

3. AFTERWARDS I SPOKE TO BUFFUM WHO WAS EQUALLY DOUBTFUL. HE THOUGHT THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD PREFER THAT ALL THOSE WILLING TO DO SO SHOULD SPEAK BILATERALLY TO THE RUSSIANS AND EGYPTIANS AND PERHAPS THE IRAQIS. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD ALREADY DONE SO IN THE FIRST TWO CASES. I HAVE NOT YET ANY SOVIET REACTION.

4. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET WOULD LIKE THE FOUR POWER MEETING TO BE TOMORROW AND I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR REACTIONS BY FLASH TELEGRAM. I HAVE NOT YET SEEN KING HUSSEIN'S APPEAL AND WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THAT ALSO.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE PARIS, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, BEIRUT, CAIRO AND TEL AVIV.

MR. WARNER

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.EAST. DEPT.

W.EUR. DEPT.

N.AFR. DEPT.

RES. DEPT. (AMER SECT)

ARAB DEPT.

" " (SOVIET SECT)

U.N.D.

" " (W.E.SECT)

AMER. DEPT.

E.E.S.D.

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

F L A S H U K MISSION NEW YORK

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1835

3 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 1835 OF 3 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PARIS, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, BEIRUT, CAIRO, AND TEL AVIV.

NY TELNO 1832: MIDDLE EAST.

THE RUSSIANS ARE UNWILLING TO EXPRESS ANY VIEW REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW.

2. IT OCCURS TO ME THAT A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE MIGHT BE FOR THE FOUR TO MEET AND ACT AS FOLLOWS. WE WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT SEEK TO AGREE A PUBLIC STATEMENT OR ANY COMMUNICATIONS TO THE IRAQIS OR JORDANIANS. INSTEAD, WE WOULD TRY TO MAKE CERTAIN AGREED RECOMMENDATIONS TO OUR GOVERNMENTS IN VERY GENERAL TERMS, FOR SEPARATE BILATERAL ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY THEM. WE WOULD THEN ANNOUNCE PUBLICLY THAT WE HAD DONE SO. THIS WOULD SHOW THAT THE FOUR WERE ACTIVE AND THAT GOVERNMENTS WERE RESPONDING TO THE KING'S APPEAL. AT THE SAME TIME WE SHOULD AVOID THE IMPOSSIBLE TASK OF TRYING TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A STATEMENT AIMED SOLELY AT THE ARABS (WHICH WOULD BE QUITE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE RUSSIANS) OR WHICH DENOUNCED THE ISRAELIS FOR HOLDING UP JARRING'S DISCUSSIONS (WHICH WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE AMERICANS).

3. THE OBJECTION TO ANY DISCUSSION OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST BY THE FOUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK IS THAT IT WOULD COMPLETELY CHANGE THEIR MANDATE FROM CONSIDERATION OF THE TERMS OF A SETTLEMENT AND WOULD TURN THEM INTO A KIND OF COURT OF APPEAL OR REGULATORY BODY TO DEAL WITH COMPLAINTS OR INCIDENTS. I DO NOT THINK THEY CAN BE EFFECTIVE IN THAT ROLE AND IT IS UNLIKELY IN ANY CASE THAT THE AMERICANS OR THE RUSSIANS WOULD AGREE TO IT. HOWEVER, MY PROPOSAL IN PARA 2 ABOVE MIGHT JUST GET ROUND THE PROBLEM.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE PARIS, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW AND PRIORITY TO BEIRUT, CAIRO AND TEL AVIV.

MR. WARNER

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.EAST. DEPT.

AMER DEPT.

N.AFR. DEPT.

N.E.S.D.

ARAB DEPT.

W.EUR. DEPT.

U.N.D.

RES. DEPT. (AMER SECT)

" " (SOVIET SECT)

" " (W.E.SECT)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE PARIS

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 779

3 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO F C O TEL NO 779 OF 3 SEPTEMBER AND R F I
IMMEDIATE TO AMMAN WASHINGTON UKNIS NEW YORK AND PRIORITY TO
BAGHDAD BEIRUT CAIRO MOSCOW TELAVIV.

YOUR TEL NO. 948 TO AMMAN (NOT TO UKNIS NEW YORK): JORDAN AND IRAQ

FRENCH U N REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED
TO SEEK TO CONCEPT A FOUR POWER STATEMENT SUPPORTING THE JORDANIAN
POSITION ALONG THE LINES REQUESTED BY KING HUSSAIN (AMMAN TEL. NO.
445 - NOT TO ALL). BACKGROUND TO THIS IS AS FOLLOWS:

2. DIRECTEUR AFRIQUE/LEVANT AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY SHOWED ME YESTERDAY,
BEFORE I HAD SEEN AMMAN TEL. UNDER REFERENCE, A SIMILAR TELEGRAM
FROM THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN ABOUT THE KING OF JORDAN'S
APPEAL. DE LEUSSE'S PERSONAL REACTION, WHICH HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH
M. ALPHAND BUT NOT YET AT THAT TIME WITH M. SCHUMANN, WAS THAT
THERE SHOULD BE A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE JORDANIAN APPEAL FOR
THE FOLLOWING REASONS:-

- (I) IT WAS DESIRABLE TO SUPPORT KING HUSSAIN AT A TIME WHEN HE
MUST BE FEELING PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE AND EXPOSED:
- (II) A CONTINUATION OF TROUBLE IN JORDAN WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING
TO THE PROSPECTS OF THE JARRING NEGOTIATIONS:
- (III) THIS WAS A USEFUL OCCASION TO EMPHASISE THE FOUR POWER
APPROACH TO THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM RATHER THAN LEAVING THINGS
TOO EXCLUSIVELY TO THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS.

ACCORDINGLY, DE LEUSSE PROPOSED TO RECOMMEND TO M. SCHUMANN THAT
AN ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO CONCEPT IN NEW YORK A FOUR POWER
STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED THERE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. THIS NEED
NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTION IRAQ, BUT WOULD REFER TO CURRENT EVENTS
IN JORDAN AND, WITH NO DOUBT A REFERENCE TO THE APPROPRIATE
ARTICLE OF THE U.N. CHARTER, WOULD REAFFIRM IN THE NAME OF THE
FOUR POWERS THE NEED FOR ALL CONCERNED TO RESPECT THE PRINCIPLES
OF SOVEREIGNTY AND NON-INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF

/OTHER

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

OTHER COUNTRIES (OR SOME SIMILARLY APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE). DE LEUSSE SAID THAT THE U.S. CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, WHOM HE HAD JUST SEEN IN A DIFFERENT CONTEXT, SEEMED TO THINK THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD PREFER TO MAKE A DIRECT APPROACH TO MOSCOW, URGING THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO PRESSURISE THE IRAQIS RATHER THAN GET INVOLVED IN FOUR POWER CONSULTATION ABOUT A STATEMENT. BUT AT THAT TIME DE LEUSSE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS ACTION HAD IN FACT BEEN TAKEN BY THE AMERICANS. IN ANY CASE, HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD PREFER ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN A FOUR POWER FRAMEWORK. HE ASKED ME TO SEEK YOUR VIEWS, IF POSSIBLE, BEFORE HE SAW M. SCHUMANN.

3. AFTER SPEAKING TO YOUR DEPARTMENT, I CONVEYED TO M. DE LEUSSE YOUR REACTION AS IN YOUR TEL. TO AMMAN UNDER REFERENCE AND MADE CLEAR THAT THE AMERICANS HAD ALREADY INSTRUCTED THEIR AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW TO TAKE ACTION. HE THANKED ME FOR THIS INFORMATION. HIS OWN REACTION TO OUR ATTITUDE WAS TO ACCEPT THAT, GIVEN THE APPARENT SOVIET INTEREST IN A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, IT MIGHT IN PRACTICE PROVE MORE EFFECTIVE FOR THE RUSSIANS, IF THEY WERE WILLING TO DO SO, TO EXERT PRESSURE DIRECTLY ON IRAQ. NEVERTHELESS, HE CONTINUED TO DISLIKE THE IMPRESSION THAT WAS DAILY GAINING GROUND THAT THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS WERE BEING LEFT TO SORT OUT THE MIDDLE EAST OVER THE HEADS OF OTHER POWERS WITH IMPORTANT INTERESTS THERE. MOREOVER, KING HUSSAIN NOT ONLY WANTED THE IRAQIS TO BE CALLED TO ORDER, BUT WAS ALSO SEEKING A PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF FOUR POWER CONCERN ABOUT HIS OWN POSITION. WHILE THE AMERICAN INITIATIVE IN MOSCOW MIGHT GO SOME WAY TO MEET THE FORMER IT DID NOTHING TO SATISFY THE LATTER CONSIDERATION. WHETHER OR NOT THEREFORE, WE WERE RIGHT TO BE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE CHANCES OF AGREEMENT ON A FOUR POWER STATEMENT, HE THOUGHT THAT THE ATTEMPT SHOULD AT LEAST BE MADE.

4. IN CONVEYING TO ME THIS MORNING THE INFORMATION IN PARA. 1 ABOVE, DE LEUSSE CONFIRMED THAT THESE INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN APPROVED BY M. SCHUMANN, WHO AGREED WITH HIS APPROACH TO THE

/PROBLEM

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS TELNO 779 TO FCO

-3-

PROBLEM AS DESCRIBED ABOVE. DE LEUSSE RE-EMPHASISED FRENCH
DISLIKE OF THE WAY IN WHICH THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS SEEMED
TO WISH TO TURN THE MIDDLE EAST INTO THEIR OWN "CLOSED SHOP".

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO AMMAN, WASHINGTON AND LKMS
NEW YORK AND PRIORITY TO BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, MOSCOW AND
TEL AVIV.

MR. PALLISER

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION
N.E.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1837

3 SEPTEMBER 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO. 1837 OF 3 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
TO PARIS AMMAN BAGHDAD WASHINGTON MOSCOW BEIRUT CAIRO AND TEL AVIV.
FOR ATTENTION FIRST THING FRIDAY.

YOUR TELEGRAM TO MOSCOW NO. 741: MIDDLE EAST.

Iranian
I HAVE SPOKEN TO YEST. HE WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE FRENCH
PROPOSAL FOR A FOUR POWER MEETING FOR THE SAME REASONS AS IN MY
TELEGRAMS NOS. 1832 AND 1835. MOREOVER HE THOUGHT FOUR
POWER CONSULTATION QUITE UNNECESSARY BECAUSE THE BEST STEPS
POSSIBLE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES WERE ALREADY BEING TAKEN WITH THE
IRAQIS AND THE RUSSIANS. I PUT TO HIM TENTATIVELY AS A PURELY
PERSONAL SUGGESTION THE PROPOSAL IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 1835 BUT HE
DID NOT LIKE IT. HE SAID IT WOULD ONLY CAUSE COMPLICATIONS TO GO
ALONG WITH THE FRENCH, WAS QUITE UNNECESSARY, AND HE WAS SURE THE
FRENCH WOULD CLIMB DOWN IF ASKED TO DO SO.

2. I ALSO MENTIONED THE MATTER TO JARRING WHO CLEARLY DID NOT
AT ALL LIKE THE IDEA OF A FOUR POWER MEETING AND THOUGHT THAT IT
WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL TO HIS OWN POSITION TO HAVE THE FOUR SEEMING TO
TAKE OVER.

3. GRATEFUL FOR EARLY INSTRUCTIONS AS TO WHAT REPLY I SHOULD GIVE TO
KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.

FCO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE PARIS AMMAN BAGHDAD MOSCOW PRIORITY TO
BEIRUT CAIRO AND TEL AVIV.

MR. WARNER

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

N.A.D.

ARABIAN DEPT

U.N.D.

W.E.D.

AMERICAN DEPT

E.U.S.D.

RESEARCH DEPT (W.E. SECTION)

RESEARCH DEPT (AMERICAN SECTION)

RESEARCH DEPT (SOVIET SECTION)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAELI DISPUTE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

LYPHER/CAT A

F L A S H FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO MOSCOW

TELEGRAM NUMBER 741

3 SEPTEMBER 1970.

(NE)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO MOSCOW TELEGRAM NUMBER 741 OF 3 SEPTEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON PARIS BAGHDAD
CAIRO AMMAN BEIRUT TEL AVIV JIS(NE) JIS(GULF)

MY TEL NO. 248 TO AMMAN, AMMAN TEL NO. 449 (BOTH OF WHICH WE
ARE NOW REPEATING IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK) AND PARIS TEL NO. 779:
JORDAN AND IRAQ.

UNLESS YOU THINK THAT THE TIME FOR USEFUL ACTION HAS PASSED,
WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD NOW SPEAK URGENTLY TO THE
SOVIET MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON THE FOLLOWING LINES.

2. WE ARE GREATLY CONCERNED BY THE SITUATION IN JORDAN. IF THE
WORST CAME TO THE WORST, THIS SITUATION COULD LEAD TO A RETRACTION
BY JORDAN OF HER AGREEMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TALKS NOW BEING
HELD UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES AND SO TO THE COLLAPSE OF THE TALKS
THEMSELVES. WE ARE PARTICULARLY WORRIED BY REPORTS THAT THE
IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS THREATENED MILITARY INTERVENTION BY IRAQI
FORCES IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. THESE REPORTS ARE NOT HEARSAY.
THEY ORIGINATE FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN AND FROM BAGHDAD RADIO.
WE HOPE THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WILL BE READY TO USE ITS INFLUENCE
WITH THE IRAQIS TO CURB THEIR DANGEROUS AND IRRESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOUR.
WE RECOGNISE THE DIFFICULTIES. WE KNOW THAT IRAQ HAS REFUSED TO
ACCEPT THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF NOVEMBER 1967 AND HAS
COMMITTED HERSELF TO ALL-OUT SUPPORT FOR THE FEDAYEEN. WE NEVER-
THELESS HOPE THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WILL FIND IT POSSIBLE
TO ACT IN THE WAY WE HAVE SUGGESTED.

3. IN SPEAKING ABOUT THE JORDANIAN REQUEST THAT THE FOUR POWERS
/SHOULD

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

SHOULD ISSUE A JOINT STATEMENT (AMMAN TELS 445 AND 451), YOU SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE REPORT OF THE MISSION IN NEW YORK ON THE DEPUTIES' MEETING WHICH IS BEING HELD TODAY. THE MISSION ARE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS (GIVEN BY TELEPHONE) TO SUPPORT THE FRENCH IN THEIR PROPOSAL THAT A STATEMENT SHOULD BE ISSUED UNLESS THE AMERICANS ARE POSITIVELY UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THIS IDEA. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE MISSION WOULD REPEAT THEIR REPORTING TELEGRAM FLASH TO MOSCOW.

4. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, WE HAVE DECIDED NOT TO SPEAK TO THE IRAQIS OURSELVES. WE DO NOT THINK THAT ANY REPRESENTATIONS WE MIGHT MAKE WOULD INFLUENCE THE IRAQIS. IN ANY CASE, THE JORDANIANS HAVE NOT SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT TAKE ACTION OF THIS KIND.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

N.A.D.

ARAB DEPT.

U.N.D.

W.E.D.

AMER DEPT.

E.E.S.D.

RES. DEPT. (SOVIET SECT)

" " (AMER SECT)

" " (W.E.SECT)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

CONFIDENTIAL

September 3, 1970.

The Prime Minister has seen Amman telegram No. 445 of September 2 and in particular paragraph 2 setting out the Jordanian proposal that the British, the Americans and the French should concert with the Russians a joint statement supporting the Jordanian position and condemning Iraqi intervention.

The Prime Minister has asked what view the Foreign and Commonwealth Office take of this proposal, and I should be grateful if you would let me have a note as soon as possible. Meanwhile, I am drawing the Prime Minister's attention to Foreign and Commonwealth Office telegram No. 248 of September 2 and Paris telegram No. 779 of September 3 which appear to be relevant to his enquiry.

/ to Amman

CCW

I. McCluney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CY-HER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2559

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
3 SEPTEMBER 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 2559
OF 3 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO CAIRO TEL AVIV MOSCOW
PARIS UHHS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO AMMAN BEIRUT.

MIDDLE EAST.

BEARING IN MIND THE ANGLO/AMERICAN TALKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH
ARE TO TAKE PLACE NEXT WEEK AND SISCO'S RECENT VISIT TO SAN CLEMENTE
TO REVIEW THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITH THE
PRESIDENT, I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE TIMELY TO SEEK AN AUTHORITATIVE
U S VIEW OF THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. I ACCORDINGLY CALLED ON
SISCO AT NOON TO-DAY AND ASKED HIM SPECIFICALLY WHAT WAS THE U S
VIEW ABOUT WHAT HAD REALLY HAPPENED ON THE EGYPTIAN SIDE OF THE
CANAL AND HOW THE U S GOVERNMENT NOW PROPOSED TO HANDLE THE
DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM THE PRESENT SITUATION.

2. SISCO AGREED THAT MY CALL WAS WELL-TIMED AS HE WAS NOT IN A
POSITION TO SPEAK WITH MORE PRECISION ABOUT WHAT HAD HAPPENED.
AT SAN CLEMENTE ALL THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO
THE PRESIDENT. THE AMERICAN CONCLUSION WAS THAT THERE HAD BEEN
SIGNIFICANT VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE STANDSTILL. THEY HAD
EVIDENCE OF :

- (A) THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW SITES WITHIN THE 50 KILOMETRE STANDSTILL
ZONE;
- (B) UNOCCUPIED SITES NOW BEING OCCUPIED, AND
- (C) MOVEMENT OF EQUIPMENT WITHIN THE STANDSTILL ZONE.

/ TO DEAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

TO DEAL WITH THIS SITUATION THE U S GOVERNMENT HAD NOW TAKEN TWO STEPS:

(I) THEY HAD WITHIN THE PAST 24 HOURS HAD A FRANK EXCHANGE WITH THE ISRAELIS, BOTH IN WASHINGTON AND IN TEL AVIV ABOUT FACTS AS THEY WERE NOW REVEALED:

(II) THEY HAD INSTRUCTED THEIR REPRESENTATIVES, IN CAIRO AND MOSCOW TO BRING THE SPECIFIC EVIDENCE OF VIOLATIONS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE UAR AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS WITH A VIEW TO SEEKING RECTIFICATION OF THE SITUATION AND A HALT TO FURTHER VIOLATIONS. THEY WERE MAKING THE POINT THAT THESE VIOLATIONS PLACED THE PEACE TALKS IN JEOPARDY. ADDITIONALLY THEY WERE MAKING A PUBLIC STATEMENT QUOTE IN THE LATEST POSSIBLE KEY UNQUOTE (THE TEXT IS IN MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 2553).

THEY HAD DECIDED THAT THEY MUST SAY SOMETHING OWING TO THE CREDIBILITY GAP, AS SISCO PUT IT QUOTE WITH OUR OWN PEOPLE UNQUOTE. HE ALSO NO DOUBT HAD IN MIND THAT AMERICAN SILENCE MIGHT BE MISINTERPRETED BY THE RUSSIANS AND THE EGYPTIANS. SISCO ADDED THAT THEY HAD TRIED TO AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION OF PUTTING ANYONE IN THE DOCK.

3. SISCO SAID THAT WHILE WE WERE TALKING A HIGH LEVEL MEETING WAS IN PROGRESS IN ISRAEL TO DECIDE HOW TO REACT TO THE SITUATION. THERE WERE BROADLY TWO VIEWS:

(I) THAT OF THOSE WHO, WHILE TAKING THE VIOLATIONS SERIOUSLY, WANTED TO GET TEKOAH BACK TO NEW YORK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE - THIS WAS THE VIEW OF MR EBAN AND ALSO OF MRS MEIR; AND

(II) THAT OF THOSE WHO FOLLOWED GENERAL DAYAN IN HOLDING THAT NO PROGRESS COULD BE MADE WITH TALKS UNTIL THERE HAD BEEN A QUOTE ROLL BACK UNQUOTE OF THE FRESHLY EMPLACED MISSILES.

/4.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON TELNO. 2559 TO FCO

-3-

4. SISCO SAID THAT THE U S GOVERNMENT HAD REPRESENTED MOST STRONGLY TO THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT LAST NIGHT THE DESIRABILITY OF GETTING ON WITH THE TALKS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. TO REASSURE THE ISRAELIS, THEY HAD TOLD THEM WHAT THE U S GOVERNMENT WOULD DO IN THE EVENT OF A BREAKDOWN OF THE TALKS SO THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE PLACED AT A MILITARY DISADVANTAGE. AT THE SAME TIME THEY HAD MADE IT CLEAR HOW SERIOUSLY THE U S GOVERNMENT WOULD VIEW ANY UNILATERAL ATTEMPT BY THE ISRAELIS TO FORCE THE RESTORATION OF THE STATUS QUO BY MILITARY MEANS.

5. DURING THE COURSE OF OUR CONVERSATION SISCO WAS CALLED AWAY TO THE TELEPHONE TO SPEAK TO THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR, GENERAL RABIN, WHO, HE SAID, WAS BEING VERY HELPFUL IN REPRESENTING TO HIS GOVERNMENT THE DESIRABILITY OF GETTING AHEAD QUICKLY WITH THE TALKS. SISCO MADE IT CLEAR THAT HIS AIM WAS TO LEAVE THE ISRAELIS IN NO DOUBT THAT THE RECOMMENDATION TO PRESS AHEAD WITH THE TALKS CAME WITH THE FULL WEIGHT OF THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL AUTHORITY AND WAS NOT TO BE REGARDED SIMPLY AS A MESSAGE FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT OR FROM SISCO HIMSELF.

6. SISCO THEN WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THE U S VIEW OF THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MOVEMENT OF MISSILES. UNDOUBTEDLY THERE HAD BEEN A CHANGE IN THE BALANCE, WHICH WAS SERIOUS BUT WOULD NOT BE CATASTROPHIC FOR ISRAEL. THIS WAS TAKING ACCOUNT OF ALL THAT THE U S GOVERNMENT WERE DOING IN THE POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC FIELD TO GET THE TALKS GOING AND ALL THAT THEY HAD INDICATED THEY WERE PREPARED TO DO TO SEE THAT ISRAEL QUOTE WAS NOT DISADVANTAGED UNQUOTE. IN CONSIDERING THE SITUATION SISCO SAID, IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY TO KEEP IN MIND THAT THE RESTRICTION ON ISRAEL'S FREEDOM OF ACTION HAD LARGELY COME ABOUT BEFORE THE CEASEFIRE TOOK EFFECT.

/7.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

7. TURNING TO THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN ISRAEL, SISCO SAID THAT HE WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE LAST 36 HOURS. THE RIGHT WING HAD MADE CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL CAPITAL OUT OF THE DEVELOPMENTS AND IT NOW SEEMED THAT DAYAN HAD SWUNG MORE PEOPLE TO HIS WAY OF THINKING. HOWEVER, THE U S GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE THEIR OWN CONCERN TO SEE THE TALKS STARTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO THE ISRAELIS. IT WAS AGGRAVATING THAT THE RUSSIANS AND THE EGYPTIANS HAD GIVEN THE ISRAELI HARDLINERS A PRETEXT FOR DELAYING THE TALKS. IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO SEE WHY THEY HAD DONE THIS. THERE WAS NO IMPORTANT MILITARY ADVANTAGE FOR THE UAR, SINCE, AT ANY TIME WHEN THEY THOUGHT THE TALKS WERE BREAKING DOWN, THEY COULD HAVE MOVED THE MISSILES INTO THEIR PRESENT POSITION IN THE SPACE OF TWELVE HOURS.

8. I ASKED SISCO ABOUT THE UAR ALLEGATIONS OF ISRAEL'S VIOLATIONS OF THE STANDSTILL. HE SAID THAT THE ISRAELI CONTENTION WAS THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO NEW CONSTRUCTION, ONLY MAINTENANCE WORK, AT THE PLACES WHERE THE UAR ALLEGED THE VIOLATIONS HAD TAKEN PLACE. THE US HAD NOT UNDERTAKEN ANY SURVEILLANCE ON THE ISRAELI SIDE OF THE CANAL. BUT IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THE RUSSIANS PRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHS PROVING ISRAELI VIOLATIONS, THEY WOULD BE QUOTE EVEN-HANDED UNQUOTE IN THEIR ATTITUDE TO THESE.

9. I ASKED SISCO WHETHER HIS REMARKS IN THE SAN CLEMENTE PRESS BRIEFING ABOUT A PEACE-KEEPING ROLE FOR THE SUPER-POWERS HAD BEEN MADE WITH THE PURPOSEFUL INTENT. HE SAID THAT HIS REMARKS HAD BEEN BLOWN UP OUT OF THEIR PROPER CONTEXT BY THE PRESS. HOWEVER, THE U S GOVERNMENT'S POSITION, ENDORSED BY THE PRESIDENT, DID NOT PRECLUDE A PEACE-KEEPING ROLE FOR THE MAJOR POWERS. THEY WERE THINKING OF THE FOUR POWERS RATHER THAN THE TWO

CONFIDENTIAL

/SUPER-POWERS

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON TELNO. 2559 TO FCO

- 5 -

SUPER-POWERS ALONE. BY REFERRING TO A PEACE-KEEPING ROLE THEY WERE THINKING IN TERMS OF AN OBSERVER FUNCTION. IN MENTIONING THIS TO THE PRESS, HE WAS SIMPLY THROWING OUT THE IDEA THAT THE U S GOVERNMENT WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER THIS IF THE PARTIES WISHED IT. THE U S GOVERNMENT HAD NO PROPOSAL TO PUT FORWARD AND IT WAS QUITE WRONG OF THE PRESS TO IMPLY THAT THEY HAD. IT WAS SIMPLY THAT, IF THE TALKS REACHED THE POINT OF CONSIDERING UN PEACE-KEEPING, HE WOULD WANT THE PARTIES TO KEEP IN MIND THE POSSIBILITY NOT ONLY OF BRINGING IN THE USUAL NEUTRALS BUT ALSO OF USING TEAMS CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH OF THE FOUR POWERS. QUOTE FOUR MEN IN A JEEP UNQUOTE WAS THE PHRASE SISCO USED. 10. I ASKED SISCO WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY EXCHANGES WITH DOBRYNIN IN WASHINGTON. HE SAID THAT DOBRYNIN WAS NOT HERE AND THAT ALL THE US EXCHANGES WITH THE RUSSIANS HAD TAKEN PLACE IN MOSCOW. EVEN THERE IT WAS DIFFICULT TO GET ON TO PEOPLE WITH SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY AS THEY ALL SEEMED TO BE TAKING THEIR SUMMER HOLIDAYS AT PRESENT.

11. TO SUM UP, SISCO MADE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT THE U S GOVERNMENT (THE PRESIDENT AS WELL AS THE STATE DEPARTMENT) ATTACHED OVER-RIDING IMPORTANCE TO ACHIEVING A RESUMPTION OF JARRING'S TALKS WITH THE PARTIES. THEY WERE AWARE THAT SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF THE STANDSTILL HAD TAKEN PLACE AND THAT THESE COULD NOT BE IGNORED, BUT THEY WERE DOING THEIR BEST NOT TO ALLOW THIS SITUATION TO FRUSTRATE THEIR PRINCIPAL AIM. WHATEVER MAY HAVE BEEN SISCO'S EUPHORIA AT AN EARLIER STAGE, HE IS UNDER NO ILLUSION NOW ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY AND DELICACY OF THE TASK. HE CLEARLY WANTED ME TO BE AWARE OF THE VERY TOUGH TERMS IN WHICH THE US GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN SPEAKING TO THE ISRAELIS. HOWEVER, WITHOUT GIVING SPECIFIC DETAILS, HE INDICATED THAT TO GIVE ISRAELIS THE NECESSARY REASSURANCE THE US GOVERNMENT ARE COMBINING THEIR VERY FIRM PRESSURE FOR EARLY TALKS WITH JARRING WITH SUBSTANTIAL UNDERTAKINGS ABOUT THE SUPPLY OF MILITARY (PRESUMABLY ELECTRONIC) EQUIPMENT FOR USE IN THE EVENT OF A BREAKDOWN OF THESE TALKS.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE CAIRO TEL AVIV MOSCOW PARIS AND SAIGON TO AMMAN AND BEIRUT.
MR. FREEMAN

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE.

A.S.D.

AMERICAN D.

A.R.D.

W.E.D.

ARABIAN D.

DEFENCE D.

E.E.S.D.

NEWS D.

U.N.D.

RESEARCH D. (SOVIET SECT.)

S.E.D.

(W.E. SECT.)
(AMERICAN SECT.)

H.O.D. (INTERNAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPRUS CMT 'A'
IMMEDIATE MOSCOW
TELEGRAM NO. 1013

CONFIDENTIAL
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
3 SEPTEMBER 1978

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1013 OF 3/9 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, BEIRUT, PARIS, TEL AVIV, JIS (NE) AND JIS GULF.

AMMAN TELS. NOS. 449 AND 451 : JORDAN AND IRAQ.

THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR HERE HAS ALSO RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO APPROACH THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON THIS SUBJECT, AND HAS PROMISED TO LET ME KNOW RESULTS.

2. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT I SHALL NOT GET AN APPOINTMENT WITH VICE-MINISTER VINOGRADOV BEFORE NEXT WEEK (THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IS SEEING HIM THIS AFTERNOON TO MAKE STRONG REPRESENTATIONS ABOUT U.A.R. INFRINGEMENTS OF CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS, AND THESE WILL NO DOUBT KEEP HIM BUSY). IF SO, I WOULD PROPOSE TO WORK THE SUBJECT OF JORDAN AND IRAQ INTO A GENERAL TALK RATHER THAN TREAT IT SEPARATELY.

3. WHEN VINOGRADOV SAW BEAN, HE SAID THAT HE KNEW OF NO APPROACH BY THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET ESTIMATE HAD BEEN THAT KING HUSSEIN'S POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE FEDAYEEN HAD RECENTLY IMPROVED, BUT EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT TROUBLE IN AMMAN MIGHT AFFECT THE PROSPECTS OF ISRAELI-JORDANIAN TALKS UNDER THE CEASE-FIRE, AND SUGGESTED TO BEAN THAT THEY SHOULD CONTINUE TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS WASHINGTON, PARIS AND DEFCONCEN.

DEFCON PLEASE PASS JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

SIR DUNCAN WILSON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[SENT TO D.C.C.]

FCO/WH DISTRIBUTION
H.E.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

Middle East

b1 10/2

September 4, 1970.

I wrote to you last night about the Jordanian proposal that the British, the Americans and the French should concert with the Russians a joint statement supporting the Jordanian position and condemning Iraqi intervention. I added that while awaiting your advice, I would show the Prime Minister Foreign and Commonwealth Office telegram No. 248 to Amman of September 2 and Paris telegram No. 775 of September 3.

In the light of the Paris telegram, the Prime Minister has commented:-

"I have much sympathy with the French view. E.H."

GWL

I. McCluney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

DEPARTMENT

Foreign & Commonwealth
Office

reach addressee(s)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIORITY MARKINGS

Flash
Immediate
Priority
Routine

(Date)

Despatched

Del. has now issued

PGD 4/ix

FLASH

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

En Clair.

Code

Cypher

[Security classification
—if any]

CONFIDENTIAL

[Privacy marking
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

Addressed to UNITED NEW YORK, PARIS, MOSCOW

telegram No. 1105 (date)

And to

repeated for information to (JMS) WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, CAIRO,

AMMAN, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, JIS(NE), JIS(GULF)

Saving to

Draft Telegram to:—
UNITED New York
Paris, Moscow
No.

(Date)

And to:—

Flags A, B & C

Repeat to:—

Washington

Baghdad

Cairo

Amman

Beirut

Tel Aviv

JIS(NE)

JIS(Gulf)

Saving to:—

Your tels No. 1832, 1833 (not to all), 1835 and 1837 and Moscow tel No. 1016: Jordan and Iraq.

We saw merit in the idea of your supporting the French in their proposal because we wished to demonstrate to the Jordanians that we had responded positively to their appeal and because we did not wish the French to think that their line of argument had made no impression on us. But we were at no time optimistic about the likelihood of all Four Powers being ready to agree that a joint statement might usefully be issued. It is now clear that the Americans are totally opposed to the French proposal. We therefore hope that the French can be persuaded not to pursue it.

2. In speaking to Kosciusko-Morizet, you should say that we have considerable sympathy for the motives of the French in proposing that the Four Powers should

/concert

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE VIEWED IN THIS MATTER

Departmental

Distribution:—

NED. NAD.

Arabian D.

U.N.(Pol) D.

WED. American D.

EEED.

Research D.

Copy to:—

(Soviet Section)

(American

W.E.

concert a joint statement (you could refer to points (I) and (II) in para 2 of Paris tel No. 779). We consider, too, that action by the Four Powers would be consistent with their terms of reference as set out in the French memorandum of 16 January, 1969 (FCO tel No. 30 to Paris of that date). But it is clear that the Americans are unenthusiastic about the idea and it is very uncertain whether the Russians would agree to issue a statement in terms acceptable to the other three powers. Besides, three full days have now elapsed since the Jordanians made their appeal and action has already been taken by the Americans (and the French themselves) in capitals in response to it. For these reasons, we hope that the French will not pursue their proposal and thereby run the risk of provoking disagreement among the Four Powers at a time when it is particularly important that they should act in concert.

3. H.M. Chargé d'Affaires in Paris should speak to the Quai on the same lines at the earliest opportunity.

4. H.M. Ambassador in Moscow should not volunteer anything on the subject during his conversation with Vinogradov. If pressed, he should take the line that, we should have been prepared to support the French proposal, but that we attach overriding importance to the Four Powers acting in harmony at this crucial stage.

Flag F

Flag G

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1105

TO UKMIS NEW YORK

4 SEPTEMBER 1970

(MED)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1105 OF 4 SEPTEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, AMMAN,
BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, JIS (NE), JIS (CULF), MOSCOW AND PARIS.

YOUR TELS NO. 1832, 1833 (NOT TO ALL), 1835 AND 1837 AND MOSCOW
TELNO 1016: JORDAN AND IRAQ.

WE SAW MERIT IN THE IDEA OF YOUR SUPPORTING THE FRENCH IN THEIR
PROPOSAL BECAUSE WE WISHED TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE JORDANIANS THAT
WE HAD RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO THEIR APPEAL AND BECAUSE WE DID
NOT WISH THE FRENCH TO THINK THAT THEIR LINE OF ARGUMENT HAD MADE
NO IMPRESSION ON US. BUT WE WERE AT NO TIME OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE
LIKELIHOOD OF ALL FOUR POWERS BEING READY TO AGREE THAT A JOINT
STATEMENT MIGHT USEFULLY BE ISSUED. IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT THE
AMERICANS ARE TOTALLY OPPOSED TO THE FRENCH PROPOSAL. WE THEREFORE
HOPE THAT THE FRENCH WILL NOT PURSUE IT.

2. IN SPEAKING TO KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE HAVE
CONSIDERABLE SYMPATHY FOR THE MOTIVES OF THE FRENCH IN PROPOSING
THAT THE FOUR POWERS SHOULD CONCERT A JOINT STATEMENT (YOU COULD
REFER TO POINTS (I) AND (II) IN PARA 2 OF PARIS TELNO 779). WE
CONSIDER, TOO, THAT ACTION BY THE FOUR POWERS WOULD BE CONSISTENT
WITH THEIR TERMS OF REFERENCE AS SET OUT IN THE FRENCH MEMORANDUM
OF 16 JANUARY, 1969 (FCO TELNO 30 TO PARIS OF THAT DATE). BUT IT
IS CLEAR THAT THE AMERICANS ARE UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE IDEA AND
IT IS MOST UNLIKELY THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD AGREE TO ISSUE A
STATEMENT IN TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHER THREE POWERS. BESIDES,
THREE FULL DAYS HAVE NOW ELAPSED SINCE THE JORDANIANS MADE THEIR
APPEAL AND ACTION HAS ALREADY BEEN TAKEN BY THE AMERICANS (AND
THE FRENCH THEMSELVES) IN CAPITALS IN RESPONSE TO IT. FOR THESE
REASONS, WE HOPE THAT THE FRENCH WILL NOT PURSUE THEIR PROPOSAL
AND THEREBY RUN THE RISK OF PROVOKING DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE FOUR
POWERS AT A TIME WHEN IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT THEY
SHOULD ACT IN CONCERT.

3. H.M. CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN PARIS SHOULD SPEAK TO THE QUAI ON THE

/DRAFTED

SAFELY LINES AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

DOUGLAS-HONE

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.
H.A.D.
ARAB. DEPT.
U.N. (E.O.) DEPT.
W.E.D.
AMERICAN DEPT.
E.E.S.D.
RES. DEPT. (SOVIET SECTION)
(AMERICAN SECTION)
(W.E. SECTION)

CONFIDENTIAL

GGGGG

J

CONFIDENTIAL

1 PYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY UKHIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NO. 1844.

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
4 SEPTEMBER, 1970.

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO F.C.O. TELEGRAM NO. 1844 OF 4 SEPTEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, AMMAN,
BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, JIS (NE), JIS (GULF), MOSCOW AND PARIS.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 1125: JORDAN AND IRAQ.

I TOOK ACTION THIS MORNING. YOST HAD ALREADY TELEPHONED AND SPOKE IN
MUCH THE SAME WAY EXCEPT THAT HE HAD LAID STRESS ON THE FACT
THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THIS WAS A SUITABLE MATTER FOR
THE FOUR POWERS. THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT YET REPLIED BUT MY FRENCH
COLLEAGUE CONSIDERS THAT THE WHOLE EXERCISE IS ALMOST CERTAINLY
DEAD.

F.C.O. PASS BAGHDAD, CAIRO, AMMAN, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, JIS (NE),
JIS (GULF), MOSCOW AND PARIS.

MR. WARNER.

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/ /SENT TO D.C.C./

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.
N.A.D.
ARABIAN DEPT.
U.N. DEPT.
W.E.D.
AMERICAN DEPT.
E.E.S.D.
RES. D. (SOV. SECT.)
RES. D. (AMER. SECT.)
RES. D. (W.E. SECT.)

NNNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

J

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT/A

F L A S H PARIS TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 791 OF 4 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELNO 791 OF 4 SEPTEMBER AND REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION F L A S H TO UKMIS NEW YORK IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON
AMMAN MOSCOW AND PRIORITY TO BAGHDAD CAIRO BEIRUT TEL AVIV JIS (NE)
AND JIS (GULF).

YOUR TEL TO UKMIS NEW YORK NO 1105: JORDAN AND IRAQ.

MINISTER SPOKE ACCORDINGLY TO DIRECTEUR AFRIQUE/LEVANT AT THE
QUAI D'ORSAY.

2. M. DE LEUSSE SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE SUPPORT YOU HAD
EXPRESSED FOR THE FRENCH PROPOSAL. BUT HE DID NOT ACCEPT THAT THE
AMERICAN LACK OF ENTHUSIASM AND THE UNLIKELIHOOD OF RUSSIAN
AGREEMENT WERE, AT THIS STAGE, SUFFICIENT ARGUMENTS TO JUSTIFY
THE FRENCH WITHDRAWING THEIR PROPOSAL. HE CONSIDERED THAT WE
OWED IT BOTH TO OURSELVES AND TO KING HUSSAIN TO BE SEEN TO BE
RESPONDING TO THE LATTER'S APPEAL AND, IF NECESSARY, TO BE PREPARED
JOINTLY TO BRING PRESSURE ON THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS TO DO
LIKEWISE. HE WAS REINFORCED IN THIS VIEW BY A REPORT FROM THE FRENCH
EMBASSY IN MOSCOW THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE REFUSING TO TACKLE THE
IRAQIS, AS THE U S AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS HAD REQUESTED.

3. ACCORDINGLY, DE LEUSSE IS RECOMMENDING THAT M. KOSCIUSKO-
MORIZET BE INSTRUCTED TO RETURN TO THE CHARGE WITH HIS THREE
COLLEAGUES, THOUGH WITHOUT, OF COURSE, GIVING ANY PUBLICITY TO HIS
APPROACH. HE ACCEPTED THAT WE WERE PROBABLY RIGHT TO BE PESSIMISTIC
ABOUT THE READINESS OF ALL FOUR POWERS TO AGREE A JOINT STATEMENT.
BUT HE THOUGHT WE WERE GIVING UP THE STRUGGLE TOO EASILY AND TOO
SOON. IN HIS VIEW, (SEE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 2 OF YOUR TEL UNDER
REFERENCE) IT WAS PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
FOUR POWERS ACTING IN CONCERT IN RESPONSE TO THIS APPEAL FROM
ONE OF THE KEY FIGURES IN THE CURRENT MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

/THAT IT

CONFIDENTIAL

/

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

THAT IT WAS WORTH RUNNING THE RISK OF PROVOKING SOME TEMPORARY
DISAGREEMENT AT THIS TIME.

F C O PLEASE PASS FLASH TO UNKIS NEW YORK IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON
AMMAN MOSCOW AND PRIORITY TO BAGHDAD CAIRO BEIRUT TEL AVIV
JIS (NE) AND JIS (GULF).

MR SOAMES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED][SENT TO D.C.C.]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

N.A.D.

ARAB. D.

U.N. (POL.) D.

W.E.D.

AMER. D.

E.E.S.D.

RES. D. (SOV. S.)

RES. D. (AMER. S.)

RES. D. (W.E.S.)

EEEEEE

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT 'A'

FLASH MOSCOW

TELEGRAM NO. 1016

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

4 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1016 OF 4/9 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION FLASH TO NEW YORK AND IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, AMMAN, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, JIS(NE) AND JIS (GULF).

YOUR TEL. NO. 741.

I HAVE AN APPOINTMENT TO SEE VICE-MINISTER VINCORADOV AT 1600 LOCAL TIME TODAY. IN THE LIGHT OF NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1837, I SHALL VOLUNTEER NOTHING, UNLESS YOU INSTRUCT ME TO THE CONTRARY, ABOUT OUR ATTITUDE TO THE JORDANIAN REQUEST FOR A FOUR-POWER STATEMENT, AND SHALL STALL IF QUESTIONED.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS (FLASH) TO NEW YORK AND (IMMEDIATE) TO WASHINGTON, PARIS AND DEFCOMMCEN.

DEFCOMMCEN PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO JIS(NE) AND JIS (GULF)

SIR DUNCAN WILSON

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
/SENT TO D.C.C./

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.	AMERICAN DEPT.
N.A.D.	E.E.S.D.
ARABIAN DEPT.	RES. D. (SOV. SECT.)
U.N.DEPT.	RES. D. (AMER. SECT.)
W.E.D.	RES. D. (W.E. SECT.)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN



Prime Minister

Jordan and Iraq

The FCO will comment on Monday on your remark that you were attracted to the French proposal ^{for} supporting the ^{Jordan} Iraqi request for a joint statement.

Meanwhile you may like to see these Telegrams, especially FCO to UKMIS New York 1105 (at the bottom of the string) which sets out FCO views. In short, they are not enthusiastic.

Very sincerely
CWR
11/7/4 4/9

YOUR TEL. NO. 741: JORDAN.

7/9/8

I TOOK ACTION WITH VINOGRADOV THIS AFTERNOON.

2. HE SAID THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ALSO VIEWED THE PRESENT SITUATION WITH CONCERN; SUCH DIFFERENCES DID NOT SERVE EITHER THE ARAB CAUSE OR THE FOUR POWER INTEREST FOR A SETTLEMENT. HOWEVER THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD NOT BEEN APPROACHED WITH ANY REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE BY THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT AND THEREFORE ANY SUCH MOVE BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS WE HAD SUGGESTED MIGHT BE MISINTERPRETED AS INTERFERENCE EITHER BY THE JORDANIANS OR BY THE IRAQIS. TWO DAYS AGO THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT HAD INFORMED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN OF THE SITUATION, BUT THIS APPROACH DID NOT CONSTITUTE A REQUEST FOR SOVIET ACTION. IN REPLY TO FURTHER PRObing, MR. VINOGRADOV WAS ADAMANT THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO JORDANIAN REQUEST FOR ANY KIND OF SOVIET ACTION. HE WAS NOT PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PRESENT SITUATION, DRAWING ATTENTION TO JORDANIAN-IRAQI TALKS WHICH, HE SAID, HAD RECENTLY BEGUN: THE PROPOSED MEETING OF THE ARAB LEAGUE IN CAIRO WAS ALSO A GOOD SIGN. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO WATCH THE SITUATION IN JORDAN.

3. I EXPLAINED THAT MY APPROACH WAS BASED PARTLY ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN JORDAN HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT SIMILAR TO THAT RECEIVED BY THE FRENCH, BRITISH AND AMERICAN AMBASSADORS. THIS ENVISAGED A QUADRIPARTITE STATEMENT, AND I BELIEVED THAT THE MERITS OF SOME KIND OF STATEMENT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BETWEEN DELEGATIONS IN NEW YORK (VINOGRADOV CONFIRMED THIS). IF HOWEVER THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT SAW AN OPPORTUNITY OF URGING MODERATION THEMSELVES ON THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HOPED IT WOULD DO SO. /4. MR. VINOGRADOV

CONFIDENTIAL

4. MR. VINOGRADOV CLAIMED THAT HE HAD CHECKED WITH MR. DEAN ON 3 SEPTEMBER AND THE LATTER HAD ALSO SAID THAT THE JORDANIAN APPROACH TO AMAN HAD INCLUDED A REQUEST FOR ACTION.

5. THE CONVERSATION THEN TURNED TO A PREDICTABLE DISCUSSION OF THE JORDANIAN RELUCTANCE TO PROCEED WITH THE JARRING MISSION AND THE JORDANIAN POLICY OF CEASEFIRE EXPERIMENTS. VINOGRADOV LAID EMPHASIS THROUGHOUT ON THE PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE OF PROGRESS WITH THE JARRING MISSION.

6. RECORD FOLLOWS BY BAG.

FCO PLEASE PASS WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS AND MOD.

MOD PSE PASS JIS (NE) AND JIS (GULF).

SIR DUNCAN WILSON.

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

/SENT TO D.C.C./

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.
N.A.D.
ARABIAN DEPT.
U.N. DEPT.
W.E.D.
AMERICAN DEPT.
E.E.S.D.
RES. D. (SOV. SECT.)
RES. D. (AMER. SECT.)
RES. D. (W.E. SECT.)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir J. Greenhill *at 11.10*

BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

(1/1)

Mr. Dwyer

Re: U.K.

9/11/70 September, 1970

Dear Peter,

Sir P. Adams. This gives a vivid picture of the situation in a week ago - I think the P.O.S. might be interested here.

Herewith another round-up to supplement the telegrams; I hope that a bit of informal background is helpful and given present conditions of work this sort of letter comes more easily off the pen, or tongue, than a more formal communication, though I shall have to get round to a despatch before very long.

2. I see that in my letter to you of 6 August I wrote of "a slow returning to normal" and that we were keeping our fingers crossed. Now, a month later, after a week in which we have had three virtual night battles, several clashes by day and the attempted assassination of the durable King, I am wondering what is the norm. My staff, who by now are pretty case-hardened, are taking it all very calmly; it is the inconvenience and restricted movement more than anything else that is such a bind (not to mention the continued non-arrival of our non-confidential bags which has nothing to do with the fedayeen). As the guns opened up on Tuesday night I was forced at the last minute to cancel a dinner party I had laid on for Archbishop Appleton who, with unpropitious lack of foresight, chose to visit Amman from Jerusalem between 30 August to 1 September; he was more or less pinned down by fire at the other end of Jebel Amman while my domestic staff were face down in the basement at this end. I think in truth the latter were more frightened by the noise of a Saladin ("one of ours") which was banging away with its main armament more or less under our windows, than they were of retaliatory fire from the fedayeen, though Christopher Lush just over the road had a chunk knocked off his roof and a bullet hole penetrated

/quite

J.P. Tripp, Esq.;
Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL




quite deeply a little lower down. Another dwelling hit that night was that of Said, my vast Sudanese driver (whom you will undoubtedly remember; his father was given by King Abdullah as a present to Kirkbride!). With tears in his eyes he described how "Wahid Katyushka" had wrecked his veranda, smashed his windows, reduced his bowels to water and necessitated a monetary loan, which I weakly conceded. The Archbishop departed rapidly early on Wednesday in a fiery (or at least smoky) chariot loaded with cholera vaccine, a present from the Jordan Army; this was, I gather taken off him by the Israelis when he crossed the Jordan and is now being held at Jericho.

3. Our Embassy Bedouin Guards are probably at least as much of a menace to our safety as are the fedayeen. You may recall that they loosed off five hundred rounds in Sunday night's exchanges, in return for which the Embassy received one hit from an armour-piercing bullet and an acknowledgment from the fedayeen press; nor did they fail to contribute to Tuesday night's proceedings, this time receiving a mention by Damascus radio. All this, and the fatal shooting in our doorway in July too, prompted me to send Christopher Lush and Colonel Richard Harrison (in uniform) to call upon the Chief of Protocol at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deliver a note which, while expressing gratitude for the presence of our guards, asks that they confine their musketry to repelling direct attacks on the Embassy itself. Hashem was wearily sympathetic and promised to do what he could, but meanwhile the insatiable Bedouin are now busy reinforcing a strongpoint immediately next door, where they have a fixed line for a machine gun directed at a fedayeen emplacement across the valley. I am told that during the June troubles one of them was firing away from a battlement constructed by himself lying on top of an oil tank (ours).

4. The trouble about the present situation is that there are some people on each side who have nothing to lose by a violent test of strength. The Army almost certainly have the edge when it comes to pounding with artillery and quick-firing medium and /long-range

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL




long-range weapons and Hussein's "hawks" (though not, I believe, Hussein himself) want to exploit this advantage. I have reason to believe that in Tuesday night's firing, which was sparked off by the attack on the King, they killed and wounded a relatively large number of fedayeen. And I am sure they can do it again and again but without making a significant difference to the numerical strength which the fedayeen can deploy if it comes to street fighting in Amman. On the other side there are, of course, extremist fedayeen who are desperate because if they do not do something now and if the peace talks make progress, they are going to lose their support to the moderates who will be prepared to settle for half a loaf (roughly the pre-1967 frontiers) rather than a whole one (the pre-1948 frontiers).

5. But the most depressing feature is an apparently total (and one can only hope temporary) breakdown of confidence between the King and Arafat: Hussein appears to think that Arafat is becoming as extreme as the rest of them, and does not want to cooperate: while Arafat appears to believe (perhaps correctly) that Hussein and his government are only waiting for a really favourable opportunity to liquidate the whole fedayeen movement, or at the very least "assist" it to wither away if and as peace negotiations make progress. There is however one motive favourable to a compromise solution and common to both sides, namely a deep aversion on the part of the majority to a repetition of the "June terror".

6. We have now had two quiet nights in succession but yesterday (as reported separately by telegram) we had an official car taken at gun point within half a mile of the Embassy. That makes two, one having been taken in June. It is poor consolation that on the same day the Americans lost four, the Chinese one, the Royal Palace one and that in addition scores of private cars were stolen. We are trying to devise methods of minimising the risk but we have to make trips to the airport and communication with the Commercial Office down Salt Road presents a particular problem. I think we shall have to make more use of taxis for a while.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



7. I had the wardens in yesterday and gave them a résumé of the situation as we saw it and asked them to spread the word. I also stressed that the situation was not one in which British or even foreigners in general were the targets of hostility, but rather that the danger, as they knew, lay in becoming accidentally involved in the cross fire between the Government and the fedayeen. The way to minimise the risk was to keep in touch with us, keep away from known risky areas of Amman, and keep their heads down whenever shooting was going on. In my judgment we had not reached the stage where I felt it necessary to advise or arrange for members of the community to leave Jordan. They took all this cheerfully enough.

8. I am sending copies of this letter to Dick Beaumont in Cairo, John Barnes in Tel Aviv, Alan Edden in Beirut, and Donald Hawley in Baghdad, in case something of the flavour of our present existence here may be of interest to them.

Yours ever,

J.F.S.

(J.F.S. Phillips)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

IMMEDIATE CAIRO TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 951 5 SEPTEMBER 1970

SECRET

ADDRESSED IMMEDIATE TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 951 OF 5 SEPTEMBER 1970, REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO TEL AVIV, AMMAN, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS AND MOSCOW, ROUTINE BEIRUT.

WASHINGTON TEL NO 2559 AND MY TEL NO 947 AND 948:

BREACHES OF N.E. CEASE-FIRE.

I WAS SENT FOR AT SHORT NOTICE BY MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS LAST NIGHT. MR RIAD SAID THAT HE WANTED TO TALK ABOUT
THE US ACCUSATIONS THAT THE UAR HAD BREACHED THE CEASE-FIRE
(THIS TELEGRAM) AND THE SITUATION WHICH RESULTED FROM THE
STATE DEPT.'S SPOKESMAN'S PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT TO THIS
EFFECT (MIFT).

2. MR MAHMUD RIAD SAID THAT WHEN THE MFA
HAD RECEIVED THE AMERICAN DEMARCHE ON 3 SEPT. THEY HAD
IMMEDIATELY REPORTED THE MATTER TO PRESIDENT NASSER WHO
HAD ORDERED AN INVESTIGATION AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, USING THE
CO-ORDINATES PROVIDED BY THE AMERICANS. THE UPSHOT HAD
BEEN THAT THE AMERICAN ACCUSATIONS WERE ALMOST ALL
ILL-FOUNDED. INDEED AT SOME OF THE CO-ORDINATES GIVEN
THERE WERE NO WORKS OF ANY KIND. MR RIAD SAID THAT
THERE WERE THREE TYPES OF POSSIBLE BREACH OF THE
CEASE-FIRE TERMS:

SECRET

/C. J. THE

- (A) THE MOVEMENT OF NEW MISSILES INTO THE STANDSTILL ZONE:
- (B) THE MOVEMENT OF MISSILES FROM ONE POSITION TO ANOTHER WITHIN THE ZONE:
- (C) THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW SITES:

3. MR RIAD SAID THAT IN RESPECT OF (A) THERE WAS NO SUBSTANCE IN THE U.S. ACCUSATION. IN RESPECT OF (B) THE UAR CONSIDERED THAT IT HAD UNDER THE ORIGINAL TERMS OF THE CEASEFIRE THE RIGHT TO ALTERNATE MISSILES BETWEEN EXISTING SITES. TO FORBID THIS WAS TO CONDEMN THE UAR MISSILES AND THEIR CREWS TO ALMOST CERTAIN AND INSTANTANEOUS DESTRUCTION IN THE EVENT OF A RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES SINCE THE INFORMATION OBTAINED BY ISRAELI AND AMERICAN CHECKING OF THE CEASE-FIRE, PROVIDED THE ISRAELIS WITH THE

FULLEST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OF UAR DISPOSITIONS. NEVERTHELESS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF AN ISOLATED INCIDENT ON 10TH AUGUST WHEN A UNIT COMMANDER ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE HAD MOVED A MISSILE TO AN ALTERNATE SITE, THE UAR COMMAND REFRAINED IN DEFERENCE TO AMERICAN INTERPRETATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE TERMS FROM ALTERNATING MISSILES BETWEEN EXISTING SITES. ON (C) MAHMUD RIAD SAID THAT THERE WAS ROOM FOR DIFFERENCE OF INTERPRETATION, AND CONSTRUCTION WORK HAD BEEN DONE, BUT IN THE UAR VIEW THIS WAS IN THE NATURE OF MAINTENANCE (AND HENCE PERMISSIBLE) SINCE IT WAS CONFINED TO EXISTING SITES AND NO NEW SITES WERE BEING CONSTRUCTED. HE SAID THAT THE UAR HAD PROOF THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE ALSO ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION AND ON NEW WORKS - WHICH THEY TOO CLAIMED WAS MAINTENANCE.

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
AAB/TOTAL DISCUTE

CYPHER CAT 'A'

SECRET

IMMEDIATE CAIRO

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 952

5 SEPTEMBER 1970

ORIGINAL INTENT

ADDRESSED IMMEDIATE TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 952 OF 5 SEPTEMBER 1970, REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO TEL AVIV, AMMAN, WASHINGTON,
UKHIS NEW YORK, PARIS AND MOSCOW, ROUTINE BEIRUT.

MIPT: BREACHES OF M.E. CEASE-FIRE.

Handwritten signature/initials

MR RIAD THEN TURNED TO THE PUBLIC STATEMENT MADE BY THE STATE
DEPT. SPOKESMAN (WASHINGTON TEL 2553). HE SAID THAT ,
MADE AT A LOW LEVEL THOUGH IT MIGHT BE ,THE STATEMENT RE-
MAINED AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF THE US GOVT. IT SHOULD
COMMAND CREDENCE BUT GIVEN THE VAGUE NATURE OF THE ACCUSATIONS
CONTAINED IN THE MEMO GIVEN TO HIM, IT WOULD SURELY HAVE
BEEN MORE POLITIC TO CHECK THOSE ACCUSATIONS WITH THE
UAR GOVT. FIRST, PARTICULARLY AS THE PUBLIC STATEMENT
MADE NO MENTION OF THE UAR'S COMPLAINTS AGAINST ISRAEL
FOR WHICH PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE EXISTED. MR BERGUS
HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE UNITED STATES WERE "TALKING TO
THE ISRAELIS TOO" BUT THAT WAS NOT ENOUGH. IT SHOULD
HAVE BEEN PUBLICLY STATED. OTHERWISE IT APPEARED THAT THE
US GOVT BELIEVED THAT THE UAR ALONE HAD BREACHED THE
CEASE-FIRE. GIVEN THE ATTITUDE AT PRESENT ADOPTED BY
THE MILITARY CLIQUE IN ISRAEL THIS WAS, HE SAID, A
DANGEROUS AND IMPRUDENT PUBLIC IMPRESSION TO CREATE.
THE UAR HAD ALREADY BEEN A VICTIM OF AN ISRAELI PRE-EMPTIVE
STRIKE IN 1967 WHEN UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE US
GOVT. COULD RESTRAIN THE ISRAELIS, AND NOW TO DECLARE
PUBLICLY THAT THE UAR ALONE WAS VIOLATING THE CEASE-FIRE
WAS TO HAND ISRAEL GRATUITOUS JUSTIFICATION FOR
ANOTHER PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE. IT WAS GIVING DAYAN A BLANK
CHECK SIGNED UNCLE SAM AND GOD KNOWS WHAT USE HE WOULD

CONFIDENTIAL

2. MR RIAD SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE UAR CONSIDERED THE DELIVERY OF WAR MATERIAL TO ISRAEL BY THE US GOVT TO BE A BREACH OF THE UNDERTAKINGS WITH WHICH THE U.S. GOVT HAD LAUNCHED THE ROGERS INITIATIVE, IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ACCEPT THE ARGUMENT THAT THE US GOVT FELT OBLIGED TO DO THIS TO ASSUAGE ISRAELI APPREHENSIONS, BUT THE STATEMENT BY THE STATE DEPT. SPOKESMAN COULD BE COUNTED ON TO HAVE PRECISELY THE OPPOSITE EFFECT, NAMELY TO EXCITE THE WAR-MONGERS IN ISRAEL. ALREADY MR. ALLOU WAS TALKING OF ENTERING ON DISCUSSIONS WITH JARRING FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 242 (IF AT ALL) ON THE BASIS THAT SHARM EL SHAikh, JERUSALEM, GOLAN HEIGHTS AND THE WEST BANK WERE ALL NOT NEGOTIABLE. WHAT, HE ASKED, REMAINED OF RESOLUTION 242 FOR ISRAEL TO IMPLEMENT ? AND WHAT SIGN OF AMERICAN INFLUENCE WAS THERE TO GET THEM TO IMPLEMENT IT?

3. FINALLY MR RIAD SAID THAT HE HAD ASSURED MR. BERGUS THAT THE UAR GOVT. INTENDED TO OBSERVE THE CEASE-FIRE FAITHFULLY, THAT THEY WERE NOW OBSERVING IT AND THAT THEY WOULD DO SO IN THE FUTURE. HE SAID HE HAD GIVEN MR. BERGUS A MEMORANDUM GIVING THE UAR VIEW OF THE PRESENT SITUATION- ONE MONTH AFTER THE START OF DR. JARRING'S TALKS SHOULD HAVE STARTED.

4. HAVING LISTENED TO THIS EXPOSE I ASKED MR. RIAD WHAT EXACTLY HE EXPECTED H.M. GOVT TO DO. THEY WERE NOT GUARANTORS OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND THEY DID NOT DISPOSE OF THE MEANS TO CHECK ITS OBSERVANCE, THOUGH THEY CERTAINLY HOPED IT WOULD BE SCRUPULOUSLY OBSERVED BY BOTH PARTIES SO THAT TALKS WITH JARRING COULD GET GOING. HE SAID THAT HE WAS MAKING THIS COMMUNICATION TO ME AND TO THE FRENCH AND SOVIET CHARGES D'AFFAIRES SO THAT WE SHOULD INFORM OUR RESPECTIVE GOVT'S OF THE FACTS OF THE CASE. HE SAID THAT HE WANTED TO BEAR IN UPON THE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES THE POTENTIALLY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF THE PUBLIC STEP THEY HAD NOW TAKEN AND THE HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY THAT NOW LAY ON THE US GOVT. TO ENSURE THAT THE CEASE-FIRE AFFORDS THE SAME SECURITY TO THE UAR AGAINST ISRAELI BREACHES AS VICE VERSA.

CONFIDENTIAL

CAIRO TELNO. 952 TO P.C.O.

-3-

POO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, U.K.DIG NEW YORK AND
PARIS.

SIR R. BEAUMONT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

N.A.D.

ARABIAN DEPT

E.A.S.D.

U.N.D.

S.E.D.

AFRICAN DEPT

U.E.D.

DEFENSE DEPT

NEWS DEPT

RESEARCH DEPT

(SOVIET, W,

A.L. AMERICAN ACTIONS)

MOD INTERNAL

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

100/1 (NOT TISSUE)

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE CAIRO

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 953

5 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED IMMEDIATE TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 953 OF 5 SEPTEMBER 1970, REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO TEL AVIV, AMMAN, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS AND MOSCOW, ROUTINE BEIRUT.

GUARD
-----MY TWO I.P.T'S : MIDDLE EAST CEASEFIRE

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE U.A.R. AUTHORITIES
ARE SERIOUSLY WORRIED AT DEVELOPMENTS IN ISRAEL AND THE
POSSIBILITY OF AN ISRAELI PRE EMPTIVE ATTACK. THEY ALSO
FEAR THAT DAYAN IS GOING TO USE THE CEASEFIRE AND THE
AMERICAN DESIRE TO KEEP THE ISRAELIS IN THE JARRING GAME
AT ANY PRICE NOT ONLY TO MAINTAIN ISRAEL'S MILITARY
SUPERIORITY BUT ALSO TO WEAKEN THE U.A.R. MILITARILY
BY THE PROVISION OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE UNDERTAKEN IN
THE NAME OF CEASEFIRE OBSERVATION AND EVEN BY TRYING TO
GET THE AMERICANS TO HAVE MISSILES REMOVED FROM THE
STANDSTILL ZONE WHICH WERE THERE BEFORE CEASEFIRE CAME
INTO EFFECT ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY CAME IN AFTER 8 AUGUST.

2. THE NEED FOR THE AMERICANS TO APPEAR EVEN-HANDED IS,
AS I SAID IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 947 , AN ESSENTIAL PREMISE
OF THE CEASEFIRE AND THE JARRING MISSION. IT IS CLEAR
THAT U.A.R. CONFIDENCE IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN
SOMEWHAT ERODED BY THIS INCIDENT. THE EGYPTIANS SAID TO

BERGUS THAT THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, WHICH WITH THE ROGERS INITIATIVE HAD BEEN RESTORED TO 10% OF ITS FORMER STRENGTH, HAD NOW SLUMPED ONCE MORE TO ZERO.

ONE OF THE JUNIOR MEMBERS OF MAHMUD RIAD'S PRIVATE OFFICE DURING AN INTERVAL IN OUR TALKS (WHILE RIAD SPOKE TO NASSER ON THE TELEPHONE) BROUGHT OUT AGAIN TO ME THE THEORY THAT THE WHOLE ROGERS INITIATIVE MIGHT BE AN ELABORATE U.S./ISRAELI STRATEGY DIRECTED AGAINST THE U.A.R. AND THIS POSSIBILITY WAS CLEARLY NOT FAR BELOW THE SURFACE IN RIAD'S DISCOURSE. IN PARTICULAR THE FAILURE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN TO MENTION THE U.A.R. COMPLAINTS OF ISRAELI VIOLATIONS AND THAT THEY WERE BEING TAKEN UP IN TEL AVIV IS REGARDED AS VERY SIGNIFICANT. BERGUS TELLS ME THAT HE HAD SUGGESTED INCLUSION OF A REFERENCE TO THIS IN THE STATEMENT BUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD SAID THAT IT WAS MORE THAN THE ISRAELI TRAFFIC WOULD BEAR AT THE MOMENT. BERGUS (NOT FOR QUOTATION) REMARKED THAT THIS WAS THE AMERICAN ACHILLES HEEL AND I AGREE. I WOULD VENTURE THE OPINION THAT THE REASON WHY THE U.A.R. MAY HAVE BREACHED THE CEASEFIRE (WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 2559) IS PRECISELY BECAUSE FROM THE START THEY WERE NOT FULLY CONFIDENT OF U.S. INTENTIONS AND AMERICAN ABILITY OR WILL TO CURB THE ISRAELIS FROM TAKING MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF THE CEASE-FIRE.

3. I WOULD JUDGE NEVERTHELESS THAT THE SHUDDER WHICH THE POSSIBILITIES OPENED UP BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT HAVE SENT DOWN THE EGYPTIANS' SPINE (IF ANY) WILL NOT BE WITHOUT IT SALUTARY EFFECT ON NASSER AND HIS ADVISERS AND THAT A MORE STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE TERMS OF THE CEASEFIRE (OR AT LEAST MUCH BETTER CAMOUFLAGED BREACHES OF IT) IN THE FUTURE CAN BE EXPECTED PARTICULARLY IF IN FACT THEY HAVE FINISHED DOING WHAT THEY WERE DOING. SO MUCH THE BETTER. BUT THE TIME MAY NOW BE COMING WHEN A SHOW OF CONCERN FOR EGYPTIAN SECURITY WOULD HELP MATTERS ALONG. ALTHOUGH I KNOW THE U.S. GOVT GAVE UNDERTAKING'S TO ISRAEL, IT SEEMS TO ME A FUNDAMENTAL ANOMALY OF THE

AMERICAN APPROACH TO THIS QUESTION THAT THEY APPEAR TO WISH TO LEAVE CONCERN FOR EGYPTIAN SECURITY DURING THE CEASEFIRE TO THE RUSSIANS (I.C.F. THEIR PRESENT DEMARCHE IN MOSCOW OVER U.A.R. BREACHES) THEREBY UNDOING MUCH OF THE GOOD THEIR INITIATIVE HAS ACHIEVED IN THIS COUNTRY, CASTING DOUBT ON THEIR OWN FAIRNESS OF PURPOSE AND THEMSELVES POLARISING THE ISSUE IN PRECISELY THE WAY THAT HAS LED TO THE PRESENT SORRY PASS WITH RUSSIANS ALL OVER THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE IS A DISPOSITION HERE TO WISH TO PUT FAITH IN THE AMERICANS AND I SUGGEST THE AMERICANS MIGHT BE ENCOURAGED TO ENCOURAGE IT. THEY COULD AFTER ALL KEEP THE RUSSIANS IN THE PICTURE (IF, AS I ASSUME, THIS IS NECESSARY) THROUGH THE DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL WITHOUT PUBLICISING THE FACT AT EVERY TURN.

4. I HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY OBTAINED FROM BERGUS A COPY OF THE DOCUMENT HANDED TO HIM (BY I.P.T. PARAGRAPH 3) BUT ASSUME YOU CAN GET IT FROM U.S. EMBASSY IN LONDON OR STATE DEPARTMENT.

FCO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND PARIS

SIR R.BEAUMONT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.	W.E.D.
N.A.D.	DEFENCE DEPT.
ARAB DEPT.	NEWS DEPT.
E.E.S.D.	RES. DEPT. (SOVIET SECT)
U.N.D.	" " (S.E.SECT)
S.E.D.	" " (AMER SECT)
AMER DEPT.	MOD INTERNAL

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE.

Middle East

September 7, 1970

Over the weekend the Prime Minister has read a number of telegrams about the Middle East, in particular in the context of the Jordanian request for a four-Power statement on Iraqi intervention. The telegrams seen by the Prime Minister include Ukms New York to F.C.C. Nos. 1832, 1835 and 1837 of September 3, F.C.C. to Moscow No. 741 of September 3 and F.C.O. to Ukms New York 1105 of September 4.

The Prime Minister has commented:-

"If the four Powers do not agree we should carry out our own policy. The others have had bilateral talks. Why should not we? Let us get on with it.

E.H."

C. R.

I. McCluney, 'sq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

-104-

CYPHER CAT 'A'

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY CAIRO

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 961

8 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED PRIORITY TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 961 OF 8 SEPTEMBER 1970, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW, PARIS, UKHIS NEW YORK.

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. ~~2559~~, PARAGRAPH 7:
VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE.

ALTHOUGH THIS IS ACADEMIC BY NOW I AM NOT ALTOGETHER SURPRISED THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAVE BREACHED THE CEASEFIRE. IN MY VIEW, THE FOLLOWING ARE POSSIBLE GENERAL REASONS (NOT NECESSARILY IN ORDER OF PROBABILITY):

(I) THE EGYPTIANS ARE NOT ABOVE CHEATING PARTICULARLY IF THEY HOPE THEY CAN GET AWAY WITH IT.

(II) THE U.A.R. GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD CHEAT. THEY KNOW THAT THEY DID SO IN THE TWO TRuces OF 1948, AS THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS MENTIONED TO THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE.

(III) THEY HAVE SUFFERED TWICE FROM ISRAELI PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACKS (1956, 1967) AND THEY ARE NOT CONVINCED OF THE GOOD FAITH OF THE ISRAELIS AND, WHAT IS MORE IMPORTANT, THE GOOD FAITH OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THEY CLAIM THAT IN 1967 THEY HAD AMERICAN ASSURANCES AGAINST AN ISRAELI PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE WORTHLESS. NASSER HAS SAID THIS TO BRITISH VISITORS AND I HAVE HEARD SOME CORROBORATION FROM DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES WHO WERE HERE AT THE TIME.

(IV) STARTING FROM THE BOTTOM, IT IS CLEAR THAT ANY MILITARY COMMANDER WORTH HIS SALT WILL TRY TO IMPROVE THE DEFENSIVE POSITION OF HIS UNIT DURING A CEASEFIRE, PARTICULARLY IF HE KNOWS THAT THERE ARE LIKELY TO BE FURTHER BOMBARDMENTS.

2. THERE ARE VARIOUS SPECIFIC REASONS CONNECTED WITH THE INTERNAL SITUATION AS REFLECTED IN THE A.S.U. CONGRESS IN LATE JULY.

CONFIDENTIAL

/(1) A

(I) A DESIRE TO REASSURE PUBLIC OPINION AND THE ARMED FORCES THAT THE CEASE-FIRE WILL NOT BE USED TO ALLOW ISRAEL TO GAIN ADVANTAGE, AND

(II) AN ATTEMPT BY NASSER TO FULFIL HIS PUBLIC COMMITMENT THAT THE U.A.R. WILL COME OUT OF THE CEASEFIRE POLITICALLY, MILITARILY AND INTERNATIONALLY STRONGER.

3. I SUSPECT ALSO THAT HESITANCY WITH WHICH THE ISRAELI GOVT ACCEPTED THE CEASEFIRE AND THEN ONLY UNDER AMERICAN PRESSURE LED NASSER TO THE MISTAKEN BELIEF THEY WERE IN FACT DETERMINED NOT TO LET THE TALKS WITH JARRING SUCCEED. THIS THEREFORE, IN HIS EYES MADE THE RISK OF PRE-EMPTION THE GREATER.

4. IT IS NOT FOR ME TO ASSESS HOW FAR THE RUSSIANS HAVE ENCOURAGED OR CONNIVED IN THESE VIOLATIONS. I WOULD DOUBT VERY MUCH WHETHER THEY HAVE ENCOURAGED THEM, BUT MAY HAVE FELT THAT, HAVING ALREADY PUT VERY STRONG PRESSURE ON THE EGYPTIANS DURING THE MOSCOW TALKS IN JULY, THERE WAS A LIMIT TO WHICH THEY COULD NOW DISCOURAGE NASSER FROM TAKING ACTION WHICH HE REGARDED AS ESSENTIAL FOR INTERNAL PURPOSES HERE. IT IS, I SUPPOSE, CONCEIVABLE THAT THE RUSSIANS ALSO ARE CAPABLE OF MISJUDGING ISRAELI REACTIONS.

5. I AM CONVINCED HOWEVER THAT NASSER STILL DESIRES AND NEEDS A SETTLEMENT AND TO THAT EXTENT HE HAS MISCALCULATED BOTH ISRAELI REACTIONS AND, MORE IMPORTANT, AMERICAN INTENTIONS. WITH HINDSIGHT, IT IS A PITY THAT THE AMERICANS DID NOT TAKE THE STRONG HINT MADE BY THE EGYPTIANS WHEN DISCUSSING CEASEFIRE TERMS THAT THEY DID NOT WISH THE RUSSIANS TO ACT ON THEIR BEHALF IN SURVEILLANCE AND OFFER THE EGYPTIANS THE SAME KIND OF SURVEILLANCE AS THE ISRAELIS WERE GETTING.

FCO PSE PASS PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON, PARIS AND UKHIS
NEW YORK

SIR R. BEAUMONT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

H.E.D. W.E.D.
N.A.D. DEFENCE DEPT

ARABIAN DEPT NEWS DEPT

E.E.S.D. RESEARCH DEPT(SOVIET,

U.N.D. W.E. AND AMERICAN SECTIONS)

S.E.D. MOD INTERNAL

AMERICAN DEPT

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

ROUTINE U K MISSION NEW YORK

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1835

9 SEPTEMBER 1973

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 1835 OF 9 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, CAIRO, AMMAN, TEL AVIV AND SAIGON TO
BEIRUT, UKDEL NATO AND JERUSALEM.

M.I.P.T.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ISRAEL GOVERNMENT'S DECISION AS CONVEYED TO
JARRING:

ISRAEL'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE U.S. PEACE INITIATIVE ACCORDING TO
ITS DECISION OF AUGUST 4TH, 1973, AND THE APPOINTMENT OF A
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE TALKS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF AMBASSADOR JARRING
ARE STILL IN EFFECT.

THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT HAS GRAVELY VIOLATED THE CEASEFIRE-
STANDSTILL AGREEMENT, AND THIS VIOLATION IS CONTINUING WITHOUT LETUP.

THE STRICTEST OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE-STANDSTILL AGREEMENT
IS ONE OF THE CENTRAL ELEMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PEACE INITIATIVE AND
OF THE TALKS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF AMBASSADOR JARRING. THEREFORE,
SO LONG AS THE CEASEFIRE-STANDSTILL AGREEMENT IS NOT OBSERVED IN ITS
ENTIRETY, AND THE ORIGINAL SITUATION RESTORED, ISRAEL WILL NOT BE
ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THESE TALKS.

AMBASSADOR TEKOAH, WHO IS RETURNING TO HIS POST AS HEAD OF THE
PERMANENT DELEGATION OF ISRAEL AT THE U.N., HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO
BRING THIS DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO THE ATTENTION OF
AMBASSADOR JARRING.

FCO PASS PARIS, MOSCOW, CAIRO, AMMAN, TEL AVIV AND SAIGON TO
BEIRUT, UKDEL NATO AND JERUSALEM.

SIR C. CROWE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.	AMER. D.
N.A.D.	W.E.D.
ARAB D.	DEFENCE D.
E.E.S.D.	NEWS D.
U.N.D.	RES. D. (SOVIET SEC)
S.E.D.	(W.E.SEC.)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION:
ARAB /ISRAEL
DISPUTE

(AMER.SEC.)
MOD INT

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT 'A'

CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

PRIORITY CAIRO

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 975

9 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

Handwritten signature/initials

ADDRESSED PRIORITY TO FCO TELEGRAM NUMBER 975 OF 9 SEPTEMBER 1970, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW, PARIS, UKNIS NEW YORK.

GUARD

MY TEL . NO. 991 : MIDDLE EAST CEASEFIRE.

(THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN TOLD TO ME BY U.S. REPRESENTATIVE IN CAIRO ON THE ABSOLUTE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WILL NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH HIS OWN PEOPLE AND IN PARTICULAR WITH ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT AS HE HAS GIVEN HIS SOLEMN UNDERTAKING THAT IT WILL NOT BE MENTIONED TO THE ISRAELIS)

MINISTER OF GUIDANCE ASKED BERGUS TO CALL THIS MORNING AND SAID THAT HE HAD A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NASSER. THIS MESSAGE WAS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE U.A.R. GOVERNMENT WERE VERY MUCH UPSET AT THE AMERICAN ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE TERMS BY THE U.A.R. AND THAT THEY HAD NOTED THAT THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE AMERICAN MEMORANDUM HAD SERIOUS GAPS AND MIGHT NOT THEREFORE BE COMPLETELY RELIABLE. THE U.A.R. GOVERNMENT HAD ACCEPTED THE CEASEFIRE IN GOOD FAITH AND WITH THE OBJECT OF AN HONEST IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 242. THE PROOF OF THIS WAS TO BE SEEN IN THE DISARRAY INTO WHICH THE U.A.R.'S DECISION HAD THROWN THE ARAB WORLD INCLUDING MANY OF ITS FRIENDS.

/2. THE

CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

2. THE MESSAGE WENT ON THAT HAVING INTERCEPTED A MESSAGE TO THE UNIT COMMANDER WHO HAD MOVED HIS MISSILES ON 10 AUGUST TELLING HIM THAT HE SHOULD NOT HAVE DONE SO AND THAT HE SHOULD NOT DO SO AGAIN.) PRESIDENT NASSER'S MESSAGE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE U.A.R. SIDE HAD DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO CHECK THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE AMERICAN MEMORANDUM.

THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN ASSURED BY GENERAL FAWZI THAT THEY WERE INACCURATE BUT HAD NOT CONTENTED HIMSELF WITH THIS AND HAD SENT A TEAM OF INSPECTION FROM THE PRESIDENCY. IT HAD CORROBORATED GENERAL FAWZI'S ASSURANCES. THE MESSAGE SAID THAT SOME OF THE CO-ORDINATE REFERENCES GIVEN IN THE AMERICAN MEMORANDUM WERE OF DUMMY SITES WHILE AT THREE OR FOUR OTHERS THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING. (MR. HAIKAL SHOWED MR. BERGUS ON A COPY OF THE AMERICAN MEMORANDUM SOME OF THE CO-ORDINATES WHERE THERE WAS NOTHING.) THE MESSAGE FINALLY WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE HAD ADMITTEDLY BEEN SOME CONSTRUCTION WORK GOING ON BUT THAT THIS HAD BEEN ENTIRELY ON SITES THAT HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY OCCUPIED AND HAD BEEN IN PART DESTROYED. THEY WERE NOT NEW SITES AND THE U.A.R. CONSIDERED THE CONSTRUCTION WORK FELL WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF MAINTENANCE.

3. MR. BERGUS TOLD ME THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WERE PRESSING THE ISRAELIS VERY STRONGLY FOR ASSURANCES THAT THEY HAD NOT VIOLATED THE CEASEFIRE IN THE MANNER ALLEGED BY THE EGYPTIANS AND WOULD NOT VIOLATE IT. HE SAID THAT THE ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER HAD ADMITTED TO AN AMERICAN CONGRESSMAN THAT THEY HAD BEEN TARMACING ROADS IN THE STANDSTILL AREA TO MINIMISE THE DANGER OF MINING. THEY HAVE ALSO CERTAINLY BEEN OVERFLYING THE CANAL. MR. BERGUS REMARKED THAT ALTHOUGH IT COULD BE ARGUED THAT THESE WERE VERY MINOR BREACHES OF THE CEASEFIRE TERMS THEY WERE NEVERTHELESS BREACHES AND THEY MADE THE TASK OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN DEALING WITH THE EGYPTIANS THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT, PARTICULARLY THE OVERFLIGHTS, SINCE IT WAS ON GENERAL DAYAN'S INSISTENCE THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ABANDONED THE FORMULA BY WHICH EACH SIDE WOULD BE ABLE TO OVERFLY THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER FOR INSPECTION PURPOSES IN FAVOUR OF A FORMULA BY WHICH AIRCRAFT MUST STAND OFF AT LEAST TEN MILES FROM THE CANAL, WHICH THE ISRAELI AIRFORCE WERE CLEARLY NOT DOING.

CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

CAIRO TELNO. 975 TO FCO

-3-

4. I ASKED MR. BERGUS WHETHER HE HAD HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO
REPLY TO THE EGYPTIANS IN ANSWER TO THEIR REPUDIATIONS OF
THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE AMERICAN MEMORANDUM (NYTEL 951 ET SEQ).
HE SAID HE HAD NOT AND THAT THE DEMARCHE BY HAIKAL WAS
UNPROVOKED AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED. HE ADDED THAT SISCO
HAD HOWEVER SPOKEN MORE IN SCORROW THAN ANGER TO
U.A.R. REPRESENTATIVE IN WASHINGTON.

FCO PLEASE PASS PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON , PARIS AND
UKNIS NEW YORK

SIR R. BEAUMONT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

N.E.D.

N.A.D.

ARABIAN D.

E.E.S.D.

AMERICAN D.

W.E.D.

U.N.D.

DEFENCE D.

NEWS D.

RESEARCH D. (AMERICAN SECT.)
(SOVIET SECT.)
(W.E. SECT.)

EMERGENCY UNIT

CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

Copy also on. Transport
Part 3 Sept 1970

Private Secretary

c.c. Mr. Renwick
Mr. Daunt
Sir P. Adams
Mr. Gallagher
Mr. Ritchie
Mr. Hanbury-Tenison
Mr. Egerton
Mr. Tesh

* Passage deleted
& retained under
Sec. 2(+)
J.R. Green
23.6.2000

Situation in Jordan

~~*****~~ have told us on the telephone of a report ~~*****~~ It is that difficulties have arisen in the relationship between M. Rochat and the Jordanian Government and the Fedayeen (not specified, but presumably Fatah and those other than PFLP): M. Rochat is said to be refusing to agree that those people who have been released from the TWA and Swissair aircraft and are now in the hotel in Amman should now leave Jordan and the Jordanians feel that he is using the situation of the hostages to procure the release of the Israeli passengers, whom the Jordanians regard as enemy aliens. (While this report is at variance with the information in paragraph 2 of Amman telegram No. 490, it is confirmed by a message from the U.S. Embassy in Amman, of which we have been given a copy).

2. The Jordanian Prime Minister, Abdul Han'im Rifai, is seeking to overrule M. Rochat's instructions to the passengers now in the hotel and has said that if M. Rochat "continues to interfere in the internal affairs of Jordan" he may ask him to leave. B.B.C. reports that M. Rochat had procured various comforts for the passengers still on the aircraft (air-conditioning and the like) have apparently also given offence to the Jordanian Government which claims that it had itself organised this without M. Rochat's help.

3. It is difficult to assess how significant this report is in itself but it is unfortunate and even ominous that M. Rochat and the Prime Minister should be at odds in this way.

J. P. Tripp
(J. P. Tripp)

Near Eastern Department
10 September, 1970

SECRET



Peter (M)

B/R to Peter Moon on 14/9
if no reply by then to my
letters of 3rd, 4th + 7th Sept.

I have spoken to FCO.

They find it difficult to
give a useful answer in a
rapidly changing situation.

Given hijacking etc, I
decided not to press them
^{at this stage} further: although there is
a basic difference of view
between the PM + FCO.

But if the Gov^t in Jordan is
in danger of collapsing then is clearly
a new situation

CWR 1/9